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INTRODUCTION
The five hundredth anniversary of the birth of
Martin Luther was celebrated around the world with great
fanfare in A.D. 1983, and well it should have been. Luther
was a theological giant of a thinker, contributing volumes
of writings that are the center of doctrinal studies even to
our present day. But he was no mere philosopher of the
church, who idled away his time in the contemplation of
dogmatic trivia. Not only was Luther a theologian of few
peers, but also was he a devout Christian man, who dedicated
his work of prolific writing to the greater goal of enabling
the people of God to rediscover the comforting Word of the
Gospel--and this, that once terrified consciences might be
stilled by the voice of the Triune God who offers a new
beginning through His Son, to our world's races of people
traveling on a collision course with their own selfdestruction. And so it is well that the world should have
celebrated the birth of a man who fought towering obstacles
in his time, so that God's promise of peace to men on whom
God's favor rests could be heard as a herald of good news
amidst the troubling realities of daily life.
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2
Luther broke into print with his writings only
reluctantly.1 He did so, however, in order that the people
of his day would be led to and into Scriptures.2 It is not
without warrant that E. G. Schwiebert notes:
Although Luther's Postils and Catechisms played an
important role during the formative years of the
emerging Lutheran Church, they pale into insignificance
when compared with his translation of the Bible into
German. . . . It is impossible to evaluate its role in
the furthering of the Reformation, for its assistance in
spreading the Gospel to the common man was immeasurable.3
Luther would not have wanted to add to the volumes of theological writings, the reading of which served to keep men
and women from the task of fervently studying the Scriptures.4
Rather, he sought, above all else, to bring the sacred
writings into the hearts and minds of all people within his
reach. As will be seen in the survey of Luther's understanding of ratio presented in the following pages, his keen
interest in turning the human mind away from its introspective mode of thought, and toward an openness to God's
revelation of Himself in Scripture, stemmed directly from
the most crucial foundation of Luther's theology: a proper
view of man in relation to God.
'Martin Luther, D. Martin Luther's Werke (Weimar: H.
Boehlau, 1883-), 6:480. Hereafter cited as WA.
2WA 10 III, p. 176.
3Ernest G. Schwiebert, Luther and His Times: The
Reformation from a New Perspective (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1950), p. 643.
4„
The number of books on theology must be reduced
and only the best ones published. It is not many books that
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Seeing ourselves in a proper relation to God is not
an easy task. The inherent pride that we possess causes us
not always to see facts as they are, but as we would like
them to be; and for us, who live in these days of the PostEnlightenment, this problem has only become more compounded.
Our human reason has stolen the day from the fear of God
that is the beginning of wisdom. The ratio of man, which
God meant to be a special gift to mankind (distinguishing
man from the lower animal kingdom), has become instead a
curse for us. In our inner search for the peace which only
God can give, our reason stubbornly resists yielding its
place of highest honor to any superior source of truth.
Modern theological scholarship bears testimony of
our desire to render more credit to reason's capacity for
knowing the truth about God and our relation to Him than is
due it. Many biblical scholars no longer are willing to
define Scriptures as being the word of God; rather, the
sacred writings are sifted through the sieve of human reason
as an a priori guide to determining truth, with the hope
that some grain of truth will pass through the test to lead
make men learned, nor even reading. But it is a good book
frequently read, no matter how small it is, that makes a man
learned in the Scriptures and godly. Indeed, the writings
of all the holy fathers should be read only for a time so
that through them we may be led into the Scriptures. As it
is, however, we only read them these days to avoid going any
further and getting into the Bible. . . ." Martin Luther,
Luther's Works, 55 vols., gen. eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and
Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House and
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-), 44:205. Hereafter
cited as LW.
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us into a deeper relationship with God and one another.
Especially those events recorded in Scripture that do not
meet the rigors of empirical substantiation, are cast off by
reason as being mythological cloakings for an underlying
truth which can be determined only through further speculation and evaluation (for some scholars, as was the case for
Karl Barth, God reveals His truth through the written word
of God, as the latter "gives occasion" for the Word of God
to take place).5
In seeking a fitting place for ratio in the realm of
Christian proclamation, the expected extremes present themselves. Some see any use of ratio in the arena of Christian
doctrine to be an encroachment on the integrity of God's
revelation to man, and would have us to throw human reason
out of the picture altogether, with an invitation into the
province of pure mysticism. Others have no use for any
system which is in any part irrational or unreasonable (any
thought that requires an element of "faith"); hence, they
will have nothing to do with a religion that boasts of an
outside revelation that is able to approach truths not
accessible to human reason via observation and experience.
In establishing a less radical--perhaps mediating-view of the proper place of ratio within the parameters of
5See Samuel H. Nafzger, "Scripture and Word of God,"
in Studies in Lutheran Hermeneutics, ed. John Reumann, in
collaboration with Samuel H. Nafzger and Harold H. Ditmanson
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), p. 111.
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theological pursuits, one must ask some pertinent questions:
What is a "responsible" use of human reason in the systematic
formulating of dogma within God's Church? What is reason's
proper relationship to revelation? What relationship does
reason bear to the interpretation of Scripture? To what effect does the employment of reason in making defense of the
truth claims of the Christian faith work, both inside and
outside the circle of the Christian church? What is reason's
competence since the Fall of man, to discern truths which lie
beyond the empirical evidence of the world?
Martin Luther must have wrestled with the same kinds
of questions in arriving at his own conclusions concerning
the proper place of ratio in Biblical theology. The following pages will present the Reformer's understanding on this
crucial issue. That investigation will be conducted on the
basis of three primary writings: The Lectures on Galatians
(1519) [also referred to in this thesis as the "Galatians
Commentary (1519)"], On the Bondage of the Will [also called,
simply, "Bondage of the Will" in these pages], and The Disputation Concerning Man [also referred to simply as the
"Disputation"].
The survey concerning Luther's understanding of the
use of reason in theology will be presented in what this
writer believes to be a very logical order. Chapter One
will present the ideas on the subject, as developed by extremely significant forerunners of Luther, which helped give
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shape to the prevalent attitude toward theological method in
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Chapter Two will present Luther's own educational background, and a section
lending historical information concerning the three primary
works under consideration in this thesis, with attention
given to their context within Luther's career. Chapter Three
will outline Luther's views of man's ratio, especially since
the Fall in Eden. In that chapter, special importance will
be placed upon the Reformer's concept of reason's competence,
and incompetence, to know that which is 'true.' Chapter Four
shall survey Luther's ideas concerning the proper place of
reason as regards the interpretation of Sacred Scriptures.
Chapter Five will then give attention to his position on the
employment of ratio within the field of applied theology.
The final chapter will offer a brief summary and conclusion,
as well as presenting some questions for further investigation.
Through the research and study required for the preparation of the discussion which follows, this writer has come
to heed the warnings of those historians and dogmaticians who
have turned their immense energy and skill to the field of
Luther scholarship. It is dangerous, at best, to present
rash hypotheses concerning where one thinks Luther would take
his stand today, in the midst of the thoroughgoing debates
concerning the proper place of reason in theological studies.
The purpose of this thesis is not to speculate regarding
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where this writer thinks Luther would stand today in the
midst of the battles fought to give ratio its proper place
in Christian theology. Instead, this writer finds merit in
the practices of the Augustinian scholars of Luther's day,
allowing an author's writings to speak for themselves when
presenting another's point of view on a given subject.6
That shall be the attempt of the following pages: to permit
the primary sources themselves the opportunity to speak out
on the topic of Luther's concept of the proper use of reason
in knowing truths about God, and man's relationship to Him.
6This practice of late medieval Augustinian scholarship is discussed on page 259 of David C. Steinmetz, "Luther
and the Late Medieval Augustinians: Another Look," Concordia
Theological Monthly, September 1973, pp. 245-260. Note how
Carlstadt, Luther and Staupitz relate to Augustine.

CHAPTER I
PRELUDE TO LUTHER'S THOUGHT
John Donne (ca. 1571-1631) perceptively wrote, "No
man is an Iland, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of
the Continent, a part of the maine; . . ."1 Curiously, the
words of that esteemed author are as appropriately quoted in
a thesis discussing the theology of Luther, as in a manuscript detailing the most famous passages in English literature. Whether consciously or unconsciously, theologians
are no less affected by their cultural and philosophical
environment than are other scholars. While the theologian
may have an advantage over others in possessing a timeless
2
norm of objective truth--the sacred Scriptures, which are
3
the very center of concern for the study of theology --he
1John Donne, "Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions: 17.
MEDITATION," in The Complete Poetry and Selected Prose of
John Donne, The Modern Library, vol. 12, ed. James H.
Dempsey, with an introduction by Charles M. Coffin (New York:
Random House, 1952), p. 441.
2The difficult problem that confronts the student of
theology includes also the understanding that the timeless
truths of Scripture are couched in human language that is
itself historically conditioned by the distinctive eras in
which these writings were penned.
3This is the definition for the study of theology, as
given by Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 4 vols. (St.
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), 1:3; however, as
8
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is, nonetheless, conditioned by the setting and persons of
his day to think and to inquire in a manner consistent with
his distinctive historical time.
If the premise is correct, that each person's
thought and mode of inquiry are molded, not only by one's
present environment, but also by especially important forerunners who contributed shape and substance to the process
of cultural development, then Luther, too, owes a certain
amount of credit to his predecessors for the fruition of his
4
own contributions to theological insight.
In this light,
those who would seek to gain the firmest grasp of Luther's
thought become obligated to determine to what extent previous contributors to the field of theology affected his
ideas. This is a formidable task. Not only are we presented
with the huge problem of determining which forerunners should
be credited with being of major significance toward the
development of Luther's thought, but also are we confronted
with the unsolvable puzzle of trying to determine to what
extent those individuals influenced his thinking. Both of
those endeavors carry with them the grave dangers of subjecis noted even in this reference, there is no concensus of
agreement regarding the centrality of Scriptures in theology,
especially concerning the view that Scripture is word of
God, and the sole source and standard of truth in this field
of study.
4Perhaps another premise which is being assumed as a
"given," is that one holds a linear view of history, which
has a definite beginning and which is progressing toward an
imminent end.
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tivity's clouding the distinction between fact and speculation.
Throughout this thesis, this writer shall not even
attempt to solve the latter problem--that of trying to determine to what extent Luther's predecessors influenced his
thinking. That is an impossible task, one which could be
resolved only by a personal conversation with Luther himself.
Only the former question of ascertaining the most predominant
forerunners of Luther's ideology will be confronted, by giving a brief survey of some of the important theologians who
preceded him.
Naturally, space here does not permit a thorough
review of the history of theology from the time of the New
Testament era to the sixteenth century, nor is that the focus
of this thesis. Instead, we shall have to be very selective
in choosing such pre-eminent individuals who made the greatest impact upon theological studies to the time of Luther.
The most distinctive criterion for determining which of Luther's forerunners to include in this survey, is the determination of how pivotal to the study of theology were their
views concerning the use of ratio in the pursuit of theological truths; admittedly, even this kind of standard is subjective to a fault. Nevertheless, such selections have here
been made on the basis of their pertinence to a survey of
Luther's understanding of ratio's relationship to theological
inquiry. They are: Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas,
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William of Ockham, and Gabriel Biel.
Augustine of Hippos
From Philosophy to Christianity
Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-430) profoundly
impacted the theology of the Christian church through his
writings and teaching, certainly no less than has Luther.
Augustine's early life can best be characterized as a
fervent search for truth. His mother, Monica, was a Christian; but it was not until he heard the Bishop of Milan,
Saint Ambrose (340-397), proclaiming Christianity from the
Scriptures in his preaching, that Augustine was to receive
the Christian faith as his own. In illustrating the importance of the influence which Ambrose apparently had on
Augustine, Peter Brown cites one account:
'When my mother followed me to Milan', he once told a
correspondent, 'she found the church there not fasting
on Saturdays. She began to be troubled, and to hesitate
as to what she should do: upon which I, though not taking
a personal interest in such things, applied on her behalf
to Ambrose for his advice. He answered me that "he could
only teach me to do what he himself did, for, if he knew
of any better rule, he would have observed it." I had
thought that he was intending just to tell us to give up
fasting on Saturdays merely by an appeal to authority,
without giving any reason (and, evidently, Augustine had
turned away, feeling snubbed). . . . But he followed
after me, and said "When I go to Rome, I also fast on
Saturday: when here, I do not. If you go to any church,
observe the local custom. . . ." As for me, on fre5Significant
.
sources for this section are: Peter
Brown, Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967; also in paperback edition by the same
publisher, 1969); and Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought: St.
Augustine to Ockham (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1959).
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quently thinking back on this statement I have always
treated it as if it were an oracle from heaven.'6
Augustine's conversion to Christianity climaxed his
diligent search for truth. That quest had led him to
consider the philosophies of Manichaeism, scepticism, and
Neoplatonism;7 and this width of experience could easily
have lent contour to his theological contributions. Gordon
Leff gives substantiation to this theory, by outlining how
Augustine's interaction with those philosophical systems may
6Epistolae 54, ii, 3, quoted in Augustine, p. 87;
Brown cites that Augustine's first contact with Ambrose took
place in Milan, in 384; see also Augustine, p. 79. The full
significance that Ambrose's preaching and argumentation had
for Augustine is well expressed by St. Augustine himself in
Confessions 5. 14. In that reference to Confessions, Augustine reveals a heightening of his doubting of the philosophy
of the Manichees, and his entrance into a time of indecision
and scepticism. It is at this time that his mother comes to
Milan to help Augustine in his search, in 385. Augustine
was baptized by Ambrose in 387.
7
Manichaeism originated with the philosopher, Mani,
in the third century A.D. Its basic tenets were to uphold a
dualistic theory of the existence of two ultimate principles,
a good principle, that of light, God or Ormuzd, and an evil
principle, that of darkness, Ahriman. These principles are
both eternal and their strife is eternal, a strife reflected
in the world which was produced by the two principles in
conflict with each other. Evil was of such strength as to
limit God's dominion, and against which God struggled. Manichaeism was characterized by a strict, ascetic code of ethics,
which sometimes produced the opposite response--libertinism
--among its adherents. Compare Bengt Haegglund, History of
Theology, trans. Gene J. Lund (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1968), p. 115; and Frederick Copleston, A History
of Philosophy, vol. 2, part 1: Mediaeval Philosophy: Augustine to Bonaventure (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press,
1959; Image Books, 1962), p. 56.
Neoplatonism proceeded from Plato's idea that there was
an ultimate reality of pure unchanging forms or Ideas, and
that the world was a pale reflection of these perfect forms.
The forms or Ideas existed in their own right and their

13
well have directed his line of inquiry when seeking to
defend and strengthen the Christian faith:
From the Manicheans he had had confirmation of his own
inclination to follow evil ways; and sin remained ever
one of his deepest preoccupations. As a Christian he
subsequently devoted much attention to its nature and
cause, for which he was able to reach a solution. Scepticism, whereby he lacked any certitude, remains apparent in his distrust of all sensory and material knowledge
and the realization that true faith comes only through
inner conviction, independently of all external phenomena. Such a position ultimately buttressed his Christian belief that all truth was spiritual. Neoplatonism,
the third stream in St [sic] Augustine's thought, was by
far the most influential: it provided him with a cosmology, a pattern of the universe by which he was able to
judge the relationship of the spiritual and the eternal
to the material and the temporal. It was from Neoplatonism that St Augustine held that the truth was immaterial, residing in forms of Ideas (rationes) which
derived from God; that God contained in Himself these
immaterial archetypes of all things; that to know the
truth is to know God, even though not directly; that only
the soul, as a spiritual being, can attain to truth which
is itself immaterial; that there is a distinction between
such intelligible knowledge, alone the path to truth, and
sensible knowledge which is dependent upon mutable things;
that the soul can only reach the truth by dissociating
itself from the sensible; that all being, as coming from
God, is in itself good; that evil is negative, a privation
of being; that everything material derives from seminal
first principle was the Good, the source of all other forms
and the means by which they were known. The Neoplatonists
translated Plato's ultimate Good into the One, the principle
of all existence. From the One's self-knowledge emanated
the first Intelligence, the Logos, containing the immaterial
Ideas of all beings. The Logos in turn gave rise to a second
Intelligence, the World Soul, from which the individual intelligences derived. A hierarchy was developed from intelligence to intelligence, until the moon and sub-lunar world
was reached. The human soul was last in the hierarchy of
spiritual beings. This very concise explanation of Neoplatonism is found in Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought, pp. 13-15.
Scepticism distrusted any knowledge as certain, especially knowledge derived from the material world, experience,
or sensual perception.
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forms latent in matter, including those things yet to
appear.8
Anthropology and Reason
Though Christianity became the highest truth for
Augustine, his conception of man seems to bear resemblance
to Neoplatonic thought. Man, says Augustine, is made of three
things: (1) a body; (2) the kind of life that makes the body
live and grow; and (3) "a head or eye of our soul, as it
were, or whatever term can be more aptly applied to our
reason and understanding." It is man's reason [ratio] that
sets him apart from the animal kingdom, and is man's most
noble gift.9
Reason, for Augustine, is not merely common sense;
rather, reason bears a sharp contrast to it. He contends
that reason makes judgments differently than does common
sense:
Reason judges by the light of truth so that, by right
judgment, it subordinates lesser things to the more
important ones. Common sense, on the other hand,
inclines toward the habit of convenience, so that it puts
a higher value on those things that truth proves to be of
lesser value. While reason places celestial bodies far
over terrestrial ones, what carnal man would not prefer
that the stars be missing from the sky, rather than a
single bush from his field, or a cow from his herd?10
8Medieval Thought, pp. 34-35.
9Saint Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, The
Library of Liberal Arts, trans. Anna S. Benjamin and L. H.
Hackstaff, with an introduction by L. H. Hackstaff (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964), 2. 6. 53. pp. 48-49.
10Ibid., 3. 5. 61. p. 100.
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In Augustine's thought, reason is the highest and
most excellent faculty of created man. A man's body, bodily
senses, and the "inner sense" are under reason's judgments.
But since even reason is inferior to God, and because of the
11
consequences of sin, reason has been shown to be mutable.
Augustine therefore distinguishes between mutant reason and
that reason which continues to be man's norm for what is
good--a reason which can never be used for evil. This
latter kind of reason he calls recta ratio, "right reason."
Right reason is the ultimate standard [though always subordinate to God], giving definition to all other virtues of
man, for example, wisdom, courage, or temperence.12
According to writings of Augustine, reason's role is
to keep the vicious elements of man's activities in check,
as reason points man instead to do the truly virtuous that
has been ordained by God. And yet, because of his corruption
in sin, man's soul and reason do not always serve God as God
himself has commanded that he should be served; rather, they
become used to a person's self-serving interests and produce
vices rather than virtues.13
Predominance of Revelation
It becomes clear through the reading of Augustine,
that he held to the idea that an immutable truth exists
12Ibid., 2. 18. 190.
11Ibid., 2. 6. 53-56.
13The City of God, 19. 25.
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apart from, and outside of, man.14

This seems a strong

foundation for Augustine's tenet that faith precedes understanding; classically, this doctrine has come to be expressed
by the formula, "I believe in order that I may understand"
(credo ut intelligam).15 A confidence that God enlightens
human reason, and that belief [faith] supersedes the knowledge that can be known through reason alone, is expressed
by Augustine, who says to his student, Evodius, in On Free
Choice of the Will:
. . . For God will aid us and will make us understand
what we believe. This is the course prescribed by the
prophet who says, "Unless you believe, you shall not
understand," and we are aware that we consider this
course good for us.16
Knowledge Leads to God
The connection of God with understanding is of central
importance for Augustine. For him, the only knowledge worth
having is that of God and self; all other knowledge has value
only as it contributes to the knowledge of God, and all proper
14On Free Choice, 2. 12. 130.
15See Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the
Middle Ages (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), p. 19,
where Gilson cites Augustine, On the Gospel of Saint John,
29. 6.: "Understanding is the reward of faith. Therefore seek
not to understand that thou mayest believe, but believe that
thou mayest understand." The English translation of this
passage is by H. Browne and J. H. Parker, A Library of
Fathers, (Oxford, 1848), vol. 1, p. 440. Gilson notes that
the actual formula, credo ut intelligam, was coined by Anselm
of Canterbury (1033-1109); see Reason and Revelation, p. 24.
16On Free Choice, 1. 2. 11., as translated by Anna
Benjamin and L. H. Hackstaff, p. 5; Cf. Is. 7:9, LXX.
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knowledge should lead one closer to an understanding of God.
Saint Augustine's background in philosophical thought
surfaces also in the area of apologetics [giving defense of
the truth claims of the Christian faith]. Here reason proves
a useful tool for demonstrating that Christianity's basic
dogma is to some degree palatable to human reason. While
perhaps not as elaborate as later Thomistic proofs for the
existence of God, Augustine proposes such a proof beginning
from an understanding of reason itself. Proceeding from the
premise that "this is God to which nothing is granted to be
superior," Augustine's proof progresses along a clearly
defined line of argumentation: (1) anything superior to reason
is its God; (2) reason is the greatest attribute of man;
(3) each man has his own reason, and can understand that
which another does not; (4) truths and objects exist, which
can be experienced by many at the same time, though the
17
objects or truths remain unchanged by the perceivers.
Simplistic as this proof may be by scholastic standards, it
does show that for Augustine, ratio did own a proper place
in theological discussion and the search for truth.
Thomas Aquinas
Assimilation of Aristotle
Saint Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1224/25-1274) was one of
the brightest lights to illumine the age of "High Scholas17On Free Choice, 2. 7.
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ticism."18

Aquinas became the pupil of the German Dominicans

with Saint Albert in Cologne from 1248 to 1252, where the
latter was to establish an institution of studies for the
Dominican order.19 The relationship between Albert and
Thomas is a significant one; for as David Knowles notes,
” • . . in the first half of the thirteenth century, there
was a gradual assimilation of Aristotle [into the field of
theology] which became complete and programmatic with Albert
the Great and his pupil Aquinas

•

,20 Here is an instance

•

where the student grew to greater stature than his master;
although Albert had done much to bring Aristotelian philosophy to bear upon the study of theology, it is Thomas who was
crowned prince of the Scholastics through his further inte18The term is employed here in the same sense as used
by Bengt Haegglund, to describe the apex of the scholastic
age in the thirteenth century; see History of Theology, p.
177. That author provides a general definition of scholasticism on p. 163 of that work: ". . . scholasticism refers to
the theology which took form in the Western universities beginning in the middle of the 11th century, reached its culmination in the 13th century, deteriorated in the late Middle
Ages, and was finally destroyed by humanism and the Reformation." Scholasticism may be defined briefly as the application of reason to revelation.
19Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol.
2, part 2: Mediaeval Philosophy: Albert the Great to Duns
Scotus (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1959, Image
Books, 1962), pp. 20-21.
2°David Knowles, "The Middle Ages 604-1350," in A
History of Christian Doctrine, In Succession to the Earlier
Work of G. P. Fisher, published in the International Theological Library Series, ed. Hubert Cunliffe-Jones, assisted
by Benjamin Drewery (Scotland: T. T. Clark, 1978; Fortress
Press, 1980), p. 269.
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grating the thoughts of Aristotle into the Christian ideology.21
Limitations of Ratio
Aristotelianism had already made its way into theology by the time Aquinas had turned his attention toward the
integration he sought to achieve. Perhaps Thomas has been
more unfairly attacked by post-Reformation theologians than
he deserves, for the role he played in the wedding of philosophy with theology. Thomas noted the limitations of ratio in
21Cf. David Knowles, "Middle Ages," p. 271; in
Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology, 1968 ed.,
s.v. "Aristotelianism: I. The Philosophy of Aristotle,"
Max Mueller indicates two great achievements of Aristotle:
(1) he transformed the speculative idealism of Plato into a
speculative realism, holding, with Plato, that the universal
and the spiritual which transcends the particulars of time
and space is on a higher plane of being and value than the
sensible; but diverging from Plato in submitting that the
spiritual has no reality of its own, but is real only when
it has entered beings as a principle and is sustained by
those beings; and (2) Aristotle provided the transition from
the oneness of philosophy to a multiplicity of philosophical
disciplines, giving separate treatment to movement in general
(physics), vital movement on the human and infra-human level
(psychology and philosophy of biological life), pure thought
(Organon, logic), art (the Poetica) and social life (politics
and ethics).
Aristotle's philosophy came under attack in the 13th
century, because of its inconsistency with the Christian
faith. Mueller's article in Sacramentum Mundi notes, ". . .
Aristotle's philosophy does not allow for a God who is really
superior or transcendent to the world; hence there is in it
no creator of the world. The world is eternal, and in its
perpetual movement tends towards the centre [sic] of its
movement which as such is the divine, blessed and self-sufficient life and movement of the spirit." Because of Aristotle's views concerning the spiritual, his system required
major adaptations in order to find a place in Christian
theology--a place which Thomas sought to determine.
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seeking to discover truths about God that can be known only
through revelation. Aquinas defined a "twofold truth of divine things," though he did so in a way contradictive to the
system of Averroes (1126-1198) before him.22 Thomas divided
revealed truth into two groups: (1) that which is attainable
by human reason, such as the truths that God exists, that He
is one, and the like; and (2) that which surpasses human
22As Etienne Gilson submits in Reason and Revelation,
pp. 39-53, if anyone is to be blamed for bringing Aristotelianism into the fore of theological discussion, to the detriment of the latter system, it ought be the Arabian philosopher, Averroes, rather than Thomas Aquinas. Averroes held
that absolute truth was not to be found in any kind of Revelation, but in the writings of Aristotle; and yet, Averroes
took great measures not to burn his theological bridges, as
he tried to arrive at some meaning of "truth" that would
convince the theologians of his day that some sort of agreement between religious faith and philosophical reason was
not impossible.
Averroes held to Aristotle's distinction between three
main classes of arguments: the rhetorical, the dialectical,
and the necessary ones, and proposed that all men be distributed among three corresponding classes: those apt to be
persuaded by clever speech only, those more open to dialectical probabilities, and those satisfied only by the necessary demonstrations of the mathematicians and of the metaphysicians. Averroes thought that theologians might reach
as high as the second class of people, at best; the third
class was made up of the elite--the philosophers--who possessed such a superior kind of truth, that they did best to
keep such truth to themselves, lest they risk unnecessary
confusion of the more common people.
The conclusions derived purely from philosophical reasoning are bound to be at variance with truths about God, known
to man only through Revelation. Therefore, the followers of
Averroes devised a scheme of "twofold truth," asserting that
philosophical conclusions which differed from the teaching of
Revelation should be held as necessary results of philosophical speculation, but, as Christians, they should believe
that what Revelation says on such matters is true. In this
way, they supposed, no contradictions would ever arise
between philosophy and theology, or between Revelation and
reason [see Gilson, Reason and Revelation, p. 57]. Aquinas
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reason, as does the truth that God is triune.23
Faith and Reason
Because of human reason's lack of ability to know
things about God that have not been revealed to it, Aquinas
came to assert that it is faith, not reason, that must be
the guiding principle of theological inquiry. Thomas asserts
that the investigation of the human reason for the most part
has falsity present within it, due partly to the weakness of
our intellect in judgment, and partly to the admixture of
images.24 It is the Fall into sin that has impaired reason's
ability to know the truth. Says Thomas:
. . . there was a tine when original justice enabled
reason to have complete control over the powers of the
soul, and when reason itself was subject to God and made
perfect by him. But original justice was lost through
the sin of our first parent . . . .25
Because human reason has thus been devalued through
the Fall, it stands inferior to divine truth in the order of
certitude. Therefore, faith must be a more reliable guide
discredited this view of "twofold" truth. Gilson summarizes
Aquinas's critique of that view thus: ". . . To say that the
conclusions of Averroes were rationally necessary, but not
necessarily true, was to empty the word 'truth' of all meaning" [Gilson, p. 80].
23
Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I. 3.
[This work will hereafter be abbreviated "SCG".]; cf. SCG,
I. 9.
24Ibid., I. 4.
25Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-2ae,
q. 85, a. 3. [This work will hereafter be abbreviated "ST".]
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toward true knowledge than is man's intellect, since faith
relies upon divine truth for what it ascertains, whereas
intellectual powers rely on human reason. To be sure,
Aquinas realized that truths perceived through senses and
observation do appear, on one level at least, to be more certain than those attained through faith; however, he maintained that the certainty of a given truth is weighed more
carefully on the basis of the source of the truth, and it was
apparent to Thomas that truth derived from the word of God,
on which faith relies, is far more trustworthy than are
axioms based on the natural light of reason.26
Philosophy and Theology
In a vein similar to that of Augustine, Aquinas posited that all true knowledge will lead ultimately to God,
inasmuch as it is God who moves the intellect to act.27
Philosophy, then, invariably plays a role subordinate to
theology, as the primary source of truth in the latter is
derived from God himself. Gilson seems correct in assessing
the Thomistic view concerning the proper balance of faith
and reason thus:
To any sincere believer who is at the same time a true
philosopher, the slightest opposition between his faith
26ST, II-2ae, q.4, a.8.
27ST, I-2ae, q.109, a.l.
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and his reason is a sure sign that something is the
matter with his philosophy .28
In matters that could be more clearly illumined and
defined through the use of reason, Thomas became the philosopher par excellence; but the truths of faith, as revealed
by the word of God, which were found to be in apparent contradiction with the assertions of philosophy, were to retain
their paramount place of distinction as the ruling norm for
what is held to be true. This is the careful balance between
faith and reason that Aquinas sought to contribute to the pursuit of the study of theology in his generation, and into the
present century.
William of Ockham
Toward a Proper Use of Aristotle
The union between Aristotelian philosophy and theology that Thomas tried to consummate was not to meet with immediate acceptance; during his own lifetime, and in the period
that followed, the jury was still out as to whether he had
been successful in his endeavor.29 Still today, many wonder
28Gilson, Reason and Revelation, p. 83.
29See Knowles, "Middle Ages," pp. 280-281; Later in
the same essay (p. 286), Knowles cites two primary reasons
for the decline of medieval thought, which were not aimed at
Aquinas's views per se, but against the general rise of
Aristotelianism within the study of theology. The first
reason for such reaction was the ascent of a new technique
of criticism, which was based on logic: the disputation. The
second was a growing attitude of dissatisfaction with the
pursuit toward abstract truth that characterized Aristotelian
logic and epistemology. Medieval argumentation had developed
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if Aquinas had really synthesized the philosophy of Aristotle
completely enough, so that it might truly find an appropriate
place in theological discourse.
It should not surprise us, then, that notable opposition to the use of Aristotelian presuppositions in theological
inquiry should arise in the thirteenth century itself. This
antithesis to Thomas's proposed solution to the "philosophical truth" versus "theological truth" debate was given further expression in the fourteenth century by William of
Ockham (ca. 1285-ca. 1349).
The approach of Thomistic scholasticism to the relationship between theology and philosophy, has been given the
designation "via antiqua". Ockham cannot properly be listed
among the proponents of the via antiqua; rather, he exemplifies the argumentation of those who helped give rise to the
via moderna, the movement that was to give new definition to
the relationship between philosophy and theology. But the
term "via moderna" may be something of a misnomer. It was
not the claim of Ockham and his followers [who came to be
known as "Ockhamists," or "nominalists") that they had invented a new way of knowing truths about man's existence;
rather, it is more proper to say that the proponents of what
into long chains of syllogisms that could be negated by the
smallest infractions in one of the propositions. The trend
had moved toward losing touch with the real world and its
people, and with the living Christ of the gospel. The fourteenth century theologians sought to correct this situation,
initiating the decline of scholasticism.
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is called the via moderna believed they had rediscovered a
more correct understanding of Aristotle than had been true
of their Thomistic predecessors.30
It is Moody's contention that Ockham's goal was to
go back to a more pure Aristotelianism, away from the distortions brought into it by the Augustinian tradition and from
the Arab commentators. This stance often pitted Ockham
against even the moderni, such as Duns Scotus (ca. 1265-ca.
1308); in fact, he criticized Scotus more directly than
Aquinas, who, in philosophy, was less affected by Augustinian
presuppositions.31
Idealism Versus Realism
If the proposition is true, that a key feature of
Aristotle's philosophy was the transformation of Plato's
speculative idealism into a speculative realism, then Moody's
assessment of Ockham's approach to epistemology and ontology
is indeed correct.32 Ockham represents a change of emphasis
in philosophical inquiry in medieval thought, that moves away
from speculation of the abstract and toward careful definition of realities that can be known to exist through the
cognitive powers of man's reason, as guided by empiricism.
30Ernest A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham
(New York: Russell Russell, 1965), p. 17; cf. Haegglund,
p. 212.
31Ibid., p. 8.
32Cf. page 19, n. 21, above.
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This is evidenced by the respective weight that Ockham gives
to the certitude of conclusions derived from "intuitive cognition" and "abstractive cognition." Intuitive cognition
here means that which can be known through man's sense experience in such a way that the intellect immediately judges
that the thing exists and evidently knows that it exists;
this kind of knowledge is of real entities, not of abstractive or universal ideas. But it cannot be said of Ockham
that he posited the extreme thesis of those who would later
be designated as "Ockhamists" or "nominalists," who emphatically declared that universals, which could not be empirically perceived, simply did not exist. Ockham maintained
that things which can be known may be known either intuitively or abstractively; abstractive cognition, in contrast
to intuitive cognition, deals with things that probably exist,
but which cannot be known through empirical evidence.33
Restrictions on Reason in Theology
Because of the clear distinction which he makes
between intuitive and abstractive knowledge, Ockham sharpens
the delimitation between truths derived through philosophy
and theology. A limit is placed on what can be known via
man's reason. Man can know with certitude only those things
which he can observe and describe through his experience
33
Ockham, Philosophical Writings, a selection edited
and translated by Philotheus Boehner (New York: Thomas
Nelson Sons, 1962), pp. 23-24.
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[This criterion for determining certain truth was to earn
the designation as "Ockham's razor."]; any knowledge of God
and His nature is contingent on the divine will, and is not
philosophically demonstrable.34 Thus, Ockham restricted
reason's role in theology to elucidating the meaning and the
implications of revealed truth, while contending that theological truths were, at most, probable.35 Gordon Leff's
description of the contrast between fourteenth century theological methodology with that of previous scholastic methodology can aptly be applied to Ockham:
Where before many theological propositions, held on
faith, had been treated as conclusions to be reached by
reason, in the fourteenth century they tended increasingly to become premises, held only on faith, from which
further conclusions could be drawn. Thus, reason could
not display the certainty or often even the probability
of revelation, merely the implications which could be
shown to follow from its articles.36
Reasoning That Involves Language
In the arena of theological discourse, Ockham's
concern is with logic, rather than with speculation; and
Copleston's assertion seems correct, that the logic of the
34Cf. Ibid., p. 103; also Frederick Copleston, A
History of Medieval Philosophy, (New York: Harper Row,
Pubilishers, 1972; Harper Torchbook, 1974), p. 238.
35This view of Ockham's view of reason in theology
is upheld in Gordon Leff, The Dissolution of the Medieval
Outlook: An Essay on Intellectual and Spiritual Change in the
Fourteenth Century (New York: New York University Press,
1976), p. 16.
36Ibid., p. 17.

28
fourteenth century was "reasoning that involves language,"
whereby all terms in a proposition must be carefully defined.
With the greater emphasis placed on logic, paradoxes became
more prominent in the theology of the fourteenth century, as
did apparently insoluable statements, such as the declaration
"What I am saying is false," if that phrase is the only
utterance offered.37 On this basis, it does not seem tenable
to suggest that Ockham abandoned altogether the use of ratio
in theological discussion. It would be more appropriate to
say that Ockham distrusted ratio's ability to determine the
'trueness' of divine revelations of faith, inasmuch as he
contended that the only 'necessary' being is God; and He is
such that by His 'absolute' power He can do anything which
does not involve a contradiction to His essence, even if it
does involve a contradiction to man's logic.38 Insofar as
man's ratio is involved in the process of "reasoning that
involves language" that was the discipline of fourteenth
century logic, human reason does find an important place in
Ockham's theology.
'Right Reason' and Ethics
A further use of reason is significant for Ockham,
namely, the employment of 'right reason' in the realm of a
37See Copleston, History of Medieval Philosophy, pp.
234-235.
38See Ibid., p. 253.
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'rational ethic.' This position is well presented by
Copleston, who states Ockham's position that since God has
created man in such a way that certain acts are harmful to
human nature and to human society, man can engage the dictates of his God-given 'right reason' to determine proper
39 This view of
behavior and directives for human conduct.
'right reason' appears strikingly similar to that of Saint
Augustine [see pages 14-15 above].
Gilson renders an apt summation of Ockham's place of
importance in the pursuit of theological truth throughout
subsequent generations of scholars:
The influence of Ockham is everywhere present in the
fourteenth century; it progressively invaded Oxford,
Paris, and practically all the European universities.
Some would profess it, others would refute it, but nobody
was allowed to ignore it. The late Middle Ages were then
called upon to witness the total wreck of both scholastic
philosophy and scholastic theology as the necessary 40
upshot of the final divorce of reason and Revelation.
Gabriel Biel41
The Age of Eclecticism
Gilson [as quoted above] appears not to have overstated the impact that Ockham's nominalism was to have on
the theological studies of successive generations. But to
this writer it seems that he rather exaggerates the extent
of the cleavage between reason and Revelation that would take
39Ibid., pp. 253-255.
4
40Gilson, pp. 87-88.
41The significant source for this discussion of Biel
is Heiko Augustinus Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology:
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place in the late Middle Ages. Rather than to suggest that
a "final divorce" between reason and Revelation actually took
place, one might more correctly propose that merely a trial
separation was pursued--and this not advocated by all scholars
of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The opinion that
especially the fifteenth century can be characterized by
eclecticism seems correct, if one makes this judgment on the
basis of a survey of important theologians of that age. An
essay by Gordon Rupp suggests that Nominalists and Realists
were at that time being affected by cross-currents of Augustinianism, Platonic thought or by mystical religion. Rupp
bestows upon this age the designation of 'Unklarheit'-absence of definition.42
The theology of Gabriel Biel (ca. 1420-1495) may well
show the markings of eclecticism. While succeeding, through
his important association with the University of Tuebingen,
in bringing the via moderna to a place of pre-eminence,43
Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Durham, North
Carolina: Labyrinth Press, 1983). This resource was helpful
not only in its relating Oberman's astute presentation of
Biel's theology, but also in its extensive inclusion of
quotations from Biel's own writings, found throughout
Oberman's work.
42E. Gordon Rupp, "Christian Doctrine from 1350 to
the Eve of the Reformation," in A History of Christian Doctrine, In Succession to the Earlier Work of G. P. Fisher,
published in the International Theological Library Series,
ed. Hubert Cunliffe-Jones, assisted by Benjamin Drewery
(Scotland: T. T. Clark, 1978; Fortress Press, 1980), p.
300.
43Cf. Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 17.
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Biel appears not to have followed consistently the methodology of the Nominalistic school that he came to represent.
Whereas he follows the principle (held, on the whole, by
nominalists of his day) that Scripture is the sole authority
and only reliable guide in matters of faith, Biel remained
strongly papalistic.44 His position on the doctrine of the
Immaculate Conception exemplifies this inconsistency; for
Biel takes as his foundation (in contrast to the principle of
Scripture as sole authority in matters of faith) the formulation established by the tradition and decision of the Church.45
De Potentia Absoluta and Ordinata
Heiko Oberman argues the case persuasively, that in
seeking to understand the theology of Biel, one must recognize the significance of the distinction between de potentia
absoluta and de potentia ordinata; for, according to Oberman,
these terms appear at all the decisive junctures of Biel's
theology.46 Truths that can be known with certainty through
human reason are those which can be demonstrated or per44Cf. Haegglund, History of Theology, p. 199; Ernest
G. Schwiebert, Luther and His Times: The Reformation from a
New Perspective (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1950), p. 156; also Rupp, "Christian Doctrine from 1350," p.
301. As Schwiebert points out, however, this inconsistency
is to be found in many of the nominalistic theologians of
that era. Therefore, it cannot be said that Biel demonstrates an inconsistency that is peculiar only to him.
45Biel, III Sent. d 3, q 1, art. 2 G, as quoted by
Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 295.
46Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 53.
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ceived by experience and observation. This is knowledge
according to de potentia ordinata. In this realm, man perceives things as they are ordinarily found in nature. But
this kind of knowledge cannot comprehend truths that lie
beyond the realm of experience and observation; and such
truths as transcend the empirical do exist, as the Creator
is able to act also according to de potentia absoluta. God
is limited in His work only by what is consistent with His
own nature. As an example, the miracles can be explained as
potentia absoluta; God's acts are not contingent on any powers
higher than His own will, and for this reason He can act
in ways which the human reason could not have predicted.47
Agreement With Ockham
Biel's distinction between potentia absoluta and
ordinata seems remarkably congruent with that proposed by
William of Ockham [see page 28 above]. In point of fact,
Biel's thought follows rather consistently the salient
features of Ockham's assessment of the relationship between
theology and philosophy, and of the role that human reason
properly may occupy within the parameters which he established for that relationship. Biel holds, with Ockham, a
confidence in the undisturbed connection between objects and
thought, thought and reality; a rejection of the concept that
universals coincide with individual things or with common na47Ibid., pp. 38-39; cf. Ibid. p. 61.
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ture; the assertion that faith is a much more reliable form
of knowledge than so-called scientific knowledge can be, by
virtue of its having God as its object, who is more infallible than any human object or inquiry can be; the position
that human reason is of no avail in the realm of faith, but
that in matters of this world, human reason should be employed
to its fullest extent; the idea that once within the circle
of faith, it is possible for at least part of the articles
of faith to present certain probabilities by deductive reasoning; that unassisted reason can know of such things as
God's existence, but nothing of His nature and essence; and
that man's intellect knows by nature the difference between
good and bad, and that good deeds have to be performed out
of an innate love for virtue.48
Reassessment of Philosophy and Theology
The last point in the above listing of similarities
in the thought of Gabriel Biel with that of William of
Ockham has an undeniable resemblance to expressions found in
Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics; and a question associated
with this discovery is "What place, if any, did Biel hold for
the employment of philosophy within the structure of his
theology?" Oberman provides the answer to this question in
the context of showing that, in Biel's case, one can speak
48Cf. Ibid., pp. 61, 71, 81, 40, 48; also Schwiebert,
Luther and His Times, p. 136.
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of a ratio fidei--that faith is not irrational or contrary
to natural reason, but rather is ungraspable by natural
reason. He maintains that it is in the area of faith, and
not in that of secular knowledge, that the authority of
49
Aristotle's metaphysics is seriously questioned by Biel.
And thus, like Ockham before him, Biel underscores the limitation of the use of ratio in the pursuit of theological
truth: reason is always subordinate to revelation in any
matters of faith.
It does not follow from these observations, however,
that Biel advocated the total divorce of reason from the
field of theological inquiry. Rather, Biel's efforts sought
to delimit clearly the parameters within which ratio could
still operate in the field of theology; and the results of
these labors was again to return Biel to the sharp distinction between philosophy and theology that had been outlined
by William of Ockham.
Three Levels of Apologetics
The place which Biel reserves for ratio within the
theological discipline may best be discovered in the three
levels of apologetics which he maintains exist. The first
level is founded on the assertion that natural philosophical
and moral elements can be found in the Bible, which make it
possible even for non-Christians who do not believe in the
49Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 41-42.

35
infallibility of the Bible to understand and to accept them
as truth. The second level of apologetics recognizes that
the Bible yields certain results not found in other fields
of research, and that these allow the doctors of Scripture
to defend articles of faith to which they refer. However,
the arguments made on this level are not viewed as being
compelling; instead, they are sufficient to refute the accusation of the absurdity of the basic tenets of the Christian
faith. The top level is formed by pure credibilia, the
inner core of faith. Here even the faithful are unable to
acquire evident knowledge. To explain articles of faith
held on this level, one must fall back on other articles of
faith.50
Within the first and second levels of Biel's
apologetics, deductive reasoning plays an important role;
but not without the involvement of faith. He presents no
rational structure which can enable the systematic theologian
to jump from one locus, accepted by faith, to another locus,
by way of sheer logical demonstration, without the employment
of faith. Yet Oberman contends that even in view of the premium Biel places on faith within theology's realm, it cannot
be said that he expresses anything so extreme as the divorce
of faith and reason.51 Oberman argues:
50Ibid., pp. 75 and 88.
51Ibid., pp. 74 and 81.
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. . . Biel is a rationalist insofar as he holds that the
distance between creator and creature as expressed in
the distinction of the potentia absoluta and potentia
ordinata can at least be partly bridged by reason.52
Biel's expression of the relationship between faith
and reason thus presented, the task may now be undertaken to
determine some of the implications these views may have had
for Luther's own approach to this problem. The next chapter
will survey Luther's life, with special reference given to
the background and setting of the primary works of Luther
with which this thesis will concern itself in showing Luther's
understanding of the role ratio is to play in the realm of
theology.
52Ibid., p. 81.

CHAPTER II
LUTHER'S YEARNING FOR TRUTH
Educational Development
Early Education
Luther's education began at the small school in
Mansfeld, the village in which he resided with his family
for the first fourteen years of his life. It is reasonable
to speculate that Luther began school at the age of seven,
and that the curriculum was that of a so-called "trivial"
school, a Latin school which taught principally three subjects (trivium): grammar, logic, and rhetoric. These, along
with music, would comprise the fundamental education of young
Luther. All classes were conducted in the Latin language,
the foremost among the subjects taught being grammar.1
For reasons not fully known, Luther was sent by his
parents to attend the school at Magdeburg in his fourteenth
year, 1497. Magdeburg was a city of approximately 12,000 at
that time, and it is not certain which of its schools he
1
Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: His Road to Reformation 1483-1521, trans. James L. Schaaf (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1985), p. 12. Brecht notes also that the
date on which Luther probably entered the school at Mansfeld
was 12 March 1491, St. Gregory's Day, on which the new school
year began.
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attended. However, Luther himself hints that it was at this
time in his learning that he first became introduced to the
Brethren of the Common Life--an order which emphasized Bible
reading and the return to simple, pious life for both the
clergy and laity--the same order, interestingly enough, with
which Gabriel Biel had associated himself in 1468, when he
became Provost of the house of the Brethren of the Common
Life at Butzbach.2
Luther stayed at Magdeburg but one year; but during
that year he made an important discovery. Ernest Schwiebert
contends that in all likelihood, it was at Magdeburg, rather
than at Erfurt, that Luther made his discovery of the Bible;
and it would not have been unusual for Luther not to have
seen a Bible before this, since at Mansfeld most of his
instruction had been by the blackboard and wax tablets, and
the students handled few books.3
Again for reasons unknown, Luther's parents decided
to send their son to Eisenach following the one year of study
at Magdeburg. Here, he would complete three years at the
2Cf. Ernest G. Schwiebert, Luther and His Times: The
Reformation from a New Perspective (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1950), pp. 117-119 and n. 55; also Martin
Brecht, Road to Reformation, pp. 15-16; also E. Gordon Rupp,
"Christian Doctrine from 1350 to the Eve of the Reformation," in A History of Christian Doctrine, in succession to
the earlier work of G. P. Fisher, published in the International Theological Library Series, ed. Hubert Cunliffe-Jones,
assisted by Benjamin Drewery (Scotland: T. T. Clark, 1978;
Fortress Press, 1980), p. 301.
3Luther and His Times, p. 119.
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parish school of St. George. Apparently, Luther praised his
teacher, Wigand Gueldenapf, as one who taught grammar in a
fashion superior to any other.4 Such praise may have been
reciprocal, as Luther emerged through all his studies as a
most intelligent student.
University of Erfurt
Luther entered the University of Erfurt in the summer
semester of 1501. The city of Erfurt was a populous one of
some 20,000 inhabitants; and the university, though waning a
bit from its lofty reputation as leader among German universities that it held in the middle of the fifteenth century,
was still a prestigious one in the sixteenth century. Luther
later comments that for him, all other universities appeared
to be elementary schools in comparison with Erfurt.5
Erfurt became a spawning ground for the rising
tension between humanism (understood not in the modern, but
in the sixteenth century sense of the term) and scholasticism. Its teachers would include some who studied with the
Tuebingen scholastic Gabriel Biel, and the influence of
William of Ockham was becoming more noticeable at Erfurt
since the second half of the fifteenth century. The university was divided into four faculties: the liberal arts, or
4Brecht, Road to Reformation, pp. 19-20.
5Martin Luther, D. Martin Luther's Werke (Weimar: H.
Boehlau, 1883-), TR 2, no. 2788 (hereafter cited as WA); cf.
Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 29.
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philosophical (which held a place of special distinction at
this time), theology, jurisprudence, and medicine. All students began their studies in the faculty of liberal arts.
Only upon successful completion of the liberal arts was a
6
student qualified to enter one of the three higher faculties.
Although Biel and Ockham are names associated with
the university at Erfurt, following the prescribed course of
studies would not have led Luther immediately to become aware
of their profound influence on the field of theology. Rather,
the young scholar had first to contend with traditional Logic,
then with the so-called Physics, and Ethics in his career as
university student. In point of fact, it appears that only
in connection with the continuation of his studies in the
7
monastery does Luther occupy himself with Ockham and Biel.
Koestlin marvels that the forces of humanism seemed
to have so little affect upon Luther at this stage of his
education; but that writer is careful to note that humanism,
as taught at this juncture of Erfurt's history, contained
"no manifestation whatever of a tendency . . . hostile to the
6See Brecht, Road to Reformation, pp. 28-29.
7Julius Koestlin, The Theology of Luther in its
Historical Development and Inner Harmony, trans. Charles E.
Hay, from the second German edition, 2 vols. (Philadelphia:
Lutheran Publication Society, 1897; St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1986), 1:37; nonetheless, Bengt Haegglund,
History of Theology, trans. Gene J. Lund (St. Louis:
Concordia Publishing House, 1968), p. 197 indicates that
Biel's theology was basic for the instruction in Erfurt.
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"
Church or even to Scholasticism.-8Koestlin's astonishment
seems based upon the premise that since the Erfurt faculty
showed definite tendencies toward humanism, and since some
of Luther's close associates took their studies from such
men, Luther therefore must certainly have had a close circle
of friends who must have been classed as "humanists." But
Ernest Schwiebert takes exception to such presuppositions as
these, finding no evidence that Luther traveled in the
humanistic circles, and holding doubt that the humanistic
tendencies of his professors would have found their way into
the dialectic approach that he was being taught in the regular courses.9
If the forces of Erfurt humanism made little impression on Luther, then may it be concluded that nothing of the
faculty's positions left their marks upon that future Reformer? Schwiebert answers a resounding "No!" According to
that Luther-scholar, at least two of the Erfurt professors
whom Luther admired may have helped give shape to the young
8Ibid., pp. 42-43; see also Koestlin's discussion
concerning Luther's associations with his colleagues on pp.
38-40 of that work. Chief among Koestlin's listing of the
professors who gave rise to humanism at Erfurt are Maternus
Pistoris, Nicholas Marschalk (who moved away in 1502), noted
for promoting the study of Greek, and Mutianus Rufus (Conrad
Muth), who resided at nearby Gotha and had apparent influence
on the young students of the University. It is especially to
this theory that those living in Gotha had profound influence
on the University of Erfurt during Luther's undergraduate
days that Schwiebert takes exception (see n. 9 below).

9Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, pp. 134-135.
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student's later rejection of Scholasticism in the Wittenberg
curriculum, namely, Trutvetter and Usingen. Trutvetter tried
to simplify the dialectics of Ockham and Biel for use in
teaching, while Usingen distinguished, in theology, between
Aristotle and the Bible as sources of information. Describing
the teaching of Usingen, Schwiebert notes:
In matters of faith he accepted the Scriptures as an
unerring guide to truth, while his conception of the
Church Fathers and later tradition as evaluated in relation to the revealed Word doubtless influenced Luther in
his later discovery of Sola Scriptura, or the principle
of relying on the Bible alone in determining Biblical
doctrines. . . . Usingen was progressive, up-to-date,
and quite receptive to new ideas.10
The Order of Augustinian Hermits
Luther became a Bachelor of Arts at Erfurt in 1502,
completing his studies in the minimum amount of time, and a
Master in 1505. Yet because of a crisis experience in his
life, Luther would not maintain his goal of studying law.
Instead, on July 17, 1505, he quite unexpectedly applied for
admission to the "Black Cloister" in Erfurt, the chapter
10Ibid., p. 135; cf. Brecht, Road to Reformation,
pp. 34-36, where that writer notes also the importance of
Jodokus Trutfetter (ca. 1460-1519) and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi
von Usingen (1462-1532) for Luther's education at Erfurt;
also noted in Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard:
A Study in the History of Theology (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1963), p. 6: ". . . we may safely
say that the young Luther was influenced by the nominalist
philosophy of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and
that this influence is evident throughout his life."
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house of the Augustinian Hermits.11
The events that led to Luther's becoming a monk, the
near miss of a thunderbolt near Stotternheim and his near
bleeding to death following an accidental slashing of the
cephalic vein on another occasion, are well known and docu12 It must be noted, however, that the events in
mented.
themselves are not sufficient cause for Luther's engagement
to the strictest monastic order in Erfurt; rather, they were
final blows to a man terrified by his sense of guilt before
his God, and driven to despair concerning whether he could
ever know if he had done enough in life to appease God for
his wrongdoing.13
Luther would search diligently for such appeasement
during his career as a monk; but he would find it neither in
the completeness with which he carried out his monastic vows,
nor in his ordination to the priesthood in 1507. Nevertheless, the Augustinian monk was exact in his studies. It is
here, in the Black Cloister, that Martin came into close contact with the writings of Gabriel Biel; for a standard text
11See Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, pp. 136-138
for the defense of this date as the authentic time of Luther's entry into the monastery.
12For careful documentation of the Stotternheim incident, see Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 48, n. 14;
Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, p. 143, n. 121 lends documentation of the second event.
13The word most often used to describe Luther's fears
of Satan's assaults and of trials sent by God is Anfechtung.
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of that day in preparation for the priesthood was Biel's
lengthy Sacri cononis missae expositio (Canon of the Mass),
in which Biel discusses in eighty-nine lessons the entire
mass liturgy. Where necessary, Biel's writing also gave
thorough consideration to theological problems, such as
indulgences, veneration of the saints, the presence of Christ
in the sacrament, or the Lord's Prayer, or to practical questions concerning the ceremony of the mass.14 Schwiebert
notes that in his Tischreden, Luther evaluated Biel's work
at the time as having been "the best book," even the Bible
not being able to compare with its authority. Asserts
Schwiebert: "This book made a fervent disciple of papalism
out of the young monk, for, says Luther in the same conversation: 'When I read therein, my heart bled.'"15
During the years 1505-1509, Luther studied also Biel's
Collectorium and Peter d'Ailly's (1350-1420) and Ockham's commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sententiarum libri quatuor (long
used as a doctrinal textbook in Medieval theological studies)•16

Melanchthon also indicates that Augustine's On

The Letter and the Spirit deeply influenced Luther; and, as
14See Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 71.
15Luther and His Times, p. 148; the quotation is
from WA, TR 3, no. 3722, rendered in English in Martin Luther,
Luther's Works, 55 vols. gen. eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and
Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, and
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-), 54:264 (hereafter cited
as LW).
16Haegglund, History of Theology, p. 212.
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Schwiebert notes, . . . even though Luther remembered Biel
and d'Ailly almost word for word, he remembered Augustine
best of all."17 That well may be true; but it appears that
Luther's ultimate discovery, while in the monastery, was his
new relationship with the Bible. To quote the Tischreden:
At that time [in the monastery] no other study pleased
me so much as sacred literature. With great loathing I
read physics, and my heart was aglow when the time came
to return to the Bible. . . . I read the Bible diligently. Sometimes one important statement occupied all
my thoughts for a whole day. Such statements appeared
especially in the weightier prophets, and (although I
could not grasp their meaning) they have stuck in my
memory to this day. 18
Teacher of Theology
Luther's studies continued with the Augustinian
order, and by 1508 he found himself both a student and a
lecturer in philosophy. He was transferred to Wittenberg in
the fall of 1508, where he would continue as student and
teacher, delivering lectures on Aristotle's Nichomachean
Ethics. On 9 March 1509, Luther earned his first theological
degree, bachelor of the Bible, and shortly thereafter became
a bachelor of the sentences. Before he could begin his
duties of giving cursory lectures on Lombard's Sentences,
Luther was called back to Erfurt; and by this time in his
career, according to Schwiebert, "he had progressed to the
17Cf. Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, p. 157 and
n. 36.
18English translation of WA, TR 1, no. 116, as found
in LW 54, p. 14.
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point of criticizing all of the Schoolmen on the basis of
the Latin Vulgate, but he had not gone far enough to realize
that in time this principle would destroy his whole Catholic
plan of salvation."19
Following his journey to Rome (1510-1511) on business
in behalf of the Erfurt order to which he belonged, Luther
returned to the university at Wittenberg, where he would soon
begin preparations toward becoming a Doctor of Theology.
The degree was awarded to him on 19 October 1512, and Dr.
Luther was officially received into the Theological Faculty
at Wittenberg on the twenty-second of that same month. As
far as can be known, Luther began his teaching activity
during the winter semester of 1513/14.20
Selected Writings in the Context
of Luther's Career
Luther's Early Lectures and the
Galatians Commentary of 1519
The first lectures given by Luther (at least the
first ones to have been preserved), are those on the Psalms
(1513-15). During this period of his Biblical studies,
19Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, p. 173.
20As Brecht points out in Road to Reformation, p.
127, the reason for the year's delay in Luther's teaching
career is unknown. That author speculates that such a period of time could have been required by the young teacher as
a preparation interval before his lectures could begin;
Schwiebert maintains, in Luther and His Times, p. 282, that
Luther may have lectured on Genesis in 1512-13, though no
positive evidence exists.
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Luther appears to have employed a positive aspect of Biblical
Humanism,21 by endeavoring to pay close attention to the
classical languages of Scripture, notably, Greek. It seems
possible that this diligent study of the text of Scripture,
in preparation for his lectures on the Psalms, could well
have led to Luther's famous Tower Discovery, at which time
he finally discovered the Gospel and the full impact of the
ultimate dynamic of the Christian faith: the forgiveness of
sins.22
In his early lectures on the Scriptures, Luther used
methodology similar to the other Wittenberg professors. The
text was presented in a fourfold meaning: the literal, the
allegorical, the tropological, and anagogical. Luther used
21Schwiebert makes an important point regarding the
role "Humanism" played in the German Reformation, revealing
that scholars have discovered that there were no less than a
half dozen different kinds of Humanism, the common denominator being a Heimweh, or homesickness, for something in
ages past; see Luther and His Times, p. 275.
22Much discussion has taken place regarding the exact
date of Luther's "Tower Discovery." Ernst Bizer and Uuras
Saarnivaara, ascribe to the experience of Luther's discovery
of the Gospel a late date at the end of 1518 (in this case,
Luther would not have made his discovery until one year after
his posting of the 95 theses in Wittenberg); but others,
like Schwiebert, Gordon Rupp, and Heino Kadai, hold to the
early date of 1513/14. See Heino 0. Kadai, "Luther's Theology of the Cross," in Accents in Luther's Theology: Essays
in Commemoration of the 450th Anniversary of the Reformation,
ed. Heino 0. Kadai (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1967), p. 268, n. 50; Saarnivaara cites, in support of the
later dating, Luther's Preface from the year 1545, as well
as excerpts from other lectures and writings of Luther; cf.
Uuras Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel: New Light
upon Luther's Way from Medieval Catholicism to Evangelical
Faith (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1951), pp.
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contemporary illustrations and anecdotes to liven the subject.23 But a marked change in Luther's approach to the
Biblical texts arises by the time of his next series of
lectures, those given in 1515/16 on Romans. From this time
onward, he largely abandons the fourfold interpretation of
the Scriptures in the classroom, rendering instead what one
scholar calls "a historical-Christological"24 interpretation--an approach rising from the grammatical historical
method--that focuses especially on one's spiritual relationship with Christ. This method of interpretation can be
called solus Christus, as it seeks to pursuade every Bible
student to find Jesus Christ in every passage.24
103-105, and 122. Indeed, this seems to be powerful ammunition in support of the later dating of the Tower Discovery;
Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 225, concurs, both with the
evidence presented by Saarnivaara, and with the later dating
of the experience itself.
23Cf. Ernest Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, p.
283; A. Berkeley Mickelson, Interpreting the Bible (Grand
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1963), pp. 35-36,
outlines the method of "fourfold interpretation" that was
common for exegetes of the Middle Ages, rendering a rough
paraphrase, in English, of some Latin poetry of the sixteenth
century: "The letter shows us what God and our fathers did;
The allegory shows us where our faith is hid; The moral
meaning gives us rules of daily life; The anagogy shows us
where we end our strife." Hence, Mickelson shows that the
literal is the plain, evident meaning; the moral (tropological) sense tells men what to do; the allegorical sets
forth what they are to believe; the anagogical centers in
what Christians are to hope.
24Hilton C. Oswald, Luther's Works, vol. 25: Lectures
On Romans: Glosses and Scholia, ed. Hilton C. Oswald (St.
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1972), p. xi; also Herbert
T. Mayer, Interpreting the Holy Scriptures: Principles for
the Proper Study of the Bible (St. Louis: Concordia Publish-
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Luther's lectures were delivered from notes comprised
of Glossae and Scholia. The Glossae (glosses) were copies
of the Vulgate text with generous space between the lines,
and wide margins, for the inclusion of Luther's interlinear
and marginal notes in Latin; the Scholia were notes of extended commentary on various selected passages, written out in
detail as a separate preparation for the lectures. Especially the Glossae were intended to be dictated almost verbatim in the classroom; but Schwiebert makes mention of the
fact that when one compares Luther's own Glossae and Scholia
of his lectures to the student notes that have been preserved
on Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews, it must be concluded that
Luther did not always closely follow his manuscripts when
delivering his lectures.25
Coinciding with Luther's lecturing on Romans, the
humanist scholar, Erasmus of Rotterdam (ca. 1469-1536), had
published his annotated edition of the Greek New Testament
(February 1515). Apparently, Luther was making use of this
new edition by the spring of 1516, a fact not insignificant
for the lectures he would give on Galatians, which took place
from 27 October 1516 until 13 March 1517.26 He was critical
ing House, 1967), p. 39.
25Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, p. 283; also see
Hilton Oswald, Lectures on Romans, LW 25, pp. ix-x.
26Cf. Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 129 and n. 3;
Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel, pp. 74-75 and n.
171, which refers the reader to a letter Luther wrote to
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of Erasmus's "annotations" on Paul, because they spoke only
of the Christian's freedom from the Cermonial Law, and not
the whole Law. Saarnivaara notes that Luther thus must have
known at that time that man cannot be justified without faith,
simply by fulfilling the Moral Law [see note 26]. Clearly,
this also is the central theme, not only of Paul's Letter to
the Galatians, but of Luther's lectures on this part of
Scripture, as well--a fact that further complicates trying to
ascribe the proper date to Luther's Tower Discovery (Turmerlebnis) [see page 47, note 22, above]. Whether the Galatians lectures occurred before, or after, that event remains
an unsolved puzzle.
The earliest of Luther's lectures on Galatians are
preserved in a student notebook on the classes given in 1516
-1517, first published in the twentieth century by Hans von
Schubert and then revised for the Weimar edition by Karl
Meissinger (WA, 57). Luther used those notes as a basis for
the printed version of his exposition of 1519 (WA 2, 445618; Saint Louis, 8, 1352-1661; LW 27, 151-410), but significantly revised and expanded some of his earlier judgments.
Four years later (1523), he published a revised and abbreviated version of the commentary.27 The writer of this paper
Spalatin on 19 October 1516, in which he relates his criticism of Erasmus' annotations.
27
See Jaroslav Pelikan, Luther's Works, vol. 27:
Lectures on Galatians 1535, Chapters 5-6 and Lectures on
Galatians 1519, Chapters 1-6, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, associate
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has chosen to give attention to the published version of
1519, rather than to the lengthier commentary on Galatians of
1535 (based on Luther's lectures from 1531), because of the
earlier work's importance for understanding Luther's approach
to theology, and of the proper role of ratio within that
field of study, at the relative beginning of his career.
[Luther's later ideas concerning man's ratio will be represented in this paper by his 1536 Disputation Concerning Man.]
The extent to which the lectures on Galatians may
have given rise to the events of October 1517 is open only
to speculation. Certainly, Luther's study for his lectures
on the Psalms, Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews (1517/18)
could not have damaged his spiritual growth; yet the Lutherscholars place far more weight on the controversy over indulgences as the cause for the 31 October 1517 declarations,
than on the early lectures themselves. And well they should;
for the Ninety-five Theses deal primarily with the abuses of
the indulgences sold to individuals as satisfaction for their
sins--a widespread practice as a result of Pope Leo X's
(1475-1521; Pope 1513-21) revival of the jubilee indulgence
of 1510 under Julius II (1443-1513; Pope 1503-13). But this
writer finds wisdom in the words of Brecht, who states that
between 1513 and 1516 a definite change certainly took place
in Luther's image of God, a change apparently aided by his
ed. Walter A. Hansen (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1964), p. ix.
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wrestling with the texts for his early lectures. Brecht
asserts:
No longer did he find himself in continual confrontation
with the judging God. He knew that God did not reckon
sins to the believer who confessed them, and to this
extent he experienced forgiveness. But the emphasis on
the continuing reality of human sinfulness remained constant, and it was even conceived of more and more sharply,
and along with it the inability of man to produce his
own righteousness. . . . This was still the phase when
Luther despised the word "righteousness," and would
gladly have dispensed with it. . . . Luther's theology of
1516 unmistakably shows important reformatory elements,
chiefly in its emphasis upon the salvation which is given
from without. But in its stubborn orientation toward the
attitude of humility it is still obscure. The reason,
therefore, why Luther research still disputes whether or
not the Luther of the lectures on Romans was already a
reformer lies in the ambiguity of the subject itself. He
was, and yet he was not yet. But in the following lectures on Galatians Luther's way of speaking is already
much freer. There he is no longer oriented so much
toward one's own righteousness. On the basis of the
epistle text, humility takes a back seat to freedom.28
Luther and Erasmus: On the Bondage
of the Will
Reaction to Luther's posting of the Ninety-five
Theses in Wittenberg was both swift and severe. Not only
had Luther fired a resounding volley into the midst of one
of Rome's most precious fund-raising projects, the sale of
indulgences for the further construction of the cathedral in
Rome; but also had the shot been aimed directly (and delib28
Brecht, Road to Reformation, pp. 136-137; see also
Kurt Aland, Four Reformers: Luther-Melanchthon-CalvinZwingli, trans. James L. Schaaf (Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1979), p. 11, where that writer notes that
Luther's early lectures were decisively important in lending
shape to the Reformer's theology.
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erately) at the Pope himself. The Theses were but an overture to Luther's endeavor to end the blatant tyranny by
which the papacy had oppressed the souls of the faithful
people of Christ's Church; for Luther had come to see that
the forgiveness of sins rested on no human authority, but
solely on the merits and grace of Christ Himself.
Following the evening of 31 October 1517, Luther received a startling education as to just how widespread his
thoughts would come to be. He had apparently circulated
copies of the Theses only to a small circle of close friends
and colleagues; but to the astonishment of all, they spread
to all of Germany within two weeks!29 This fact marks an
extremely important point, one which J. I. Packer and 0. R.
Johnston do not miss in their thorough, yet concise, historical and theological introduction to their English translation of On the Bondage of the Will, that the Lutheran
Reformation was the first historical movement to have nationwide printed publicity. Luther would use this gift of
history to his advantage, although he was not entirely
pleased that the Theses themselves had been given such wide
publication--for this was not his immediate intent.30

Never-

theless, Luther became a prolific writer during these early
29
See Luther's comments in LW 41, p. 234.
30
Martin Luther, On the Bondage of the Will: A New
Translation of "De Servo Arbitrio" (1525), Martin Luther's
Reply to Erasmus of Rotterdam, trans. and ed. J. I. Packer
and O. R. Johnston (United States: Fleming H. Revell Co.,
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years of the Reformation; and strong reaction to his efforts
was not slow in coming from the Roman Church.
The times were indeed changing. The spirit of the
Renaissance of secular culture now seemed to be penetrating
the bastion of the Church, or so it must have seemed to Rome.
The calls for reform in the Church, that seemed only a whisper with John Wycliffe (1320-84) and John Hus (ca. 1370-1415),
became a battle cry for those who followed Luther's lead.
Many must have wondered when the other great mind of the
Reformation era, Desiderius Erasmus, might join forces with
the German reformer.
Gordon Rupp bestows upon Erasmus the distinction of
being "the greatest figure in the northern Renaissance .
an indispensible link between the overlapping themes of
humanism and reformation . . • •,31 Erasmus had studied
with the Brethren of the Common Life at Deventer (1475-84).
He later became a monk, and was ordained a priest in 1492.
His service to the bishop of Cambrai brought him out of the
secluded life, and after a time he studied philosophy and
theology at the College de Montaigu in Paris (1495-96). On
the first of three visits to England (1499-1500), he came
into the circle of Christian humanism through John Colet
(ca. 1467-1519), who allegedly persuaded him to turn his
1957), p. 38; and Brecht, Road to Reformation, p. 205.
31,Christian Doctrine from 1350," p. 302, though
elsewhere he calls Erasmus the "flitting Dutchman."

55
humanistic interests in the direction of Biblical studies.
During his studies, Erasmus acquired a distaste for Scholasticism--and for theology, in general; therefore, Packer and
Johnston aptly declare, "Erasmus was no theologian."32 But
a man of incomparable learning he was, and no one could stand
the same ground with Erasmus in his field of the reading and
writing of classical languages.
Erasmus took his position against the complexities
of the scholastics, seeking a return to the simpler Christianity of the New Testament era. Here shines forth a
thought held in common with Colet (and certainly the return
to a simpler, more pious, Christian living was a major motif
found in the Brethren of the Common Life, though one can
only speculate as to how much influence this order had on a
boy, who was at most eighteen--and probably fifteen--years
of age when he left that school). On this count, Erasmus
holds something in common with Luther; but there is more.
With his humanistic approach to the classical languages, Erasmus paved the way for the deep Biblical scholarship of Luther. That Luther made extensive use of Erasmus's
magnum opus, his publication of the Greek New Testament, has
already been noted [see page 49, above]. And it should be
noted again (as pointed out previously on page two of the
introduction to this thesis), that Luther's own magnum opus
32On the Bondage of the Will, p. 19.
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was not to be found in his volumes of commentaries, and the
like; rather, his most towering achievement for the expansion
of the Reformation was the translation of the Bible into the
German language, the New Testament having been translated
and published by September of 1522, from Erasmus's revised
text of 1519 [the Old Testament would be translated from an
equally fine edition of the Hebrew, as rendered by Johann
Reuchlin (1455-1522)].33
Erasmus approved of Luther's assault on abuses; yet
he opposed innovations in doctrine and church life.34 Also,
Erasmus was always careful to protect his close relationship
with the Pope, and with Henry VIII (1491-1547), in shrewdly
33Schwiebert, Luther and His Times, p. 528 gives
evidence that Luther had begun translating parts of the
Psalms as early as 1517, while at Wittenberg. However, not
until his stay at the Wartburg in 1521 did his work toward
the translation of the entire Bible begin in earnest. The
first complete translation of the Old and New Testaments did
not appear until 1534; but this edition did not satisfy
Luther's high standards. Two additional complete revisions
were published, with the aid of Luther's fellow professors;
the last did not appear in print until after Luther's death
in 1546. Cf. Schwiebert, pp. 643-644; see also Heinrich
Bornkamm, Luther in Mid-Career: 1521-1530, edited and with a
Foreword by Karin Bornkamm, trans. E. Theodore Bachmann
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), p. 46, for reference
to older, out-dated German translations of the Bible extant
at the time of Luther. These versions noted, Luther's was
the first written in the idiom of the German people, equivalent to the Greek Koine, which made the Bible easily accessible to a nation hungry to discover the Gospel.
34Lewis W. Spitz, Jr., Lutheran Cyclopedia, 1975 ed.,
s.v. "Erasmus, Desiderius." See also the extremely fine summation of the relationship between Luther and Erasmus in
Brian Albert Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 156-167.
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keeping his doors open to new opportunities. Therefore, his
relationship to Luther, although he had many thoughts in
common with the German theologian, was kept always at some
distance, even though his friendship with other keys of the
Reformation, Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), for example,
(who also demonstrated a desire for a more cautious progress
toward reform than was Luther's manner) would continue even
after Luther's death.
Finally, Erasmus's luxury of being allowed to remain
in an intermediary position between Luther and the Roman
Church was revoked. Henry VIII, himself looking for papal
favors, began pressuring Erasmus to go into print, in providing the Church with a definitive refutation to Luther's
new challenge. The Dutchman gave in to the insistance of his
friends and enemies, and on 1 September 1524, his Diatribe
seu collatio de libero arbitrio

(Discussion, or Collation,

concerning Free-Will) appeared.
The Diatribe of Erasmus did

cut to the heart of the

Reformation, giving Luther the opportunity to elucidate in
his response, De servo arbitrio (On the Bondage of the Will),
[WA 18:600-787; LW 33:(xi), (5-13), 15-295] the meaning of
the pure Gospel proclamation. Luther says to Erasmus on his
choice of topics with which to launch his public attack:
Moreover, I give you hearty praise and commendation on
this further account--that you alone, in contrast with
all others, have attacked the real thing, that is, the
essential issue. You have not wearied me with those
extraneous issues about the Papacy, purgatory, indul-
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gences and such like--trifles, rather than issues--in
respect of which almost all to date have sought my blood
(though without success); you, and you alone, have seen
the hinge on which all turns, and aimed for the vital
spot.35
Published in December of 1525, the answer to Erasmus's Diatribe stands as one of the most important writings
to come from Luther's hand; certainly, it is that, also, for
a paper which seeks to discover Luther's concept of the use
of ratio within the framework of theological discussion. It
is in this writing that Luther meets Erasmus on the same
humanistic ground, pushing his own intellect and reason to
high limits, in making defense of the Biblical basis for the
Reformation. Here, perhaps as nowhere else, does Luther
demonstrate what he considers to be the proper role of man's
reason in the pursuit of theological truths.
The Later Disputations of Luther
Luther's most prolific period of writing had been
the decade of the 1520s. Fully two-thirds of his original
works had appeared between the years 1516 and 1530. Throughout his career as a reformer, Luther's health had not been
good; but the years 1531-1546 would bring him more frequent
and more serious illness.36 It is not surprising, then,
35
On the Bondage of the Will (Packer and Johnston),
p. 319; cf. WA, 18, 786, 26-31; LW 54, 294.
36
Mark U. Edwards, Jr., Luther's Last Battles:
Politics and Polemics, 1531-46, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1983), pp. 9-10.
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that those years would see a corresponding decline of productivity from Luther's pen.
In seeking to find, in the Reformer's later period
in life, a work that demonstrates that theologian's mature
views concerning the proper role of ratio in the course of
theology, the Disputation Concerning Man (1536) was selected
by this writer for inclusion in this paper's discussion. In
that disputation, Luther pays tribute to man's gift of reason, while at the same time carefully delimiting the scope
in which reason is competent to search out truth. Unfortunately, only a fragment of the entire disputation has been
preserved.37
As part of the academic exercises of the Medieval
world, "disputations" were also a part of Luther's life and
career, especially from the time he became a Doctor of Theology in 1512. The statutes of the University of Wittenberg
in the year 1508 noted three types of disputations in the
faculty of theology: the disputation for receiving a degree,
the festive and public quarterly disputations, and the weekly
circular disputations, which professors conducted for the
benefit of the students. In part due to the influence of
humanist concepts of education, the three types of disputa37This writer used the English translation of Lewis
W. Spitz in LW 34, pages (135), and 137-144. That version
is based upon WA 39 I, (174) 175-180; see Lewis W. Spitz, ed,
Luther's Works, vol. 34: Career of the Reformer IV, gen. ed.
Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1960), p.
135.
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tions fell into disuse at Wittenberg from 1525-1533. In
1533, however, their use was revived; and Luther favored
their use greatly.38
Care must be used, however, in seeking to use the
disputations of Luther to prove his position on a particular
area of theology. Many were not penned by him personally,
and even those that were contained articles for discussion
purposes alone, not intended to be final formulations of
ideas.39 For this reason, this writer shall carefully weigh
the concepts, as related in the Disputation, with the contents of the two other primary documents with which this
thesis will be concerned.
Epilogue to Chapter II
Literally volume upon volume has been written about
the life, times, and teachings of Martin Luther. This chapter has not begun even to consider all of the highest moments in his illustrious career; rather, it has been written
especially with the intent of providing background information for the three primary Luther sources being considered
in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, as well as rendering pertinent facts concerning his education and career that
have significant bearing on the development of the Reformer's
understanding of the use of ratio within the context of
38Ibid., p. xiii.
39Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard, p. 14.
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theological inquiry and presentation.
Upon his death in 1546, Luther had provided the world
with a reawakening to the light of the Gospel proclamation.
Through the enormous library of work produced by that scholar,
the realm of theology would feel such impact so that the
world would give thanks for his birth five hundred years
later.
Luther's scholarship was profoundly important for the
development of approaches to theology throughout the centuries that would follow his lifespan. It is the thesis of
this writer, that at no point is Luther's contribution to
theology more decisive than at the juncture where the Reformer determined faith must divorce reason. The following
pages seek to underscore where Luther made that demarcation
in his own pursuit of truth.

CHAPTER III
RATIO BEFORE AND SINCE THE FALL:
LUTHER'S VIEW OF MAN BEFORE GOD
Definitions
Before any clear discussion of Luther's understanding
of the way ratio may be employed in theology can take place,
the term itself must be given adequate definition. The task
of delimiting the scope of the word 'ratio' becomes all the
more important, when its wide variety of nuances is taken
into consideration. Just as the English noun, 'reason,' carries more than one meaning, so does its Latin equivalent.
'Ratio' may denote not only the faculty of mind which calculates or plans (the usage of the term which is employed
throughout this paper), but also can it refer to the following: (1) the motive, or ground, for an action; (2) a plan,
scheme, or system; (3) a theory, doctrine, science; (4) consideration taken, or account rendered, and (5) any transaction, affair, or business.1
A complete word-study of the occurrences of the vocable 'ratio' in The Bondage of the Will, the Galatians Commentary (1519), and the Disputation Concerning Man, would
1
Cassell's Latin Dictionary, 1968 ed., s.v. "ratio."
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reveal that Luther used the word in especially the sense of
"man's faculty of mind," and "the motive, or ground, for an
action." The occasional usages of ratio in the latter sense
are not of importance to this paper; rather, it is the meaning of that word in the first connotation that is of interest
here. That aspect of 'ratio' is expressed most fully by the
German, 'Vernunft'. The German vocable expresses only the
nuance of man's "reason, intellect, intelligence, understanding," and so forth;2 hence, it is, in that respect, a more
useful rendering than its Latin counterpart, in lending contour to the topic being considered in these pages.
Bengt Haegglund, in showing the antithesis between
faith and reason in Luther's theology, further maintains that
'Vernunft' does not merely denote the human ability to comprehend; rather it stands for the "entire attitude of natural
man, which gives to him his natural knowledge and aspiration".3 The qualification of Vernunft as applying to the
'natural man' seems apt, especially in light of the discussion below, which will contend that in Luther's theology,
ratio can properly be categorized with the things of the
flesh, in contrast with things of the Spirit.
2
The New Cassell's German Dictionary, 1971 ed., s.v.
"Vernunft."
3
Theologie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der
Occamistischen Tradition: Luthers Stellung zur Theorie von
der Doppelten Wahrheit (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1955), p. 84.
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In the same vein, Gerhard Ebeling suggests that the
term 'ratio' be distinguished from 'intellectus.' He holds
that, for Luther, intellectus is not a mere human faculty,
nor knowledge of an arbitrary object; rather, the term refers
to something biblical--especially the wisdom of the cross.
In contrast, human intellect is mere sensualitas; and this
includes the human ratio, since it is likewise incapable of
4
understanding spiritual things (spiritualia).
While it is not the purpose of this paper to present
a word-study of Luther's use of the term 'ratio'--in contrast with its synonyms--the point made by Ebeling is a good
one. If Luther's concept of ratio is to be rendered rightly,
care must be given to distinguish the knowledge of things
spiritual which belong to a believer, from that knowledge
(or lack thereof) possessed by the unregenerate. As will be
made clear below, Luther's quarrel with ratio stems only from
its incapability to know, and to accept without argument, the
gospel (things of the Spirit). Luther condemns human reason
because it stands in opposition to man's salvation in Christ.
Hence, as will be shown in the pages that follow, ratio
stands--in Luther's theology--for that human faculty which
enables man to think, calculate, or plan; but which, as belonging to man in his fallen state, is incapable of comprehending the mysteries and will of God. Let this, then, be
4Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, trans. R. A.
Wilson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 87.
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the working definition of ratio in the discussion below. In
order that this understanding might be properly conveyed in
an English equivalent, this writer will employ the term
'human reason,' when referring to ratio (Vernunft), thus defined.
"Ratio" Before the Fall
The difficulty in substantiating the claim that one
individual was influenced by the ideas of any other person
or school, without the former's specifically stating such a
dependence upon his forerunners, is well known; and certainly
this also is the case with Luther research. One may only
surmise that Luther's educational background--that would have
made him familiar with the ideas of Augustine, Aquinas, Ockham, and Biel--must have given some shape to his developing
theological insights; and for this reason, what information
has been related in the previous chapters of this paper bears
significance to a survey of Luther's understanding of ratio.
A further problem in the composition of a survey of
Luther's understanding of ratio arises from the fact--and
here this writer must beg the indulgence of the reader in
being "trite"--that Luther was not a systematician.5 Too
often stated, or not, that Luther did not write a treatise
on the subject of the human reason remains an obstacle with
5See Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard: A
Study in the History of Theology (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1963), p. 14.
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which the modern scholar must contend. This is unfortunate;
for the want of such a work by Luther necessitates that gaps
in the present examination be left open. In addition, the
selectivity of writings with which this paper is concerned
will cause still further gaps to appear, as the intent of the
present project is to supplement the extant works of other
scholars, who have given attention to the topic of this
thesis.
The first, and perhaps most noticeable, of the gaps
in Luther's view of ratio, is discovered when seeking to
outline his concept of the competence of human reason before
the Fall of man took place. Little difficulty is encountered
in relating what the Reformer considered ratio to be at the
dawn of creation; but his ideas concerning the limits to
which human reason could be employed in that era remain unspoken.
Man's Highest Attribute
In correlation with writings as far back as St.
Augustine, Luther maintains in the Disputation Concerning
Man that man's ratio "is the most important and the highest
in rank among all things and, in comparison with other things
of this life, the best and something divine."6 It renders
humans the ability to invent and maintain the arts, medicine,
6 Martin Luther, Luther's Works, 55 vols., gen. eds.
Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-),
34:137, a.4 (hereafter cited as LW); cf. Martin Luther, D.

67
law, and whatever wisdom, power, virtue, and glory man possesses in this life.7
Indeed, those are high accolades which Luther bestows
upon man's reason, and they are not unexpected. In the Reformer's view, reason, as a gift from God to man, is the
essential difference by which man is distinguished from the
animals and other things.8 It became man's possession at the
creation, and this fact alone is sufficient to establish
ratio as a prize to be cherished; for God saw that His work
before the Fall was very good (Gen. 1:31).9 Luther asserts
that Holy Scripture has established man's reason as lord over
the earth, birds, fish and cattle, saying, "Have dominion"
(Gen. 1:28); that reason is a sun and "a kind of god" appointed to administer these things in life.10
Limitations
These propositions suggest that Luther held human
reason in high regard. Nevertheless, he also noted well the
limitations of that special gift from God. Were these limits
applicable to ratio even before the Fall of man? Luther does
Martin Luther's Werke (Weimar: H. Boehlau, 1883-), 39 1:175
(hereafter cited as WA).
7LW 34, 137, a.4; WA 39 I, 175
8lbid., a.6.
9
Cf. Martin Luther, On the Bondage of the Will: A
New Translation of "De Servo Arbitrio" (1525), Martin Luther's
Reply to Erasmus of Rotterdam, trans. and ed. by J. I. Packer
and 0. R. Johnston (United States: Fleming H. Revell Co.,
1957), p. 203 (hereafter cited as BOW); WA 18, 708-709.
10LW 34, 137, a.7 and a.8; WA 39 I, 175.
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not tell us. This silence may prove annoying to those who
demand a philosophical answer to the question of ratio's competence before the Fall; but Luther's tacit approach to the
query is consistent with his theological methodology. Where
Scripture is silent, he is silent. The Bible does not delve
into the issue of the extent of man's knowledge before the
Fall, and neither does Luther.
Luther's approach to theology will be given a more
detailed review in chapter five, below. For the present,
suffice it to say that his method appears to have close connection with man's relation to God. Man is ever the creation; God is the Creator--and never the twain shall converge
[the incarnation of Christ notwithstanding]. God remains
God, and man, man. God is always above the scope of man's
comprehension. The Divine acts exceed man's grasp.11 God
remains free above all things. He has not bound Himself
totally by His word of revelation to man. Wherever God hides
Himself, and wills to be unknown to us, there we have no concern. "What is above us does not concern us."12
Moot questions abound in the structure of Luther's
thought. Why did God let Adam fall, and why did He create
all men with his [Adam's] same sin?13 Why does God not alter
11BOW, p. 93; WA 18, 627, 19.
12Ibid., p. 170; WA 18, 685, 7: "Quae supra nos,
nihil ad nos."
13Ibid., p. 209; WA 18, 712, 29.
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the evil wills of His creation?14

How is it that God would

do that which is absurd to human reason, by requiring impossibilities of man's 'free-will' [to will that which is 'good'
and to avoid evil)? Luther's answer to all remains the same:
let God be God. Reason may insist that God acts inconsistently, but this is simply because the things of God lie beyond its grasp. Reason wants to shut out all articles of
faith, and to judge the real by what she [Luther often refers
to 'Reason' in the feminine gender, and the German noun, Vernunft, also is feminine] is able to see, feel, and
understand.15
A correlation seems to exist between Luther's connotation of human reason's sphere of competence, and Ockham's
description of "intuitive cognition" [see page 26, above].
But Brian Gerrish signals a key difference between Luther
and Ockham: for the former, Ockham's epistemological problem
('How do we know God?') becomes subordinate to the soteriological problem ('What must I do to be saved?').16

Luther's

"razor" for distinguishing the true from the untrue (in the
more important realm of the spiritual life of man) would not
be, What is demonstrable by use of empirical evidence? but,
Does the assertion agree, or disagree, with the Gospel?
14Ibid., p. 208; WA 18, 712, 24.
15Ibid., pp. 201-202; WA 18, 707-708.
16
Brian Albert Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in
the Theology of Luther (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962),
pp. 55-56.

70
The Reformer is critical of Erasmus's Diatribe precisely because it fails to acknowledge the necessity of reason's submission to faith in matters that pertain to man's
relationship to God. Ratio cannot fathom faith's response to
the question, Why are some saved, while others are not?
Luther contends that reason can make no other response to
that question than to surmise that God is one of Chance--that
God merely sits by in idleness, not using His own wisdom,
will and presence to elect, separate and inspire, but entrusts to man the business of curbing God's wrath.17 Human
reason will not allow God to be God. The basis for this fact
lies in the Fall of man.
"Ratio" Since the Fall
The Totality of Sin's Effect on Man
It has been observed that if we fail to grasp Luther's
literally staggering idea of sin, we shall never do justice
to the genius of Luther or fathom his profundities.18 Surely
this applies to the realm of rightly understanding the Reformer's concept of reason's limited scope within the parameters of things spiritual. And Luther's understanding of the
totality of sin's binding effects upon man lies at the very
center of his argumentation against Erasmus in The Bondage
17BOW, pp. 199-200; WA 18, 706, 13.
18Heinz Bluhm, "Luther's View of Man in His Early
German Writings," Concordia Theological Monthly 34 (October
1963):586.
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of the Will.
Erasmus condemned Luther's view of the severity of
the effect which Adam's sin had upon all subsequent generations of mankind:
[Luther] exaggerates the importance of original sin by
teaching that it has corrupted even the noblest faculties
of man to such a degree that man cannot know God, that
he hates him, and that even the believer who is justified
by faith remains a sinner.19
By editing Erasmus's words, substituting the vocable
"underscores" for "exaggerates," one is given a fair summation of Luther's view of the condition of man after the Fall.
Luther held fast to the words of Romans 5, that by the single offense of the one man, Adam, all men lie under sin and
condemnation.20 By virtue of that condition, man becomes
hostile toward God, and refuses the aid of faith in Christ
for his salvation. Man is a sinner; and his sin is seated,
not in the skin or in the hair [or any of the lesser parts
of man's being], but in the highest attributes of natural
man: in the reason and the will [ratione et voluntate].21
19On Free Will, IV, 13, as quoted in Hermann Sasse,
"Luther and the Word of God," in Accents in Luther's Theology: Essays in Commemoration of the 450th Anniversary of the
Reformation, ed. Heino O. Kadai (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1967), p. 65.
20BOW, p. 297; WA 18, 773, 7.
21Ibid., p. 311; WA 18, 782, 14; cf. BOW, p. 280 [WA
18 761, 32]: "And doubtless that ignorance and contempt are
not seated in the flesh, in the sense of the lower and grosser affections, but in the highest and most excellent powers
of man . . . that is, in reason and will . . . ."
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That Erasmus would so vehemently attack Luther for
suggesting that original sin has corrupted human reason along
with all other attributes of man, probably did not surprise
the Reformer. Rather, Erasmus's insistent endeavor to preserve the integrity of ratio even after the Fall would merely
prove that he was human. Luther cited Romans 1:21 in defense
of his position, showing that, since the Fall, men became
fools in their reasoning, and their heart was darkened--they
22 So
became vain in their own reasonings [dialogismois].
blinded has man become in his vanity, that he would rather
protect his reason and be damned, than to admit reason's corruptness.23 Luther criticizes the Diatribe for supposing
that man is sound and whole after the Fall:
. . . Scripture describes man as corrupted and led captive, and, furthermore, as proudly disdaining to notice,
and failing to recognise [sic], his own corruption and
captivity; . . .24
Luther's concept of ratio after the Fall, then, takes
notice that that gift has been profoundly impaired by the
devastating effects of original sin. To what extent has
man's reason been limited by his sin? That question is to be
considered now.
22BOW, p. 277; WA 18, 759, 29.
23Ibid., p. 309; [WA 18, 780-781]: ". . . And as long
as my will and my reason are blessed, I shall be glad for my
filthy animal flesh to be taken away and damned; so far am I
from wanting Christ to be its Redeemer!"
24Ibid., p. 153; WA 18, 674, 9.
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Ratio Impaired--Not Destroyed--by Sin
In spite of the magnitude of Adam's sin for the human
race, Luther did not defend the position that man's ratio was
utterly destroyed in the Garden. It has been noted above
[pages 65 and 66] that Luther held, with high regard, reason's God-given abilities to have dominion over the rest of
the created order, and to administer things in this life.
And we note further, that he believed that God did not revoke
this privilege from man after the Fall of Adam.25 But lost
is reason's aptitude to know and to judge rightly, in accordance with God's perfect will. Though reason has not been
destroyed by the Fall, it is, nonetheless, made to serve the
sinful self-awareness and self-glorification of fallen
man.26
The nature of reason's impairment lies chiefly in the
arena of man's knowledge of God. Pelikan assesses the extent
to which Luther maintained ratio's ability to know God thus:
Luther was perfectly willing to grant that the unaided
human mind can know that there is a God, 'quod est Deus. 1
But it cannot know what God is, 'quid est Deus'.27
In The Bondage of the Will, Luther holds that the knowledge
of God in reason, carried to its logical conclusion, is
25LW 34, p. 137, a.9; WA 39 I, 175.
26Cf. Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther,
trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1966), p. 66.
27Luther to Kierkegaard, p. 22.
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nothing but atheism; for reason cannot resist the assault of
the power and the paradox of evil in the world.
Behold! God governs the external affairs of the world
in such a way that, if you regard and follow the judgment of human reason, you are forced to say, either that
there is no God, or that God is unjust; as the poet said:
'I am often tempted to think there are no gods.'28
In view of Luther's personal struggles with the concept of
the "righteousness of God" earlier in his career, these words
might be self-descriptive of his own wrestling with the issue
of man's natural knowledge of God.
Luther's description of man's natural knowledge of
God takes form in his contention that all men find the following in their hearts [as shall be shown in the next section, man's "heart" can be synonymous with "reason," and
other attributes, in Luther's language usage], even if they
have no Scripture: (1) that God is omnipotent, not only in
power but also in action, and (2) that He knows and foreknows
all things, and can neither err nor be deceived. Taken
together, these assertions form a sort of 'proof for the
existence of God' for Luther. By them he seeks to show,
from "irrefutable logic," that man must admit that he does
not act by his own 'free-will,' but by necessity--that there
must exist a God who, by virtue of His foreknowledge and His
infallible and immutable counsel and power, is able to order
the direction of the paths man walks in life. This same God
28BOW, p. 315; WA 18, 784, 36; cf. Ebeling, Luther:
An Introduction, p. 230.
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writes every other law into the hearts of man.29
The Scholastic axiom--that man can know from his
natural reason that God exists, but that he can never know
who that God is by the use of his unaided reason--is never
more true than for Luther's theological understanding of
man's condition since the Fall. What natural knowledge man
has of God is, furthermore, of a legalistic order. When the
'grace' of God is sought by unaided reason, a distorted
picture is rendered. In his exposition of Galatians 5:14
("For the whole Law is fulfilled in one word, in the statement, 'YOU SHALL LOVE YOUR NEIGHBOR AS YOURSELF'"--NASB.),
Luther notes that nature may try to emulate grace, but
especially when it gets to the "cross," it meets opposition
to its own understanding of 'grace,' and rebels mightily.30
That ratio since the Fall cannot comprehend things
of a spiritual nature, is a characteristic description of
Luther's view of fallen man. Unaided reason is blind to the
knowledge of godliness.31 Reason, impaired by the Fall, now
sees things of God as 'absurd.' For example, in discussing
the complex issue of God's hardening of Pharaoh's heart,
Luther notes:
. . It is human reason that is offended; which, though
29BOW, p. 218
[WA 18, 719, 33]: "In the same way,
every other law is written in our hearts (we have Paul's
word for this [cf. Rom. 2:15]). . . ."
30LW 27, p.
353; WA 2, 578-579.
31Cf. BOW, pp.
280-281; WA 18, 761-762.
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it is blind, deaf, senseless, godless, and sacrilegious,
in its dealing with all God's words and works, is at this
point brought in as judge of God's words and worksI32
The Reformer continues:
On these same grounds you [Erasmus] will deny all the
articles of faith, for it is the highest absurdity by
far--foolishness to the Gentiles and a stumbling-block
to the Jews, as Paul says [1 Corinthians 1:23]--that God
should be man, a virgin's son, crucified, sitting at the
Father's right hand. It is, I repeat, absurd [emphasis
theirs] to believe such things!33
And elsewhere in the same work:
How could reason conceive that faith in Jesus as Son of
God and Son of Man was necessary, when even at this day
it can neither grasp nor believe, though the whole creation should cry aloud, that there is a person who is
both God and man! Indeed, it rather finds offence [sic]
in such a statement, as Paul tells us in [1 Corinthians
1]--so impossible is it that it should be either willing
or able to believe itI34
Ratio in Relation to Man's Will
Flesh and spirit
At one's first impression, it may seem rather odd
that Luther would write a major book on "the bondage of the
will," and then proceed to discuss at length, not only the
topic of the human will, but also the state of man's reason.
But when Luther's usage of language is considered more carefully, the apparent confusion of terms no longer looks peculiar.
32BOW, p. 201; WA 18, 707, 22; cf. p. 150 below.
33Ibid.; WA 18, 707, 24.
34Ibid., p. 187; WA 18, 698, 5.
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Luther sees an extremely close connection between
man's will and his reason. In fact, it is man's ratio that
assists his will in lending directives to act. Returning to
Luther's defining of ratio's condition before the Fall, as
found in the Disputation, it appears significant that the
purpose for God's bestowal of reason upon man at creation
was not, primarily, that man might think, but that he might
act in ways consistent with God's own will.35 Luther apparently finds a defense in Scripture for drawing an unbroken
relationship between human reason and man's will. To which
aspect of the man is the Law spoken? To his will, as an
imperative which causes a man to act upon God's directives?
No. Rather, the Law is spoken to illuminate the blindness
of reason, "so that it may see that its own light is nothing,
and the power of the will is nothing." And further, "'By the
law is knowledge [emphasis by this writer] of sin,' says Paul
[Romans 3:20]. He does not say: abolition, or avoidance, of
sin [emphasis theirs]."36
Likewise, Luther finds an ally in Paul for treating
nearly any aspect of man, that is hostile to God since the
Fall, as synonymous. Paul lists among the "works of the
flesh" heresy, idolatry, contentions, divisions, and so forth,
which are in turn attitudes that reside in man's most exalted
35LW 34, p. 137, a.7 and 8; WA 39 I, 175.
36B0W, p. 158; WA 18, 677, 7.
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faculties, namely, reason and the will.37

In Luther, as for

Paul, all actions and attitudes of man can be classified in
but two categories: "flesh" and "spirit." In addition, so
complete is man's corruption since the Fall, that anything
that is classed as "flesh" is, by its nature, against the
spirit.38
For this reason, Paul Althaus can rightly declare
that when Luther says in one of his hymns, "My free will
hated God's judgment," any one of these other concepts could
take the place of "free will": "flesh," "flesh and blood,"
"nature" of man, "natural reason," "sense," "entire world,"
and so forth.39
Because the flesh stands in opposition to the spirit,
man's will and reason are always to be subordinated to the
revelations of God. Luther's words:
For if human words or examples, no matter how saintly,
have begun to be boasted of in opposition to those that
37Ibid., p. 313; WA 18, 783, 9.
38Ibid., p. 242; WA 18, 735, 31; cf. Gen. 6:5; 8:21.
39Theology of Luther, pp. 66-67; Heinrich Emil Brunner seems not to know of Luther's way of treating such concepts as synonymous, for he asserts in Revelation and Reason:
The Christian Doctrine of Faith and Knowledge (Westminster
Press, 1946), p. 301, n. 1: "The personification of reason
by Luther in the controversial sense ('die Hure Vernunft,'
et cetera) is not derived from the Bible but is to be understood in the light of the Scholastic use of the rational
principle. In the Bible it is not so much the reason that
is sinful as the heart, and that means the person."
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are divine, it is time for us confidently to regard whatever is not divine as flesh and blood, yes, as nothing. 40
This is the kind of statement that Erasmus could not bear;
and Luther laments the former's inability to understand the
relationship of man's sin, with human reason and the will.
According to Luther, it is fallen reason's misguiding that
has caused so many men of outstanding ability to be offended
41 Luther's
at the truths of God's Word through the ages.
lamentations are not spoken for "men of outstanding ability"
alone. The bell tolls for all. He asserts that it is to be
lamented whenever it happens that we human beings are praised
as possessing reason, because of our free will, and because
of our works, since Paul declares that it is impossible for
one who pleases himself, or men, to be a servant of Christ
and of the truth.42
"Simul justus et peccator": the
paradox of regenerate man
Thus far, a description has been given of the condition of ratio in unregenerated man. Is the ratio possessed
by a regenerated Christian man exactly the same as that found
in his unbelieving counterpart? Luther's response to that
question speaks the unreasonable; for he seeks to answer both
Yes and No. By no rule of logic is this possible, and Luther
40LW 27, p. 192; WA 2, 471, 21.
41BOW, p. 232; WA 18, 729, 13.
42LW 27, p. 181; WA 2, 464, 28; on Galatians 1:10.
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would quickly admit such. Here, as in all articles of faith,
reason and God's truth are rent asunder.
'Paradox' abounds in Luther's thought, and perhaps
the supreme example is the doctrine rendered as simul justus
et peccator (simultaneously justified and sinner).43 Luther
sees in the regenerated man a distinction not of 'either/or',
in contrast with the unregenerated, but of 'both/and'. The
believer in Christ is, on the one hand, enlightened by the
Spirit to see God's truths, and on the other, darkened by
his remaining sin. Luther saw this idea as wholly Biblical.
Coupling 1 John 1:8 with 1 John 3:9, he shows that God's Word
says, at one and the same time, that the believer is not able
to sin, yet if he says he has no sin, he is lying.44
Man in two kingdoms
According to the Reformer, regenerated man, while
still on this earth, finds himself in the realm of two overlapping kingdoms. In regard to the lesser kingdom of the
creation [actually of Satan], man is able--even after the
Fall--to be led by his own free will with regard to those
43The exact phrase 'simul justus et peccator' is
found in the Galatians Commentary (1519), WA 2, 497, 13,
where the phrase is employed to describe the Biblical personage of Job. Another clear reference to this concept is
found in WA 2, 489, 11-14.
44
LW 27, p. 230; WA 2, 496-497; the Biblical passages
as rendered in LW 27: "He who is born of God does not sin"
(1 John 3:9); and "If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us" (1 John 1:8).
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things that are below him; in the other kingdom [the kingdom
of God], he is not left in the hand of his own counsel, but
is directed and led by the will and counsel of God.45 This
places regenerated man in the precarious position of being
caught between two kingdoms that are at war with each other;
hence his life on earth will be one of great confusion and
of paradox.46
"Ratio Coram Deo"
The "magisterium" and "ministerium"
of man's use of reason
If Luther's distinction of the two kingdoms is noted,
attention must be given to the condition of ratio, as possessed by the regenerate man, and as it seeks to function
within each of those distinct spheres. The first of the
kingdoms to be treated here will be the kingdom of God. As
noted in the previous discussion [pages 78-79], the will of
God reigns supremely in this realm. Sin has darkened man's
knowledge of God; and as man stands before God (coram deo),
he is not able even to know what is right and wrong.47
Classic surveys of Christian dogmatics delineate
ratio's proper use before God, by carefully distinguishing
45
BOW, pp. 150-151 [WA 18, 672-673]: "For there is no
middle kingdom between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of
Satan, which are at war with each other."
46
Cf. Ibid., p. 253; WA 18, 743, 32.
47
Cf. Gerrish, Grace and Reason, p. 14.
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the so-called 'usus rationis ministerialis' from the 'usus
rationis magisterialis'. In this distinction, the ministerium of reason is its proper sphere of competence, when as a
maid it gives way to higher authority; the magisterium of
reason speaks of ratio's arrogating to itself judgment in
things about which it knows nothing, and which exceed its
grasp of understanding.48 These categories fit well into
Luther's view of ratio coram deo. According to the Reformer,
reason is quite stupid and absurd when applied to holy
things.49 Reason's relationship before God is a ministerial
one.
"Theologia crucis"
At no crossroad is ratio's incompetence to understand
articles of a spiritual nature more amplified, as when it
encounters the cross of Christ. Much has been written concerning the central importance of the 'theology of the cross'
(theologia crucis) for Luther's thought.50 The 'theology of
the cross' stands in contrast to the 'theology of glory'
(theologia gloriae). While the 'theology of glory' seeks to
48
See Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 4 vols.
(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), 1:199.
49
BOW, p. 152; WA 18, 674.
50
The most excellent treatment of this subject, known
to this writer, is Walther von Loewenich, Luther's Theology
of the Cross, trans. Herbert J. A. Bouman (Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1976). See also Althaus, Theology
of Luther, pp. 25-34.
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know God through His works, the 'theology of the cross' recognizes, through faith, that a true knowledge of God is to
be found only in the suffering Christ on Calvary.51
"Deus absconditus" and "revelatus"
The cross of Christ is the greatest stumbling-block
to the reason of man [see page 76 above]. Human reason is
totally baffled that God should reveal Himself to man in
this way. This is the point at which another important distinction in Luther's understanding of man's ability to know
things concerning God must be noted: the distinction between
God, as He chooses to remain hidden from the reason of man
(Deus absconditus), and God, as He has chosen to reveal Himself to man (Deus revelatus).
In The Bondage of the Will, Luther again takes the
offensive against Erasmus for the latter's failure to make
the distinction between God hidden and revealed. The Reformer notes that "Wherever God hides Himself, and wills to
be unknown to us, there we have no concern. Here that senti51
An interesting passage in Althaus, Theology of
Luther, pp. 26-27, further establishes that Luther deepens
the meaning of these concepts by showing that, in the 'theology of glory,' man seeks to know God not only through His
works, but also through man's works; in the same way, in the
'theology of the cross,' God is found not only in the suffering of Christ, but also in man's suffering. Hence, in
Althaus's words, "natural theology and speculative metaphysics which seek to learn to know God from the works of
creation are in the same category as the work righteousness
of the moralist. Both are ways in which man exalts himself
to the level of God."
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ment: 'what is above us does not concern us', [sic] really
holds good."52 Against a philosophical approach toward seeking to know God, Luther forcefully ascertains that God in His
own nature and majesty is to be left alone. The magisterial
use of human reason is to be shunned. Says Luther, "We have
to do with Him as clothed and displayed in His Word, by which
He presents Himself to us."53
Thus even regenerated man must know God only as He
has chosen to reveal Himself to him. Man must be guided by
God's word, not by His inscrutable will which we cannot comprehend.54 If reason tries to know God by observing His
works, then it will be confounded all the more; for God frequently acts in paradoxical ways. For example, Luther states
that when God quickens, He does so by killing [as occurs to
this writer, the supreme instance was at Calvary!]; when He
justifies, He does so by pronouncing guilty; when He carries
up to heaven, He does so by bringing down to hell. "Thus God
conceals His eternal mercy and loving kindness beneath eternal wrath, His righteousness beneath unrighteousness."55

52BOW, p. 170; WA 18, 685, 6.
53Ibid.; WA 18, 685, 16.
54Ibid., pp. 170-171; WA 18, 685.
55
Ibid., p. 101; WA 18, 633, 9. Luther's 'proof
texts' are 1 Kings 2, "The Lord killeth and maketh alive";
and 1 Samuel 2:6, "he bringeth down to the grave and bringeth
up" (as rendered in the Packer-Johnston text).
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Revelation at God's initiative
Therefore, the essential need of man--in order that
he might come to know God--is for God's revelation of Himself. Accordingly, in giving his exposition on Galatians
4:9, Luther agrees with Augustine regarding the fact that,
properly speaking, man does not come to know God at all;
rather, God must come to know us first.56 God, not man, must
take the initiative of this effort. As the Reformer makes
mention of the fact, 'sons of God' [regenerate men] became
such only by being born of God, not by human volition.57
And, as Luther shows from 1 Corinthians 2, unless the Spirit
[God] revealed the principal articles of faith concerning
salvation itself, no man's heart would know anything about
the matter of life everlasting.58 Luther: ". . . the whole
world, human reason, yes, 'free-will', [sic] are forced to
confess that they had not known nor heard of Christ before
the gospel [God's revelation through the word] entered the
world."59
56LW 27, p. 294; WA 2, 539, 10.
57
BOW, p. 303; WA 18, 776, 30; cf. John 1:12-13.
58lbid., p. 139; WA 18, 663.
59Ibid., p. 306; WA 18, 778, 34. As can be seen from
these points, Gerrish's distinction between Luther and Ockham
grows more significant as to its correctness [see page 69
above]. Indeed, Luther's paramount concern in his concept of
ratio is not of an epistemological, but of a soteriological,
nature.
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Without the aid of revelation from God, human reason
cannot grasp Him. In the Galatians Commentary (1519), Luther
states that Christ alone, not man's reason, is the Light and
Life of all men.60 Indeed! Then what can be made of the
ratio of unregenerated man? Has it not been shown above
[pages 73-76] that man's reason--even in the realm of the
unregenerate--was not destroyed, but merely impaired, by the
Fall? Again Luther's position must be restated, that unaided
reason is able to perceive that a God exists, but that it is
utterly incapable of knowing who or what kind of God He truly
is, namely, a God of grace.
Three lights of illumination
Luther distinguishes between three separate "lights,"
which illumine man's path to the truth: the light of nature,
the light of grace, and the light of glory.61 Judging by
Luther's usage of these terms in their context, the 'light
of nature' refers to the God-given gift of ratio, as it is
possessed even by the unregenerate, and is able to make deductions and calculations in this life; the 'light of grace'
60
LW 27, p. 293; WA 2, 538, 15: "Solus Christus est
lux et vita omnium hominum, non ratio nostra."
61
BOW, p. 317. Could these 'three lights' be a reworking of the system of three classes of arguments that had
been outlined by Averroes [see page 20, n. 22 above]? This
writer does not pretend to have the answer; but what is interesting is the observation that Luther's 'three lights'
offer a complete reversal of the order of possessed truth
that had been given by Averroes. In the latter's system, it
is the natural philosopher who holds the most certain truth;
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describes the enlightened reason of the regenerate man, who
is able to perceive such things as the Gospel and other articles of faith (against which the 'light of nature' is hostile
because of their supposed unreasonableness); and the 'light
of glory' takes into account the eschatological aspect of
man's knowledge of God, noting that our understanding of God
and His will is imperfect, at best, while man remains in this
world--that the regenerate will possess a more complete picture of God when they are taken to be with Him in heaven.
Enemy of the gospel;
friend to the law
Much mention is made in writings about Luther's theology that the Reformer spoke in condemning fashion concerning
ratio. The "White Devil," "the Devil's whore," "Frau Hulda,"
"Madam Reason," [Domina Ratio] are but a few of the not so
complimentary names which Luther employs when referring to
human reason.62 But one must recall Luther's understanding
that man's reason has not been totally destroyed, only impaired, by the Fall [see pages 73-76 above]. Reason is not
always a tool of the devil. The context in which Luther
in Luther's view, it is the regenerated man [in heaven], who
holds that highest level of knowledge, while philosophy holds
the lowest form of knowledge.
62
Cf. BOW, p. 154 [WA 18, 674, 13], p. 232 [WA 18,
729, 7], and passim. These names do not appear, as such, in
the Galatians Commentary (1519), nor in the Disputation,
though in the latter, reason is described as being under the
devil's influence, as the discussion on pages 93-95 (below)
will indicate.
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speaks of "Mistress Reason" in his writings bears important
evidence, which shows that he viewed ratio in this dark light
only as it is used in a 'magisterial' way [compare pages 8182].
Luther's criticism of reason stems from its inability
to accept the gospel as true; put in stronger terms, he sees
that misused reason has the ability to weaken--even destroy-the gospel's saving impact upon fallen man. In The Bondage
of the Will, "Mistress Reason" finds no friend in Luther:
"Reason is . . . so entrapped in the inferences and words of
her own wisdom, that she does not know what she is saying or
talking about."63 The focus of Luther's argument, in this
instance, is that reason will not allow natural man to acknowledge his total inability to do anything toward working
out his own salvation with God--or, for that matter, anything that is at all God-pleasing. Erasmus has sought to
preserve something in man's 'free-will' since the Fall, that
will enable one to at least co-operate with God's will. Yet
Luther has shown, to the contrary, that man has been totally
corrupted by his sin, and is held in captivity apart from
God as a consequence.64 The Reformer's point of contention,
throughout his treatise On the Bondage of the Will, is that
if man can be shown to retain something of his 'free-will'
63BOW, p. 154; WA 18, 674, 22.
64Cf. Ibid., p. 153; WA 18, 674, 9.
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after the Fall, which enables man to co-operate with God's
will in any way in working toward his salvation, then the
sacrifice of Christ is diminished; for in that case, Christ
would only have died to save the lesser attributes of man,
and not his reason and will (his highest attributes).
Unaided reason, as portrayed in Luther's writings,
is no friend of the Gospel. This is because man's natural
reason, since the Fall, is legalistic in character. Ratio
wants to make works of the Law the criteria for determining
who will be saved, and who will be lost, at the last judgment of God. For this reason, Luther is highly critical of
any, who would seek to use the wisdom of men as authoritative
over the Gospel, in formulating any theology which depicts
man as being able to contribute works of merit toward his
own salvation:
We learn these godless kinds of righteousness from the
decrees of men and from the monstrous theology which has
Aristotle as its head and Christ as its feet, since these
decrees and these kinds of righteousness alone hold sway.
For this is how they vaunt their petty works of satisfaction; and it is amazing what value they place on these
with their traffic in indulgences, as if it were not
enough to believe in Christ, in whom our righteousness,
redemption, satisfaction, life and glory are by faith
alone [1 Corinthians 1:30: "But by His doing you are in
Christ Jesus, who became to us wisdom from God, and
righteousness and sanctification, and redemption" NASB].65
65
LW 27, p. 328 [WA 2, 562, 1], on Galatians 5:2; cf.
a similar statement in that same work, p. 219 [WA 2, 489,
24]: "This is the kind of righteousness Aristotle and other
philosophers describe--the kind produced by laws of the state
and of the church in ceremonies, the kind produced at the
behest of reason and by prudence."
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Reason as judge over God
Allowing God alone to be the judge, over who is to
be saved and who is to be damned, is contrary to the impulse
of human reason, as described by Luther. This is the height
of the magisterial use of ratio. Luther observes that the
greatest possible offense confronts human reason, when it is
noted that God, Who is proclaimed full of mercy and goodness,
should of His own mere will abandon, harden, and damn men,
as though He delighted in the sins and great eternal torments
of such poor wretches. Says the Reformer, "And who would
not stumble at it? I have stumbled at it myself more than
once, down to the deepest pit of despair, so that I wished I
had never been made a man."66
In this arena of man's contemplation, fallen reason
will not allow God to be God. Satan's influence is felt by
the ratio of man.67 Reason praises God as God only when He
acts as One who serves its own convenience. Ratio praises
God when He saves the unworthy from their destruction, but
finds fault with Him when He damns those who are also undeserving of His mercy.68
66BOW, p. 217; WA 18, 719, 9.
67In BOW, p. 134 [WA 18, 659, 32], Luther surmises
that if Satan were not at work in this world, "the whole
world could be converted by a single word of God, heard once:
there would be no need of more."
68Ibid., p. 234; WA 18, 733.
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Invincible ignorance
In light of reason's incompetence before God, man
could easily adopt an entirely fatalistic outlook toward the
question, Why are some saved, while others are not? Luther
demonstrates, in the Galatians Commentary (1519), that teachers of that era were doing just that. Some were hypothesizing three classes of ignorance: invincible ignorance, gross
ignorance, and affected ignorance [ignorantiam aliam invincibilem, aliam crassam et affectatum].69
Luther describes the three classes of ignorance in
reference to Galatians 4:8 ["However at that time, when you
did not know God, you were slaves to those which by nature
are no gods" NASB.]. Ignorance that is affected [by the Holy
Spirit] accuses man in his sin all the more; he can no longer
plead innocence before God as Judge, claiming that he simply
did not know any better than to act as he did in life. Gross
ignorance of God's will is an intermediate category, between
"affected" and "invincible" ignorance, which partially excuses one from his sin, but not entirely. Invincible ignorance, so it was said by those who composed the theory, was
able to absolve a man from all sin.
Luther indicted those who espoused the notion of an
invincible ignorance with doing injury to God's grace, and
inflating man's supposed 'free-will.'70 God is able to sur69LW 27, pp. 292-293; WA 2, 537-538.

70Ibid.
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mount any obstacle; hence, an "invincible" ignorance cannot
exist. It might also be added, that what has been shown
above, namely, the idea that God has written His law into
the heart of man as part of his very nature [see pages 7475], shatters the mistaken concept of a so-called 'invincible
ignorance' on the part of man.
"Ratio Coram Humanitate"
Attention must now be given to the second of the two
kingdoms in which regenerated man finds himself living while
in this world, that is, the kingdom of Satan [also, "the
world," and "the flesh"]. It has been established above,
that Luther envisioned as being improper, any so-called 'magisterial' use of reason before God (coram deo), which does
not allow God to be God, and which usurps to itself the authority to declare what is righteous and unrighteous, just
and unjust. But the preceding discussion also acknowledged
a 'ministerial' use of reason, which described an appropriate
sphere of action and thinking, where ratio is free to work
within properly defined parameters. This 'ministerium' of
reason speaks of man's living with his fellowman in the
world: hence the phrase, 'ratio coram humanitate'.
Reason's majesty
In describing man's gift of ratio before the Fall,
Luther heaped praise upon it as man's highest attribute [see
pages 66-67]. Because of the lofty importance which reason

93
holds for the proper maintenance of God's creation, and for
the improvement of man's life on earth, Luther also speaks
of ratio as possessing a certain "majesty."71 But this ma- •
jesty belongs to reason not for its own sake, but because it
is a gift of God at creation; it is God who both bestowed,
and confirmed, the majestic honor upon man's reason.
Even for the unregenerate man, reason is an essential
tool for service. With it, man can "have dominion" over the
other living things on the earth; that is, he can properly
administer the things of this life.72 A high gift, reason
owns the distinction of being the inventor of all the arts,
medicines, laws, and so forth.73 Thus, it can be noted that
Luther valued man's reason highly.
Influence of the devil
Since the world can also be called the kingdom of
Satan, can it be inferred that every action of man, while he
is in this domain, is controlled by the devil; and further,
is every earthly act of man necessarily evil? As shown in
the section concerning ratio coram deo above, distinction
must be made between unregenerate, and regenerate man. If
consideration is given only to man apart from faith, then
articles 24 and 25 of the Disputation lend a certain answer:
71LW 34, p. 137, a.9 and 10; WA 39 I, 175.
72Ibid., a.7 and 8; WA 39 I, 175.
73Ibid., a.5; WA 39 I, 175.
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even though reason remains man's highest attribute after the
Fall, it still lies under the devil's power, and it must be
concluded that the whole man and every man--regardless of
one's station in life--is and remains guilty of sin and death
under the power of Satan.74 Likewise, unregenerated man is
totally unable to choose between what is 'good' and that
which is 'evil,' neither is he able to merit the grace of God
and life; moreover, the light of God's countenance is no
longer in the unregenerate since the Fall.75
If the regenerated man is taken into consideration,
the picture of man under the devil's power changes somewhat.
Yet here the caveat must again be sounded, that the fragmentary articles for debate, which follow the Disputation proper, may not necessarily represent Luther's final formulations on the topics in question. This warning in mind, the
tentative response to the question of Satan's level of dominance over regenerate man might be rendered as follows:
(1) an apparent implication in the argument against thesis
24 in the Disputation, is that man is utterly incapable of
doing anything that is 'good' (before God) apart from his
being regenerated by God; (2) against the reactionary comment
outlined in that same section--that is, "if reason is of the
devil, no one does good; but we ought to do good; therefore,
74LW 34, pp. 138-139; WA 39 I, 176.
75Ibid., p. 139, a.30, 27, and 29; WA 39 I, 176.
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all reason is not under the power of the devil"--Luther makes
defense by noting that "we are not debating about the pious
man"; (3) Luther's further comment in that section states
"all good things which are over and above the divine gift
are subject to the devil"; (4) ergo, regenerate man does,
indeed, live within two kingdoms (the kingdom of God and of
Satan), and whatever part of that individual as lies outside
God's active influence, such is as remains under the domination of the devil. However, insofar as God is actively at
work to enlighten the reason of regenerate man, the latter
is able to know the 'good' that remains a mystery to the man
without faith.76 Hence, in the case of the regenerate man,
not all reason lies necessarily under the devil's control.
One may speak of an enlightened reason, or (as in Luther's
terms), of a "theological man."77
Right reason
Paul Althaus lends interesting insight into the
theology of Luther. In summarizing Luther's view of reason,
as it is employed in earthly affairs, Althaus notes that
theology has no other task than to allow reason its place, to
76Ibid., p. 142; WA 39 I, 179.
77Ibid., p. 139, a.28; WA 39 I, 176; "theological
man" is a term which Luther uses to distinguish man, as he is
portrayed in Scripture, in contrast to a philosophical, Aristotelian, idea of man. The term refers especially to regenerate man: "Theological man is outside the realm of the
devil. Civic man has virtues to be sure, but he is not free
from the devil" (LW 34, p. 144; WA 39 I, 180, 30).
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recognize it, and to testify that it is God's creation.
Still further, in the matters of "earthly government," reason
alone is the final authority, containing within itself the
basis for judging and deciding about the proper regulation
and administration of earthly matters such as economics and
politics. Says Althaus, "In these matters the Bible, Christian preaching, and theology have nothing to say. Holy
Scripture and the gospel do not teach us how to make right
laws or administer the affairs of state."78
The selected writings of Luther with which this paper
is concerned do not allow as complete a construction of
Luther's view of reason's scope in earthly affairs, as
Althaus is able to render. However, hints do appear in a
fragmentary way within the Disputation, that reason is meant
to play a significant role in the task of administering the
affairs of this world, even for the unregenerate.
The Disputation fragment speaks of a "right reason"
[recta ratio], which is the principal part of man that distinguishes man from beasts.79 Since the early articles of
the Disputation had determined that man's "reason" was his
highest gift at creation, and that which differentiated man
from animal, it seems logical to deduce that the terms
'ratio' and 'recta ratio' denote one and the same concept,
78Theology of Luther, p. 65.
79
LW 34, p. 144; WA 39 I, 180, 16.
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insofar as they are used to describe that faculty of man that
is able to properly administer the affairs of this world, act
as the inventor and mentor of all the arts, medicines, laws,
and so forth.80 Thus, "right reason" is presented as that
attribute of man which is able to act as a guide in matters
concerning this life, regardless of whether a man be regenerate or unregenerate.
As stated before, the primary works under consideration in this paper do not lend sufficient information to construct a thorough presentation of Luther's concept of "right
reason." To go further than what is presented here, however,
would be an interesting project, especially in seeking to
discover the similarities (and dissimilarities) of Luther's
defining of this term, as contrasted with Augustine and other
prominent theologians who lived before the sixteenth century.
The focus of the current project will concentrate on matters
more fully discussed in the primary writings under present
review, beginning with Luther's understanding of the relationship of ratio to the study of Scripture.
80Ibid., p. 137, a.4, 5, and 6; WA 39 I, 175.

CHAPTER IV
LUTHER'S UNDERSTANDING OF RATIO
AS APPLIED TO SCRIPTURE
Scripture as Word of God
The previous chapter established Luther's views concerning the severe limitations incurred by human reason since
the Fall of man. Before attention may be given to the topic
of how the Reformer viewed ratio's acceptable employment in
theological concerns, the importance of ratio's relationship
to his study of Scripture must be considered. Clearly,
Luther's concept of Scripture is central to his theology; for
the teachings of Holy Writ form the very basis for the doctrines which he upheld in the many open debates of the Reformation.
The relationship between ratio and the word of God,
as drawn by Luther, is paramount toward understanding the
significance of what one writer has called the "Schriftprinzip" of the Reformation--Sola Scriptura l Establishing
that correlation demands, first, that attention be given to
Luther's conception of the meaning of 'word of God'.
1A. Skevington Wood, "Luther's Concept of Revelation," Evangelical Quarterly 35 (July-September 1963):150.
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"Word of God" Defined
In the Galatians Commentary (1519), Luther notes that
the word of God (verbum Dei) is the church's first and greatest benefit; and, on the other hand, there is no greater harm
by which the church is destroyed than the word of man and the
traditions of this world. "God alone is true, and every man
a liar [Psalm 116:11]."2 From this passage, it is exceedingly clear that the word of God held the place of highest
authority in Luther's theology, and that the words of man
pale in comparison as vehicles of proclaiming truth. But
what, exactly, is meant by the phrase "word of God" in the
Reformer's thinking?
The context of the many references to "word of God"
in the writings of Luther indicates, most often, that he
means the written words of Scripture as God's revelation of
Himself to man. Yet the phrase does not signify only that
to Luther. One notices, for example, such passages as the
following:
I am conscious of being a debtor to the Word [verbi], no
matter how unworthy I am. It has never been possible to
discuss the Word of God [verbum del] without incurring
danger of bloodshed; but just as the Word died for us,
so it requires, in turn, that we die for it when we confess it. The servant is not greater than his master. 3
2Martin Luther, Luther's Works, 55 vols., gen. eds.
Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-),
27:165 (hereafter cited as LW); Martin Luther, D. Martin
Luther's Werke (Weimar: H. Boehlau, 1883-), 2:453, 33 (hereafter cited as WA).
3LW 27, p. 159; WA 2, 449, 11.
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The interchange in this excerpt between the vocable "Word,"
and the phrase "Word of God," is striking. And if the usage
of each is noted within the context of the cited passage, one
must concede that--by both the vocable and the phrase--Luther
refers not to the words of Scripture, but to Christ Jesus
Himself: the Word made flesh. Certainly, in view of the
Reformer's acknowledgment that the written word is the
church's greatest benefit, it may be given that Luther may
have--in some sense--felt indebted to it; but this kind of
nuance does not fit the occurrence of the vocable in the sentences quoted above. Further, the third occasion of the use
of "Word" in the quotation [line 4] does not occur in the
Weimar edition, as it does in the American translation; instead, it is implied by the grammar, so that the sentence
could read, "It has never been possible to discuss the Word
of God . . .; but just as it [the Word of God] died . . . ."
Surely Luther cannot mean to say that the written pages of
Scripture died! Rather, the rendering makes more sense if
"the Word of God" is understood as "Christ Jesus," who died
for us. Ergo, "word of God" must be understood always within
the context of Luther's writings; for only then may one
determine whether by the phrase is meant either God's written
word, or the Word made flesh--Jesus Christ.
A further connotation of Luther's concept of the word
can be found in the continuation of the passage cited above:
•

•

'If they persecuted Me,' says Christ (John 15:20),
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'they will also persecute you; if they have kept My Word
[sermonem], they will also keep yours.',4 The Latin vocable
"sermonem" bears the import of a word that is spoken, or proclaimed. Therefore, Paul Althaus is not out of line in suggesting that the idea of the "spoken" word is also of great
moment in Luther's understanding of "word of God."5 For
Luther, the word of God is not something static, or lifeless.
Rather, it is a vibrant, living word; it is Christ made manifest for man through the verbal proclamation of God through
the apostles.
Scripture as Revelation of God's Word
Vehicle of the Spirit
In Luther's concept, the word of God--whether spoken
or written--does not possess power to save by its own right,
but only insofar as it is a vehicle for conveying the Holy
Spirit to man. This point is established most lucidly in the
Galatians Commentary (1519), by the Reformer's discussion
concerning whether or not infants (or the deaf) can believe
in Christ if they have not heard the preached word. Luther
finds agreement with Jerome,6 who concluded that, to the word
4
LW 27, p. 159; WA 2, 449, 13.
5The Theology of Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 72.
6
Sophronius Eusebius Hieronymus, born probably in the
340s, died 419 or 420. In addition to Augustine, Luther cites
this church father often in the Galatians Commentary--this in
accordance with the expected method of Luther's time, that a
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of God, nothing is deaf, and that it speaks to those ears of
which it is said: "He who has ears to hear, let him hear"
[Matthew 11:15]. Says Luther:
I like this answer very much, because the Word of God
[verbum dei] is not heard even among adults and those
who hear unless the Spirit promotes growth inwardly.
Accordingly, it is a Word of power and grace when it
infuses the Spirit at the same time that it strikes the
ears. But if it does not infuse the Spirit, then he who
hears does not differ at all from one who is deaf.?
Thus, for Luther the word of God receives its power
by virtue of the working of the Holy Spirit. As vehicle of
the Spirit, the word has the force to create new life in its
hearers. Apart from the Spirit's work, the word remains
empty. But the Reformer goes one step further: he indicates
not only that the word is null without the Spirit, but also
that the Spirit does not work faith into the hearts of men
apart from the word. To quote from The Bondage of the Will
at length:
If Reason should here wrinkle up her nose and say: 'Why
does God will that these things be done by His words,
when nothing is achieved by such words, and the will
cannot turn itself in either direction? Why does He not
do what He does without speaking a word, when He can do
all things without a word? For a will that has heard His
Word can do and does no more than before, if the inner
moving of the Spirit is wanting; nor could it avail or
do any less without the Word being spoken, if the Spirit
was with it; for all depends on the power and operation
of the Spirit' to this I shall say: It has pleased God
lecturer on Biblical exegesis was required to present to his
students the thoughts of approved expositors; cf. Uuras
Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel: New Light upon
Luther's Way from Medieval Catholicism to Evangelical Faith
(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1951), p. 60.
7LW 27, p. 249; WA 2, 509, 1.
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not to give the Spirit without the Word, but through the
Word; that He might have us as workers together with Him,
we sounding forth without what He alone breathes within
wheresoever He will. This He could do without the Word;
but He will not. And who are we to inquire into the
cause of the Divine will? It is enough for us to know
that God so wills, and it becomes us to worship, love and
adore His will, bridling the presumption of reason.8
It is clear from this excerpt that there is no difference between the "early Luther" and the "mature Luther"
on the matter of the word's being the vehicle of the Holy
Spirit. Because of this close correlation between the word
and the Spirit, the written word, too, becomes authoritative
and all-important for the formulation of Luther's affirmations of the Reformation.
Means of grace
In addition to being the sole vehicle of the Holy
Spirit's interaction with man, the word (in Luther's theology) is also the only means whereby God bestows His grace
upon man. Luther could not be more clear on this point: "If
you want to obtain grace, then see to it that you hear the
Word of God attentively or meditate on it diligently." And
again: "The Word, I say, and only the Word, is the vehicle
of God's grace."9 It is obvious from this passage that by
stating that only the word is God's means of grace, Luther
8Martin Luther, On the Bondage of the Will: A New
Translation of "De Servo Arbitrio" (1525), Martin Luther's
Reply to Erasmus of Rotterdam, trans. and ed. J. I. Packer
and 0. R. Johnston (United States: Fleming H. Revell Co.,
1957), p. 184 (hereafter cited as BOW); WA 18, 695, 22.
9
LW 27, p. 249; WA 2, 509, 13.
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is referring to both the spoken and written word of God;
because of the reference to "hearing" and "meditating," the
word of God may not be taken as denoting Christ in this particular excerpt, though because of His atoning sacrifice,
Jesus Christ might also be considered a "means of God's
grace" to man.10
"Sola Scriptura"
As noted above [page 98], the Scriftprinzip of the
Reformation came to be known by the phrase "sola Scriptura."
But it must be kept in mind that the concept that Scripture
was the sole authority for any article of faith, was not an
invention of Martin Luther, nor of the Reformation era. The
assertion of Scripture's primacy had been held at least since
the time of Augustine.11 Nevertheless, one can maintain the
position of Luther's having further developed the idea of
the absolute supremacy of the Scriptures in defense of true
doctrine. Yet, interestingly enough, when seeking to lend
10The discussion in this portion of the present paper
is not meant to be taken as exhaustive of Luther's enumeration of the "Means of Grace"; for surely one must consider
also the sacraments in Luther's theology, if the listing is
to be complete. For a more comprehensive overview of the
Means of Grace in Luther's theology, see Jaroslav Pelikan,
"The Theology of the Means of Grace," in Accents in Luther's
Theology: Essays in Commemoration of the 450th Anniversary
of the Reformation, ed. Heino 0. Kadai (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1967), pp. 124-147.
11For an excellent treatment of this subject, see
Hermann Sasse, "The Rise of the Dogma of Holy Scripture in
the Middle Ages," The Reformed Theological Review 18 (June
1959):45-54.
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force to his argument for the primacy of Holy Writ, even in
the eyes of Rome, Luther cites the early Fathers as support:
St. Augustine teaches that no one should be believed, no
matter how greatly he may excel in sanctity and learning
(even the highest degree of sanctity, I believe), unless
he convinces you by Holy Writ or acceptable reasoning
[here Luther must mean the 'usus rationis ministerialis'],
lest we be tricked if we play some other game.12
While many of Luther's predecessors had espoused the
supremacy of Scripture in establishing theological truths,
few went quite so far as the Reformer in subordinating even
the authority of the Church to the Bible.13 The fundamental
reasons for Luther's extreme position of the primacy of
Scripture are clear. Man's ratio has been seriously impaired
by the Fall, thereby making him totally dependent upon God's
revelation of Himself in order that anything certain about
His nature and will can be known. God's self-disclosure is
given by the power of the Holy Spirit; and the relationship
of the Spirit to the word, as vehicle of His power to reveal
and to convert, has already been determined [see pages 101103 above]; in the larger excerpt, Luther argues from the
strength of Matthew 4:4 ["But He answered and said, 'It is
written, "MAN SHALL NOT LIVE ON BREAD ALONE, BUT ON EVERY
WORD THAT PROCEEDS OUT OF THE MOUTH OF GOD"'" NASB].
12LW 27, p. 156; WA 2, 447, 15.
13Cf. Lewis W. Spitz, Sr., "Luther's Sola Scriptura,"
Concordia Theological Monthly 31 (December 1960):740-745;
see also BOW, p. 69 [WA 18, 604].
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Because of Luther's view of the necessity for the
presence and working of the Holy Spirit in order for the
Scriptures to be effective, a careful definition of 'sola
Scriptura' must be rendered, lest one be misled into thinking
that the Bible has supremacy even over the Spirit. On this
point, Bernhard Lohse has sounded the appropriate caveat:
Luther is known for his principle 'Sola Scriptura' [sic].
But Luther never forgot that man needs the enlightening
by the Holy Spirt, though the Holy Spirit never works
apart from the means of teaching and preaching. The
revelation of which the Scripture is a witness and the
revelation of the Holy Spirit cannot be separated from
each other. Luther makes the objection to the enthusiasts of his time that they try to do this. The result
of such an attempt always is that one is led not by the
Holy Spirit, but by one's own spirit. The revelation of
the Scripture and the revelation of the Holy Spirit are
in the same way one, as the works of the different persons of the Trinity are one. One must distinguish but
may not separate them.14
The Content of Scripture
Even though Luther may not be credited as the originator of the tendency toward the sola Scriptura principle of
formulating doctrine in the church, his findings were distinctive nonetheless. In an essay entitled "Luther and the
Word of God," Hermann Sasse presents the following summation:
If this tendency [sola Scriptura] is obviously in the
background of the Reformation and one of the reasons for
its success, it does not explain Luther's new understanding of the authority of Holy Scripture. For this
was linked up from the beginning with a completely new
discovery that was as important to him as it was new to
14,
Reason and Revelation in Luther," Scottish Journal
of Theology 13 (December 1960):337-365, p. 346.
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the Christian world of that time: the distinction between
Law and Gospel in the Word of God.15
The discovery of the proper distinction between Law
and Gospel was significant; for as Sasse notes elsewhere in
the same essay, the Gospel for all medieval men to that time
had been the lex Christi: 'Do this and you will live.'16 The
lex Christi was found especially in Matthew 19, in Jesus'
response to the young rich man; and when the young man heard
this statement, "he went away grieved" [Matthew 19:22, NASB].
This 'gospel' is no Gospel at all to Luther. Quite in contrast to the response of the young rich man, Luther rejoices
at having found in Scripture the true Gospel proclamation.
The clear Gospel, then, is yet another way to understand the
phrase "word of God" in Luther's writings, as can be seen in
the following excerpt from the Galatians Commentary (1519):
To put it clearly, . . . as often as the Word of God is
preached, it renders consciences joyful, expansive, and
untroubled toward God, because it is a Word of grace and
forgiveness, a kind and sweet Word.17
And in comparison with this sweet word of God is the word of
man: "As often as the word of man is preached, it renders the
conscience sad, cramped, and full of fear in itself, because
it is a word of the Law, of wrath and sin; it shows what a
15See Accents in Luther's Theology: Essays in Commemoration of the 450th Anniversary of the Reformation, ed.
Heino 0. Kadai (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1967),
pp. 47-97, especially p. 60.
16Ibid., pp. 61-62.
17LW 27, p. 164; WA 2, 453, 2.

108
person has failed to do and how deeply he is in debt."18
Because of the importance in understanding Luther's
distinction between Law and Gospel in Scripture, it is again
necessary to quote the Reformer at length:
The Gospel and the Law, taken in their proper sense,
differ in this way: The Law proclaims what must be done
and left undone; or better, it proclaims what deeds have
already been committed and omitted, and also that possible things are done and left undone (hence the only
thing it provides is the knowledge of sin); the Gospel,
however, proclaims that sins have been remitted and that
all things have been fulfilled and done. For the Law
says: "Pay what you owe"; but the Gospel says: "Your sins
or [sic] forgiven you." Thus in [Romans 3:20] we read:
"Through the Law comes knowledge of sin"; and in the
fourth chapter Paul says [verse 15]: "The Law works
wrath; for where there is no Law, there is no transgression." But concerning the Gospel Luke [24:46-47] says:
"Thus it was necessary that Christ should suffer and rise
again from the dead, and that repentance and remission
of sins should be preached to all nations in His name."
. . . Therefore he who has been justified through grace
flees from the Law to the Gospel and says [Matthew 6:12]:
"Forgive us our debts." 19
Thus the content of Scripture, for Luther, can be
properly divided between the two major categories of Law and
Gospel. Yet again let the reader beware; just as the vocable
"word" can be found in an equivocal manner throughout the
writings of Luther, so can the word "Gospel" have more than
the nuance just noted. "Gospel" may also denote the entirety
of God's revelation to man, whether this be Law or Gospel in
the narrow sense of these words. The context must determine
for the reader which connotation Luther intends for each
18Ibid.; WA 2, 453, 4.
19
LW 27, 183-184; WA 2, 466, 3.
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occurrence of this term.
The Competence of "Ratio" in
Understanding Scripture
Luther's approach to Scripture demonstrates a keen
awareness of the Bible's being a divine collection of writings, intended for the purpose of making men wise unto salvation in Jesus Christ.20 But alongside of the assertion
that the Scriptures are God's own revelation to man must be
placed the contrasting view of the incompetence of ratio,
since the Fall, to comprehend things of a spiritual nature
[as demonstrated from Luther's theology in Chapter Three
above]. How are these two ideas reconciled one to another?
Is man's reason at all capable of understanding the content
of sacred Scripture since the Fall? The following survey of
Luther's words will seek to unveil the Reformer's answers to
these questions.
The Nature of Scripture's Language
Scripture is no dark book
Erasmus had been critical of Luther for the latter's
reliance upon Holy Scripture without realizing that Scripture needs interpretation and does not interpret itself. The
former writer maintained that Scripture is in most of its
20Sasse offers a word of clarification as to the definition of "Scriptures" at the time of Luther, that is worth
noting: one must keep in mind that in Luther's era no one in
Christendom had a clear conception of what the Holy Scriptures really were; for it was not until the decision of the
Council of Trent [held in three sessions--1545-1547; 1551-
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passages dark either on account of the language it uses, or
because it even contradicts itself for the superficial
reader; and for these reasons, Erasmus held that one is compelled to deviate somehow from its literal meaning and must
reach a more moderate understanding of Scripture by way of
interpretation.21
But Luther was not willing to concede to Erasmus the
validity of the medieval viewpoint that Scripture was a dark
book which needed the interpretation of the church. To be
sure, the Reformer asserted the need for the Holy Spirit's
involvement, if any part of Scripture was truly to be understood by man. Nevertheless, he contended against Erasmus
that in its external perspicuity, the words of Scripture are
not at all obscure or ambiguous, but all that is in the
Scripture is through the word brought forth into the clearest
light and proclaimed to the whole world.22
Luther is adamant in his defense of the clarity of
Scripture. The reason for his firmness may lie in the inherent danger which Luther finds lurking within the presuppos1552; and 1562-1563] that the antilegomena of the New Testament and the Apocrypha of the Old Testament were made
canonical for the Christians under the pope. See "Luther
and the Word of God," pp. 85-86.
21Cf. Desiderius Erasmus, On the Freedom of the
Will: A Diatribe or Discourse, trans. and ed. E. Gordon Rupp,
in collaboration with A. N. Marlow, in Luther and Erasmus:
Free Will and Salvation, The Library of Christian Classics
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), p. 97; also, Sasse,
"Luther and the Word of God," p. 66.
22BOW, p. 74; WA 18, 609, 12.
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ition of those who would take an elitist, philosophical
approach to the study of Scripture. Says Luther:
. . . the notion that in Scripture some things are recondite and all is not plain was spread by the godless
Sophists . . . who have never yet cited a single item to
prove their crazy view; nor can they. And Satan has used
these unsubstantial spectres to scare men off reading the
sacred text, and to destroy all sense of its value, so as
to ensure that his own brand of poisonous philosophy
reigns supreme in the church.23
On the accessibility of clear words of Scripture to
the human mind, Luther fights against two fronts. Against
the notion of the Roman Church, that only its interpretation
of Holy Writ holds validity, the Reformer's piercing arrows
are aimed to protect the church against the philosophical
errors of the ungodly. However, Luther must defend his
flank from another, equally devastating, assault from the
"enthusiasts," who were wont to interpret Scripture in totally free fashion, according to any misguided notions.
Addressing the need to establish right doctrines only
by the authority of Scripture, Luther writes:
It is true that we shall not detect the spirits by
appeals to learning, life, abilities, majorities, distinction, or to ignorance and lack of education, or numbers, or standing. However, I do not applaud those who
take refuge in bragging about the Spirit. I fought last
year, and am still fighting, a pretty fierce campaign
against those fanatics who subject the Scriptures to the
interpretation of their own spirit. On the same account
I have thus far hounded the Pope, in whose kingdom nothing is more commonly said or more widely accepted than
this dictum: 'the Scriptures are obscure and equivocal;
we must seek the interpreting Spirit from the apostolic
see of Rome!' No more disastrous words could be spoken;
for by this means ungodly men have exalted themselves
23
Ibid., p. 71; WA 18, 606, 16.
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above the Scriptures and done what they like, till the
Scriptures were completely trodden down and we could believe and teach nothing but maniacs' dreams.24
In both of the extreme positions mentioned above lies
a common pitfall: they subject the Scriptures to a human
authority, not fully taking into account man's incompetence,
since the Fall, to know truth about God's nature and will.
For Luther, who recognized the totality of the effect of sin
upon man's reason and will [see pages 70-72 above], the subordination of God's revelation of Himself to the "so-called"
authority of human reason--whether the interpretation of
Scripture be of ancient or modern origin--was a theological
error of the most heinous kind.25 For the Reformer, the
problem of understanding Scripture lay not in the written
record of God's proclamation to man, but within fallen man
himself. Man's reason is no friend of the Gospel [see above,
pages 87-89].
Problems of language
While Luther sustained his position concerning the
natural clarity of the words of Scripture against the view
that Scripture was in most passages a "dark" book, he was
not unaware of the problems that arise when seeking to determine the meaning of select portions of the Bible which, by
their composition, are undeniably "obscure" and difficult to
24Ibid., p. 124; WA 18, 652, 35.
25Cf. BOW, p. 260; WA 18, 748, 29.
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understand. "I certainly grant that many passages [emphasis
theirs] in the Scriptures are obscure and hard to elucidate,"
writes Luther, "but that is due, not to the exalted nature
of their subject, but to our own linguistic and grammatical
ignorance; and it does not in any way prevent our knowing
all the contents [emphasis theirs] of Scripture."26
For the Reformer, the content of Scripture is Christ.
"Take Christ from the Scriptures--and what more will you find
in them?"27 The proclamation of the written word about
Christ is presented in wondrous clarity; and yet, Luther
agrees that some passages remain dark to human understanding.
Nevertheless, he contends that to declare the bulk of Scripture "obscure" on the basis of passages which contain words
that remain unknown, is not tenable. Assistance in regaining
the import of difficult passages is lent by Scripture itself.
If words are obscure in one place, they are clear in
another. What God has so plainly declared to the world
is in some parts of Scripture stated in plain words,
while in other parts it still lies hidden under obscure
words. But when something stands in broad daylight, and
a mass of evidence for it is in broad daylight also, it
does not matter whether there is any evidence for it in
the dark. Who will maintain that the town fountain does
not stand in the light because the people down some alley
cannot see it, while everyone in the square can see it? 28
The nature of the obscurity of the words of Scripture
which Luther identifies cannot fully be perceived unless one
26BOW, p. 71; WA 18, 606, 22.
27Ibid.; WA 18, 606, 29.
28BOW, pp. 71-72; WA 18, 606, 34.
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takes into account that the Bible was originally given in
ancient languages. The positive influence of the humanism
of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries [see pages 40-42
above] seemed to surface in Luther's approach toward the
establishment of the most reliable text of Scripture that
was possible. The Galatians Commentary (1519) and The
Bondage of the Will bear ample testimony of Luther's endeavor
to know the text of Scripture on the basis of the Greek and
Hebrew languages in which the New and the Old Testaments,
respectively, were given.29
The mere determination of the actual meaning of the
original Greek and Hebrew vocables in Scripture was not the
only malady which Luther encountered in seeking a proper
interpretation of the texts of the Bible. Grammatical problems also begged conquest. To compound this difficulty, one
must also take into account the perplexing connotations being
forced into the passages of Scripture by the procedure, common to medieval exegetical practice, of establishing a
"fourfold meaning" for the contents of the Bible [see page
48, note 23, above].
These obstacles to the clarity of Scripture do not
stem directly from the deficiencies of ratio; rather they
are inherent within the texts themselves, by virtue of the
task of translating the ideas of one idiom of language into
29
An extended example of Luther's disputation with
Jerome's commentary on Isaiah 40, on the basis of the Hebrew
text, is found in BOW, pp. 243-246; WA 18, 736-738.
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another language of another culture--and another era. However, the inadequacy of ratio becomes apparent in yet another
aspect of Biblical interpretation: in the understanding of
articles which require acceptance by faith.
Difficult articles
Luther does not imply that man is able to understand
every article of Scripture, in the sense of being capable of
grasping each article by logic. Scripture is plain on such
doctrines as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and so forth,
insofar as they are rendered as statements of fact; but Holy
Writ does not need to explain how these things are what they
are. Again we are reminded of the Reformer's plea to let
God be God. Some things will remain obscure to us because
God has chosen not to reveal them in Scripture.30 Man's comprehension may not exceed God's revelation. In this arena of
seeking to know the truth about God's person and works, ratio
feels the brunt of its struggle with the blindness of the
sinful will, as shall be shown through Luther's distinguishing between the "letter" and the "spirit" of Scripture.
The Letter and the Spirit
of Scripture
It was shown above [pages 109-111] that, according
to the 'external' perspicuity of Scripture, Luther contended
that the written word was no dark book, but instead is easily
30Cf. BOW, p. 73; WA 18, 608, 5.
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understood by all who read it. This idea must now be contrasted with Luther's concept of the 'internal' perspicuity
of the word of God; and, as one might suspect, the 'external'
and the 'internal' perspicuity of Scripture are presented by
the Reformer as polar opposites. Luther outlines the essential difference:
In a word: The perspicuity [claritas] of Scripture is
twofold, just as there is a double lack of light. The
first is external, and relates to the ministry of the
Word; the second concerns the knowledge of the heart.
If you speak of internal [emphasis theirs] perspicuity,
the truth is that nobody who has not the Spirit of God
sees a jot of what is in the Scriptures. All men have
their hearts darkened, so that, even when they can discuss and quote all that is in Scripture, they do not
understand or really know any of it. . . .31
The critical distinction between the 'external' and
the 'internal' clarity of Scripture rests with the working
of the Holy Spirit [compare pages 101-103 above]. If the
Spirit is impeded in His pursuit to "infuse" faith into the
hearts of those giving audience to Scripture, then the words
will remain empty. Still better, the words will no longer
act in their life-giving mode; for Luther's contrasting of
the 'internal' and the 'external' perspicuity of the word,
is analogous to the difference between a 'living' and a
'lifeless' word. These comparative analogies are apt, since
Luther's primary contention is that, for those who receive
the Spirit through the proper vehicle of the word, new life
is added. Those who have received enlightenment from the
31Ibid.; WA 18, 609, 4.
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Holy Spirit are able to see the "spirit" of the word of God,
not merely the "letter."
One might, at first, be tempted to press the issue
further, by attempting to show an exact correspondence
between Luther's contrast of the "letter" and the "spirit"
of Scripture, on the one hand, and the distinction of the
will's motivation by the "flesh" and the "spirit," on the
other. To be sure, a correlation can indeed be found among
these concepts, as in both instances the "spirit" connotes
God's activity of winning men back from their fallen state-through the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit--so that those
redeemed might again comprehend God's perfect will, and emulate Him in their own righteous living with one another.
But the concepts of "flesh" and "letter" are not so parallel.
"Flesh" referred to all aspects of man that are hostile
toward the Spirit, and therefore under the condemnation of
the Law. However, the "letter" of Scripture may refer not
only to things of the law, but to things of the gospel as
well.

One who reads Scripture may well understand the

outward meaning of Christ's death and resurrection (and all
other related facts of the gospel), but without the Spirit
the words remain only empty symbols to those who live outside
of the grace of God. Even worse, those without the Spirit's
guidance are unable to discern the true Gospel--that God's
grace is given apart from the works of the letter of the Law.
For this reason, Luther warns that the "letter" can kill
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[compare 2 Corinthians 3:6], since those without the Spirit
are deluded into thinking that God's grace is given through
works of the Law.32
"Ratio" and Method in Biblical
Interpretation
The foregoing discussion of Luther's standpoint of
Scripture as being the word of God--God's own revelation of
Himself through the Gospel--and of the deficiency of ratio
in knowing God and His will apart from this revelation,
brings focus to the Reformer's intense concern for the proper
interpretation of the Bible for any matter of the Christian
faith and life. In view of fallen reason's inability to comprehend things of a spiritual nature, Luther consigns to that
faculty of man a position of profound subordination to Holy
Writ in all aspects of Biblical interpretation.
For Luther, human reason is an extremely poor standard for discerning the truths of Scripture, "for reason, by
her inferences and syllogisms, explains and pulls the Scriptures of God whichever way she likes."33 Not even the authority of the Fathers is to be trusted on the same level as
Scripture, since their reason, too, is susceptible to error.34
32See LW 27, pp. 312-313; WA 2, 551-552.
33BOW, p. 152; WA 18, 673, 8.
34Cf. pages 104-106 above; also BOW, p. 97 [WA 18,
630, 14].

119
Yet, to classify Luther as an "irrationalist"35 in his
approach to Biblical doctrine is unjustifiable. The pages
which follow will seek to determine to what extent ratio
found employment within Luther's method of Biblical interpretation.
Distinction of Law and Gospel
Because Luther saw reason's greatest defect to lie
in its utter failure to distinguish properly between the Law
and the Gospel [see pages 87-89 above], it is not surprising
to find the same theme at the very center of his methodology
of Biblical exegesis. Hermann Sasse has found this to be
one of the most distinctive features of Luther's new approach
to the study of Scriptures in his time [see quotation, page
106-107 above].
The proper distinction between Law and Gospel comprises a main criterion by which Luther judges the validity
of any interpretation of Scripture; for, in the first place,
those who operate with the "rule of reason" (dictante
ratione) as a guide seek, by nature, to use the works of the
Law as a means to become justified by God. Such persons are
accused by Luther as taking away from men the fear of God
and teaching them to be smug, as they foolishly proclaim
that their moral works done in accordance with the rule of
35The term "irrationalist" is used here in the sense
of one who opposes the use of reason in any aspect of epistemology (how one comes to know).
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reason are not sins.36

This diminishes man's ability to

recognize his extreme need of Christ's atoning sacrifice.
This gives occasion for a second point, that in his
review of methods of Biblical interpretation, Luther is
extremely critical of any opinion which holds that man can
be justified by God apart from faith in Christ (that is, the
Gospel). In his exposition of Galatians 3:12 ("But the Law
does not rest on faith. For he who does them shall live by
them."), Luther dismisses the opinions of Jerome, on the
basis of the latter's failure to recognize the works of the
Law correctly. Whereas Jerome had asserted in his commentary
that some virtues existed without faith, Luther contends that
this is an impossibility. The Reformer holds that no one is
righteous before faith--that even Moses and the prophets
lived before God justified and sanctified, even before the
Law and the works of the Law were enjoined.37
As was noted in the third chapter of the present
work [pages 87-88], Luther unleashed his most scathing critique of the competence of ratio for those instances when
human reason was allowed to guide theological pursuits at
36LW 27, p. 189; WA 2, 469, 21.
37LW 27, p. 259; WA 2, 515. Luther's accusations
against Jerome include the charge that Jerome brought his
ideas of virtues existing apart from faith into Scripture
from an outside source. It seems, to this writer, that the
source might have been Aristotle's influential Nichomachean
Ethics, which sought to demonstrate that man's innate 'goodness' caused him to strive toward the attainment of the goal
of emulating the perfect virtues.
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the expense of the Gospel. That the clarity of the Gospel be
preserved from all dilution through any method of Biblical
exegesis, appears to be the foundation of Luther's modus
operandi of interpreting every Bible passage from the viewpoint of solus Christus [see page 48 above]. The Reformer's
razor sharp focus on the Gospel is also at the heart of
another of his criteria for the correctness of the interpretation of Scripture: the "analogy of faith."
The Analogy of Faith
In his reading of the Scriptures in the light of the
distinction of Law and Gospel, or any other essential doctrine of the Christian faith, Luther was establishing a basic
rule of interpretation that subjected ratio to a more subservient role to the word of God. This rule of Biblical
exegesis came to be known as the "analogy of faith" (analogia
fidei).38
The principle of the "analogy of faith" states in
lucid terms that no interpretation of Scripture may be
allowed to stand, if it in any way contradicts an article of
faith that is clearly established in the word of God. Even
more, all valid Biblical exegesis must revolve especially
around the chief article of faith: the Gospel proclamation
38
Otto Hof contends that Luther himself formulated
the term 'analogia fidei' to represent this principle of
exegesis, and finds the phrase used repeatedly in Luther's
writings; cf. "Luther's Exegetical Principle of the Analogy
of Faith," Concordia Theological Monthly 38 (April 1967):
242-257.
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that man is justified before God solely through the work and
sacrifice of Christ Jesus. If any rendering of a Biblical
text contradicts the true message of the Gospel, or any of
its related articles, such an interpretation must be totally
disregarded as being false.39
The 'analogia fidei' was, for Luther, a safeguard
against the overly speculative and creative interpretations
of Scripture in his day. One must remember that the common
method of exegesis in Luther's time was to establish a
'fourfold' interpretation of each text in Scripture: literal,
allegorical, tropological, and anagogical.40 This procedure
often introduced many strange ideas--even heresy--via the
liberal use of 'figures' and 'implications' that were drawn
from the text. Against Erasmus's habitual finding of such
nuances in Scripture, Luther proposed that each passage be
interpreted in the most straightforward manner possible.
Luther wrote:
Rather let this be our conviction: that no 'implication'
or 'figure' may be allowed to exist in any passage of
Scripture unless such be required by some obvious feature

39
Cf. Ibid.; Hof elucidates this principle further,
by noting that the analogy of faith does not, for Luther, set
up the church's dogma as the supreme norm over the understanding of Scripture; nor is the analogy of faith subordinate to the tradition of the church, as is still the case
today in the Roman Catholic church. Rather, the articles of
faith to be used as the guiding norm of Biblical interpretation must themselves be derived from the Scriptures alone.
See pp. 247-248 of Hof's article.
40
The explanation of each of these interpretive categories is given on pages 47-48 above, especially page 48,
note 23.
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of the words and the absurdity of their plain sense, as
offending against an article of faith. Everywhere we
should stick to just the simple, natural meaning of the
words, as yielded by the rules of grammar and the habits
of speech that God has created among men; for if anyone
may devise 'implications' and 'figures' in Scripture at
his own pleasure, what will all Scripture be but a reed
shaken with the wind, and a sort of chameleon? 41
Luther recognizes that all heresies and errors in
handling the Scriptures have come from not regarding the
simplicity of the words of the text, and from the creating
of figures and implications that come out of men's own heads.
This practice had given rise to such heresy as the Arians'
making Christ less than God, and the denial of some of
Luther's contemporaries that Christ is present in the Lord's
Supper.42 Those kinds of false doctrine Luther sought to
repudiate through the use of the analogy of faith as a guiding principle in Biblical exegetical practice, as also he
established, by that means, a method of protecting the true
articles of faith against the "enthusiasts" of his day [see
page 111 above], who played havoc with the dogma of the
Christian church through their free lance method of the interpretation of Scripture.
Scripture Interprets Scripture
Closely related with the principle of the analogy of
faith for the proper interpretation of the Bible is Luther's
41BOW, pp. 191-192; WA 18, 700, 31.
42
Cf. BOW, p. 192; WA 18, 701, 8; an excellent exposition of Luther's polemic against especially the latter
heresy is Hermann Sasse, This is My Body: Luther's Contention
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contention that Scripture interprets itself. The Reformer's
concern is that the word of God be understood in the clearest
explanations possible, rather than to allow the exegete free
license to impose upon the Bible any preconceived notions of
"doctrine."
Allusion to Luther's proposition of the selfinterpreting Scripture has been given on pages 112-114 of
the present paper. In those pages, The Bondage of the Will
was cited, bearing testimony of the Reformer's thesis that
obscure words in one place in Holy Writ are plainly explained
in another part of the Bible [compare the quotation rendered
on page 113]. However, the principle of Scripture's interpreting itself is broader than merely clearing up obscurities
of language. The maxim seeks also to underscore the need for
considering the subject-matter and the speaker's intention
before postulating a meaning for passages of God's word.43
Further, seeing the words of Scripture in their context is
of primary importance to the proper understanding of any
passage. The significance of context refers not only to the
text in its immediate setting, but also to the wider scope
for the Sacrament of the Altar, revised edition (Adelaide:
Lutheran Publishing House, 1977). That work also renders an
extremely useful analysis of Luther's concept of the use of
ratio in theology, based upon writings not under consideration in the present work.
43Cf. BOW, pp. 264-265; WA 18, 751, 33; here, Luther
takes Erasmus to task for not considering these aspects of
the text prior to his giving interpretation to 2 Corinthians
3:6-9.
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of the Old and New Testaments; for all must be interpreted
in the light of the Gospel proclamation [compare pages
119-121 above].44
In his response to the fourfold method of interpreting the word of God, Luther was not seeking to forbid
altogether the use of such linguistic devices as allegory to
discover the true meaning of the text. Yet neither did he
espouse the unlimited employment of such figures in exegetical practice. That the Reformer was aware of many dangers
inherent in these procedures has already been mentioned
[pages 122-123 above]. Therefore, Luther's approach to let
Scripture determine what is allegory, and so forth, was a
protection against the abuse of such devices.
To demonstrate Luther's exegetical methodology would
take many more pages than are available here. However, one
lengthy example in the Galatians Commentary (1519) serves to
point out his procedure of looking to the text for clues as
45 In the
to how best to interpret the words of Scripture.
exposition of Galatians 4:24-31, Luther employs an allegorical method of interpretation. But he does so on the
strength of Paul's own words, which proclaim at the beginning
of that section of his letter that what he writes is to be
taken as an allegory. Luther lets the text dictate how it
is to be read: if literal, then literally; if allegory, then
44Cf. BOW, p. 180; WA 18, 692, 17.
45Cf. LW 27, pp. 310-324; WA 2, 549-559.

126
allegorically. This way is the only completely trustworthy
way of Biblical interpretation for Luther. To be sure, he
mentions that fourfold interpretations lend added ornamentation to the text--and Luther does not forbid their usage in
toto; nevertheless, the Reformer contends that no doctrine
of faith should be established by them. The fourfold method
is not well enough supported by the authority of Scripture.46
A word of caution is also given by Luther against
the pellmell linking of Biblical passages in order to formulate doctrines. Says the Reformer, "There is, as I have
often shown, no easier or commoner failing in dealing with
the Scriptures than to bring together diverse passages as if
they were alike."47 The intent of each passage must be
studied carefully in order to determine a proper comparison
between like thoughts.
Obviously, such methods of Biblical interpretation
as are promoted by Luther demand a great deal of the use of
human reason. Not only is reason required to comprehend the
general sense of language, but also is it a veritable necessity for the analytical comparison of one passage of Scripture with another. The formulation of dogma depends as well
on the sanctified use of reason, recognizing from the preceding discussions of this paper that without the activity
of the Holy Spirit, such ratio of man is utterly incapable
46LW 27, p. 311; WA 2, 550, 29-35.
47BOW, pp. 230-231; WA 18, 728, 6.
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of making the determination of right doctrine from Scripture.
One more important aspect of the employment of ratio
in Luther's Biblical interpretation must now be considered.
That is the topic of the use of logical argument to discern
the meaning of Scripture.
Logical Reasoning
A serious problem confronts any who would seek to
demonstrate an undeniable influence of a particular school
of thought upon any other person, regardless of period. The
making of such assertions, apart from irrefutable testimony
of the subject being studied, is mere speculation. The
question presented now straddles the fence line between probable truth, and speculation: Was Luther at all influenced by
the methodology of the via moderna in his exegetical process?
Without doubt, the ways of dialectics and rhetoric
were of monumental significance to all areas of scholarship
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. That dialectics,
with its syllogistic procedure from premise to conclusion,
and rhetoric, with its emphasis upon persuasive speech and
organized thought, were central to the educational institutions of the medieval period, is a fact that no scholar (to
this writer's knowledge) would dispute. Similarly, it would
appear that no one who has done any extended reading of
Luther's works could refute the assertion that the Reformer
frequently displays his skills of dialectics, logic, and
rhetoric in his discussions of theology--even when that dis-
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cussion takes place in the field of Biblical interpretation.
To be sure, all of Luther's warnings against the
magisterial use of reason must be kept firmly in place when
suggesting that Luther employs logical reasoning in his
exegetical method. Scripture is always the supreme authority
for any matter of faith and life in the Reformer's exposition
of the word of God. Nevertheless, Luther often speaks as a
formidable opponent--even to Erasmus's Diatribe--when refuting what he sees to be erroneous conjectures on the part of
other commentators on the Bible.
The instances of Luther's use of logic and rhetoric
to elucidate the arguments of Scripture are far too numerous
to list, even though the current work gains this insight from
but three of his writings. Those skills seem too far ingrained in the Reformer's thought, even in the manner of
presenting the ideas of God's word in commentary form, for
one to read even a few pages without the notice of at least
one rhetorical device or logical argument. For the sake of
example, however, the selection of Luther's exposition of
Galatians 2:11-13 seems apt.48 The text is rendered in the
American edition of Luther's Works thus:
[11] But when Cephas came to Antioch, I opposed him to
his face, because he stood condemned. [12] For before
certain men came from James, he ate with the Gentiles;
but when they came, he drew back and separated himself,
fearing the circumcision party. [13] And with him the
rest of the Jews acted insincerely, so that even Barnabas
was carried away by their insincerity.49

48LW 27, pp. 211-216; WA 2, 483-487.

49LW 27, 211.
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Jerome had taken the position that Paul was being
hypocritical against Peter in this instance, since the former
had insisted that he circumcise Timothy on account of the
Jews who were in those regions [Acts 16:3]. Augustine had
established a contrary view of the text, citing Galatians
1:20 ["In what I am writing to you, before God, I do not lie"
--rendering of the American edition of Luther's Works] as
proof that Paul could not be acting in a hypocritical manner
in this instance, or else Paul would at least be telling an
obliging lie; and if this were allowed to stand, the authority of all Scripture would crumble--if in a single passage
one thing is said and another thing is meant [a forceful
argument indeed!].
Luther finds Augustine's argument the more satisfactory of the two presented, though he sees therein a weakness
in Augustine's rendering as "blameworthy" the Greek word for
"stood condemned" [kategnosmenos] in verse 11--a minor matter
to Luther. The Reformer then sets forth his logical argumentation for the preference of Augustine's position, over
that of Jerome: (1) Paul did not reprove Peter for having
lived in the manner of the Gentiles, as Jerome thinks (for
then he would really have been directing the same reproof
against himself, and Jerome's opinion would stand on a solid
footing) [Luther here states his antithesis to Jerome's
thesis, and establishes the ground on which the argument will
take place]; (2) Jerome must have brought to the text a
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preconceived notion that deeds done according to the Law are
not permissible after Christ's Passion, to have arrived at
such a conclusion [Luther analyzes Jerome's conclusion, and
states a most likely premise upon which Jerome must have
based his opinion]; (3) on the strength of the text, Paul is
seen to reprove Peter only for his hypocritical behavior,
censuring him for withdrawing and segregating himself from
the foods of the Gentiles when the Jews came, and causing
the Jews to believe that the ways of the Gentiles were forbidden [Luther states his major premise, that the evidence of
the text establishes that Paul censured Peter only for the
latter's hypocritical behavior in this instance]; (4) Peter
must certainly have been aware of his hypocrisy, as the text
goes to lengths to establish that he knew that the things of
the Gentiles were unrestricted, by his prior action of eating with them [Luther renders support for the position of
his major premise, on the basis of the text, while establishing his minor premise, that surely the text shows that Peter
was living in a hypocritical manner]; (5) ergo, Paul's complaint is not that the Jews concurred with respect to food-whether Gentile or Jewish--but that they concurred in Peter's
hypocrisy in forcing Gentiles and Jews into Judaism as something that was necessary [Luther draws his conclusion from
the first two premises, which he has established from the
text, thus declaring his reasoning for disagreeing with the
commentary of Jerome on this issue]. The following pages of
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Luther's commentary on these passages then continue to give
further support of his syllogism, on the basis of the textual
language, and of supporting passages, from other portions of
Scripture, which are shown to favor Luther's linguistic
analyses of the present text.
Does this kind of argumentation demonstrate Luther
to be a product of his age? Certainly he shows keen ability
in presenting his insights into Scripture with logical precision and great skill. That this method of rhetoric was
espoused by proponents of the via moderna in setting forth
argument and thought is also undeniable. But these correlations do not prove anything of Luther's dependency upon
any particular school of thought for his aptitude for interpreting the Bible. Regardless of where the Reformer learned
his skill for logical reasoning, he finds precedent for his
reasonable approach to Scripture in the very texts themselves.50 Yet let the reader take note: Luther's defense
throughout the lengthy analysis above was based solely upon
the words of the text. Great care seems to have been taken
not to fall into the trap of Jerome--that of bringing any
preconceived notions into the argument of the passage itself.
Luther seeks to prove only what the words of the Scriptures
50See, for example, LW 27, p. 264 [WA 2, 518-519],
where Luther gives analysis of Galatians 3:13-15 ["Christ
redeemed us from the curse of the Law, having become a curse
for us--for it is written: Cursed be everyone who hangs on a
tree--that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come
upon the Gentiles, that we might receive the promise of the
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seek to prove. This kind of approach to the text of Holy
Writ appears uniform throughout the works consulted for the
current project. Logical reasoning is employed by Luther
only to benefit the process of establishing the answer to
the question: What does the text say?
Conclusion Concerning Luther's
Method of Interpretation
Of Luther's concept of the proper use of ratio within
the interpretation of Scripture, then, it can be said that
the Reformer found human reason a most cherished gift,
indeed, as a God-given tool for understanding and proclaiming
God's revelation of Himself to man. However, ratio was held
by the Reformer to be always subordinate to the Word of God
[here, that term may refer to any of the definitions given
on pages 99-101 above]. Luther did not appear to care for
the use of speculation when seeking to determine the truths
Spirit through faith. To give a human example, brethren: no
one annuls even a man's will, or adds to it, once it has
been ratified"--as rendered in that text]: "Let us, therefore, set before our eyes both things: the analogy and the
fact itself. Then we shall see with how strong an argument
Paul again breaks down the righteousness of the Law. Now
the conclusion he wants to draw is this: If righteousness
can be acquired of ourselves through the Law and its works,
the promise of a blessing made to Abraham is useless, because
then we are able to become righteous without it through the
Law; or it itself is surely not sufficient to justify if the
righteousness of the Law has to be added to it; and thus the
testament and promise of God is either superfluous, or it is
deficient and requires the addition of something else. Both
notions, however, are utterly detestable. Therefore the
opposite is true, namely, that the righteousness of the Law
is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take note! A very
strong argument indeed!"
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of Scripture. A rule of thumb for his approach toward the
determination of right doctrine, as derived from the careful
exegesis of the Bible, might be presented in the same manner
in which Luther proposes his method of debate against Erasmus
in The Bondage of the Will:
Let it suffice for now . . . that the Scriptures are
perfectly clear in their teaching, and that by their
help such a defence [sic] of our position may be made
that our adversaries cannot resist; and that what cannot
be thus defended is not our business, and is of no concern to Christians.51
Luther's concept of the ministerial use of reason in
the study of Scripture, as suggested by that passage, serves
to anticipate the topic for consideration in the next chapter
of the present work: Luther's view of the proper place of
ratio within the framework of theological discussion, and
the responsible formulation of doctrine.
51BOW, p. 133; WA 18, 659, 18.

CHAPTER V
LUTHER'S POSITION CONCERNING THE
USE OF RATIO IN APPLIED THEOLOGY
Luther's Critique of Philosophy
as Contrasted with Theology
Noted Luther-scholars have suggested that an important aspect of Luther's theology is his delimiting of the
extent to which philosophy might be employed in conversation
concerning man's relationship to God.1 The significance of
that task grows all the more, when one considers the extent
to which philosophy had come to influence theology between
the apostolic age and the time of the Reformation. Chapter
One of the current work demonstrated how Augustine, Aquinas,
Ockham and Biel had all employed a philosophical methodology
in their theological endeavors, especially as they wrestled
with the question as to how man might come to know things
about God. Jaroslav Pelikan summarizes the extent to which
1This point is shared by so many such scholars, that
a full listing of references is not practical. However, an
apt quotation on this subject is given in Gerhard Ebeling,
Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, trans. R. A. Wilson
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 92: "The task posed
by Luther's theology is that of giving a fuller exposition
of the relationship between theology and philosophy in the
light of his extremely contradictory assertions concerning
reason."
134
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philosophy had become a part of applied theology in the sixteenth century, suggesting that as a man in that era, Luther
inherited a tradition in which Christianity and philosophy
were much more closely intertwined than they are today.
Says Pelikan, ". . . the many Summae of the medieval thinkers
bear witness to the fact that there was no eminent theologian
in the Middle Ages who was not also at least something of a
philosopher, and vice versa."2 The present chapter will seek
to give expression to Luther's distinguishing between the
proper--and improper--usage of philosophy (as the exercise
of ratio to discover that which is true) within the sphere
of theological discussion, and the formulation of right
doctrine.
The Proper Realm of Philosophy
Philosophy's area of competency
The passages which uncover Luther's view of philosophy's area of competency (as found in the primary sources
under consideration by the current work) are few in number.
But a synthesis of those excerpts reveals the fact that the
Reformer held for a very limited scope in which philosophy,
as a discipline engaging ratio in the pursuit of truth, was
free to operate. The most significant of those references
can be found in thesis nineteen of the Disputation Concern2Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard: A
Study in the History of Theology (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1963), p. 3.
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ing Man: "But as this life is, such is the definition and
knowledge [cognitio] of man, that is, fragmentary, fleeting,
and exceedingly material."3 This passage appears to intimate
that man's certain knowledge (referring to unregenerate man)
is limited to the realm of the empirical. Any meaningful
knowledge which can be possessed through human contemplation
must find its basis only in what can be perceived by the
outward senses.4 If that premise is true, then that which
could be said of Luther's concept of the limitations of
ratio in knowing truth [compare pages 67-70 above] applies
also to his view of the competency of philosophy. Especially
things which concern God are always beyond the scope of man's
grasp, and if anything is to be known about God's nature and
will, it must be given via outside revelation.
Thesis nineteen of the Disputation seems to indicate
Luther's acceptance of a Nominalistic critique of that which
can be known through philosophy. The Reformer's limiting of
certitude to the observable and the experiential, seems to
establish a correlation between Luther's understanding of a
'valid' philosophy, and the epistemology of the tradition ala
3Martin Luther, Luther's Works, 55 vols., gen. eds.
Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-),
34:138 (hereafter cited as LW); Martin Luther, D. Martin
Luther's Werke (Weimar: H. Boehlau, 1883-), 39 1:176 (hereafter cited as WA).
4This writer finds justification, in the passage
cited, for Paul Althaus's holding for the same contention;
cf. The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 62.
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Ockham and Biel, in which Luther was educated. Abstract
cognition was not thought to bear any large degree of certitude among the followers of Ockham [see the discussion on
pages 26-27 above]. Abstractive ideas dealt only with things
that probably exist, and were not trustworthy to the same
degree which could be said of those things that were demonstrable via empirical evidence.
Luther's limitations on that which can be known
through philosophical inquiry established a clear boundary
between reason and revelation as sources of truth. Applied
reason could comprehend only the mundane things concerning
man's own existence, whereas, the revelation which comes to
man from without knows truths of a broader scope. If one is
permitted to deduce from statements in the Disputation fragment (against theses thirteen and fourteen), it becomes evident that Luther believed that the Gentiles [in this context,
"Gentiles" apparently means "unenlightened men," before such
have come to receive faith through God's revelation] are able
to discern that God exists, but that they are not capable of
knowing anything of substance about Him.5This delimitation
of the competence of philosophy is entirely consistent with
5LW 34, p. 140 [WA 39 I, 177]: "Those who know God
also know their own efficient cause. But the Gentiles have
known God. Therefore, the Gentiles have also known their own
efficient cause. By logical consequence, therefore, it is
mistakenly asserted in the thirteenth and fourteenth argument
that human reason and philosophy do not know the efficient
cause of man. I prove the minor premise: The Gentiles knew
God, but they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him
[Romans 1:21]. Objection: They have indeed known God, but
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Luther's concept of ratio since the Fall of man [compare
above, especially pages 73-75, 85-86, 105]. In fact, the
Reformer's primary criterion for setting limits on the use
of philosophy in theological discussion is, apparently, the
recognition that philosophy does not take into account the
fallen state of mankind.
Improper anthropology
According to Luther, philosophy fails in its task to
determine truths about God, and man's relationship to Him,
because it knows nothing of "theological man" (Theologico
homine).6 The scope of philosophy is limited to that which
can be deduced through reflection about things that are perceivable in this world; and since human wisdom does not take
into account man in his fallen condition, it renders an
inaccurate picture of the creation and of the creator.7
Hence, philosophy's improper anthropology is wont to render
falsehood instead of truth. Says Luther:
Therefore let those people who have learned from the tree
of Porphyry and from the teachings of Aristotle and other
philosophers how to praise, boast of, and love rational
not as creator. Explanation: Yes, to know God is indeed
something else than to know that he is the creator of all
things. For the most excellent knowledge of God is to know
that he has created all things.
6Cf. LW 34, p. 139, a. 28 [WA 39 I, 176]: "So also,
of those who introduce Aristotle (who knows nothing of theological man) to witness that reason aspires to the best
things;"
7Cf. LW 34, p. 138, a. 13 and 14; WA 39 I, 175; these
articles are fully quoted in note 11, page 140, below.
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man and then to trust in their own precepts and to justify their own counsels--let them see how well their
wisdom savors of the truth of God, which allots everything human to falsehood, vanity, and destruction.8
Luther's writings also indicate that the difference
in opinion concerning the anthropology of philosophy and of
theology is not, simply, that philosophy tends to see man in
a more positive light than does theology. Descriptions of
some philosophers, instead of acknowledging man and his attributes as a gift from God, portray man in far lesser terms.
Luther notes the terminology of various men, who have ascribed to "man" the distinctions "chaos" (Plato), "vacuum"
9 Not seeing man as
(Leucippus), and "infinite" (Aristotle).
theological man, philosophy often misses the point as to the
real meaning and worth of man as the crown of God's creation.10
A further flaw in philosophy's view of man rests in
its limited concept of life itself. Natural philosophy is
not capable of seeing beyond the present world; hence, it has
8LW 27, p. 181; WA 2, 464, 24-31.
9Martin Luther, On the Bondage of the Will: A New
Translation of "De Servo Arbitrio" (1525), Martin Luther's
Reply to Erasmus of Rotterdam, trans. and ed. J. I. Packer
and 0. R. Johnston (United States: Fleming H. Revell Co.,
1957), p. 266 (hereafter cited as BOW); WA 18, 752, 25.
10Cf. LW 34, p. 138, a. 20 and 21 [WA 39 I, 176]:
"[20] Theology to be sure from the fulness of its wisdom
defines man as whole and perfect: [21] Namely, that man is
a creature of God consisting of body and a living soul, made
in the beginning after the image of God, without sin, so that
he should procreate and rule over the created things, and
never die, . . ."
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a terminal vision of things as they are, and does not grasp
the immortality that God bestows upon man--nor, most significantly, does philosophy know anything of the gift of eternal
life that is given only through the Son of God, Jesus Christ,
to all who believe in Him.11 In The Bondage of the Will,
Luther points to experience as lending validity to that
assertion:
Look at experience; see what the most distinguished minds
among the nations have thought of the future life and the
resurrection. Is it not a fact that the more distinguished their minds were, the more ridiculous the resurrection and eternal life was to them? Or were not those
philosophers and Greeks at Athens, who called Paul a
'babbler' and a 'setter forth of strange gods' when he
taught these things (Acts 17.18), men of mind? Porcius
Festus in Acts 24 (26.24) cried out that Paul was mad
because of his preaching of eternal life. What of Pliny's
yapping about these matters in his seventh book? What of
Lucian, that great wit? Were these stupid men? To this
day, it is true of most men that the greater their wit
and learning, the more they deride this article, and that
openly, thinking it a fable. For no man on earth, unless
imbued with the Holy Ghost, ever in his heart knows of,
or believes in, or longs for, eternal salvation, even if
he harps upon it by tongue and pen.12
From this excerpt, one can also determine the distinctive
feature of Luther's understanding of the proper sphere of
theology: the radical difference in its source of knowledge,
as distinct from philosophy.
11LW 34, p. 138, a. 13 and 14 [WA 39 I, 175]:
"[13] For philosophy does not know the efficient cause for
certain, nor likewise the final cause, [14] Because it posits
no other final cause than the peace of this life, and does
not know that the efficient cause is God the creator." Cf.
LW 34, p. 138, a. 23 [WA 39 I, 176]: "[Man] can be freed and
given eternal life only through the Son of God, Jesus Christ
(if he believes in him)."
12BOW, pp. 139-140; WA 18, 663, 27.
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The Proper Sphere of Theology
Epistemology
The epistemology [the process of how one comes to
know] of philosophy had as its source of truth (according to
Luther) man's capability to make deductions based upon things
which he was able to observe with his senses. Beyond these
demonstrative truths, little else could be known via philosophical speculation; and what additional theories man derived from such speculation was, at best, only probable
"truth" [see pages 136-137 above]. Therefore, theological
articles of faith lay outside the scope of philosophy's competency.
If anything more is to be known of things which
transcend the observable and the demonstrative--and, certainly, this is the focus of concern for theology, which
seeks to know all that can be known about God--such truth
must come to man from without [see pages 73-76 above]. And
Luther's assertion that God has deliberately chosen, in some
things, to remain hidden from man's reason [compare pages
83-84 above], makes the need for a reliable source of outside
truth all the more essential to the task of theology.
Luther finds that outside source of truth in God's
own revelation of Himself to man. The Word of God [Christ
and the Scriptures] acts as that vehicle of the Holy Spirit
which enlightens man's thinking to include truths not available to it via the observable creation. As Chapter Four of
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the current work has established, Luther contended for the
primacy of Scripture as the supreme source of God's revealed
knowledge. But although this view is consistently present
throughout all three of the primary sources under consideration in these pages, Luther's educational background lends
evidence that such was not always the case for him. The
study of Biel, while in the Erfurt monastery, would have put
Luther in contact with the inconsistency in theological authority so prevalent in those days of eclecticism [see pages
29-31 above]. As in the case of Biel, is was not rare for a
theologian to hold for Scripture's being the sole source of
truth for articles of faith, while at the same time allowing
the dogma of the church to enjoy an equal honor--especially
in the instance of papal decrees. [The "tradition" of the
Roman church was not officially declared to be on equal footing with Scripture as authoritative for doctrine and practice, until the Council of Trent, session IV.] This disagreement in the view of epistemology, it would appear, was
at the center of any doctrinal controversy within the Christian church; and key to one's method of determining theological truth is the understanding of the limitations (if any)
that should be placed on human reason within that exercise.
For this reason, the noting of Luther's point of view in
delimiting the competency of ratio to know things that are
true is critically important, if one is to understand the
basis of his many criticisms of false doctrine within the
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church of the sixteenth century.
As in philosophy, which has always been a field in
which not one, but several views concerning the proper source
of truth have contended for supremacy, so also is the case
in theology. Luther was well aware that not all theologians
shared his position that Scripture alone was to be the norm
for all true doctrine and right practice in the Christian
church. Moreover, the Reformer demonstrates in the Bondage
of the Will that he realized that this struggle had been
raging since the time of Christ . . . and beyond.13 Also,
the Reformer acknowledged the fact that the differences in
epistemology for theology--as distinct from philosophy--tended to place theology on a more suspect foundation than systems based on human reason were willing to allow. For this
reason, Luther notes in the Galatians Commentary (1519) that
even Paul preferred to call faith a persuasion, "because it
is something that cannot be demonstrated unless you believe
13BOW, pp. 129-131 [WA 18, 656-657]; in this excerpt,
Luther shows how people through the ages have shut off their
common sense, when confronted with the clarity of Scripture,
so as to defend, stubbornly, their own presuppositions. Among
the examples given are: Christ silencing the Sadduccees
[Matthew 22] by proving the resurrection of the dead with a
Scripture quotation from Exodus, while they continued to
oppose Him; Stephen spoke on Luke's testimony [Acts 6], but
his audience continued to resist him; John Hus preached
against the Pope from Matthew 16, demonstrating that the
Pope and his men are not the church of which Christ speaks,
but the authorities burnt him instead of abandoning their
views; and Luther himself refutes the notions concerning
'free-will' by the clear teachings of Scripture, yet his
opponents vigorously reject his statements.
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the one who is persuading you; for faith does not tolerate
the quarrels of the sophists."14
A critical distinction:
Law and Gospel
The most critical point of disagreement between
theology and philosophy that is found throughout Luther's
writings, is the proper distinction between Law and Gospel.
As was shown in the general discussion concerning Luther's
condemnatory allegations against the use of ratio in matters
having to do with man's relationship with God [see pages 8789 above], so is Luther's main contention against the knowledge of philosophy that it is unable to comprehend the grace
of God and the Gospel proclamation.15
For defense of his assertion that, above all, the
purity of the Gospel must be preserved at all cost to reasonability and rational argument, Luther needed look only to
Paul's letter to the Galatians:
Therefore let us say confidently with Paul: "Damned and
accursed be every doctrine from heaven, from earth, or
from whatever source it is brought--every doctrine that
teaches us to trust in works, righteousness, and merits
other than those that belong to Jesus Christ." And by
saying this we are not being insolent toward the popes
14LW 27, p. 339; WA 2, 569, 17-19.
15Cf. Pelikan, Luther to Kierkegaard, p. 4, where
that writer asserts that Luther repudiated the systems of
the medieval thinkers because of what they had done to free
grace, and not principally because of what they had done with
Aristotle. On page 11 of that same work, Pelikan posits that
what Luther most passionately feared was a repetition of the
medieval error by which Aristotelian philosophy had been permitted to obscure the Gospel.
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and the successors of the apostles; we are being dutiful
and truthful toward Christ. For one must prefer Him to
them; and if they should refuse to allow this, we must
shun them altogether as being anathema.16
Philosophy, like fallen reason itself, was seen by
Luther as being legalistic in nature. The Reformer cataloged
the kind of righteousness espoused by Aristotle and other
philosophers, as being a righteousness that came only through
works of the Law, and by habit.17 But true theology finds
man's righteousness only in the merits of Christ, bestowed
upon man through the faith given by the Holy Spirit. That
these two approaches to reconciliation with God stand contrary to one another is self evident. The way of philosophy
is based upon the conclusions of human reason, whereas the
way of true theology is founded in faith.
The proper sphere of theology (in contrast to philosophy), then, is centered especially in the pursuit of the
pure Gospel; for only as man receives this Gospel through the
Holy Spirit's activity in Word and sacrament, is he enabled
to see the truth about his relationship with God. The source
of this truth lies outside of man's own intellect and ratio;
hence, theology contributes to his knowledge of that which is
true, by expounding the content of God's revelation of Himself to mankind.
16LW 27, p. 179; WA 2, 462, 29-34.
17LW 27, p. 219; WA 2, 489; this reference is fully
rendered in English on page 89, note 65, above.
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Against Joining Philosophy with Theology
Gerhard Ebeling has taken the position that Luther
represents not merely an antithesis between philosophy and
theology in general, but of good and bad theology--of true
theology and pseudo-theology.18 On the basis of the previous
discussion above, this writer finds Ebeling's statement an
agreeable one. Understood as defined by Luther's writings,
philosophy, as such, was not guilty of spreading only false
statements; to entertain this kind of idea about man's ability to deduce truths about his life and environment via empirical evidence would be ludicrous. "Good" theology takes
into consideration reason's capability to discern truth based
upon experience and the observable. "Bad" theology (pseudotheology), on the other hand, fails to grasp the inherent
limitations of human reason to know of truths which lie
beyond the perceivable world and life.
Luther had seen that the church had lost sight of
Christ and the pure Gospel, because some were preoccupied
with Aristotle's philosophy--a system which did not clearly
distinguish between the demonstrably provable and that which
can be known only through the outside revelation of God.19
According to the Reformer, not a few theologians and jurists
sometimes followed monstrous opinions (monstra sententiarum)
18Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, p. 79.
19Cf. Brian Albert Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study
in the Theology of Luther (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962),
P. 33.
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instead of the familiar doctrine of the church (domestica
ecclesiae doctrina).20 Erasmus himself, it is charged by
Luther, was guilty of treating Christian doctrines as no
better than the views of human philosophers, choosing to
argue that it was stupid to wrangle and fight and assert
concerning such doctrines, because doing so only resulted in
bad feelings and in a disruption of outward peace.21
Where any philosophical point is in conflict with the
word of God, Luther would contend that true theology is under
obligation to dispute against the joining of philosophy with
theology to the extreme. To do such was not merely for the
sake of winning an argument; rather, at stake was the Gospel
itself . . . and that destructive result was, for the Reformer, not only a possibility, but a foregone reality within
the church. In the Galatians Commentary (1519), it is noted
that Paul's theology of salvation by grace, for Christ's
sake, through faith had vanished entirely in some circles,
and could not be understood by those who declared falsely
that Aristotle's ethics were entirely in accord with the doctrine of Christ and of Paul. On this point, Luther says:
For our righteousness looks down from heaven and descends
to us. But those godless men have presumed to ascend
20LW 27, p. 248; WA 2, 508, 29-31; here, one must
read the "familiar doctrine of the church" as doctrine that
has rightly been deduced from Scripture (and not such as is
contrary to the word of God), since Luther has no qualifying,
nor condemnatory, remarks concerning those teachings in the
passage noted.
21BOW, pp. 69-70; WA 18, 605, 15.
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into heaven by means of their righteousness and from
there to bring the truth which has arisen among us from
the earth.22
Luther's position concerning the joining of philosophy with theology, then, is that a clear distinction must
be made between the kind of knowledge that is appropriate to
each sphere of inquiry. The speculations of philosophy must
not in any way interfere with the articles of faith that are
regarded as truth in theology. For example, Luther's words
concerning the right understanding of the righteousness that
can come to man only through faith:
For those men should be kept far away from Holy Writ who,
with distinctions drawn from their own brains [cerebro],
bring into theology various kinds of righteousness and
say that one is ethical, that another is the righteousness of faith, and speak of I know not what other kinds.
By all means let the state have its own righteousness,
the philosophers their own, and everyone his own. But
here [Galatians 2:21] one must take righteousness in the
Scriptural sense; and the apostle says plainly that this
righteousness does not exist except through faith in
Jesus Christ . . . .23
For Luther, the key question which calls for a strict
cleavage between philosophy and theology is of a soteriological nature.24 His concern for the use of philosophy with
theology is, above all, that men might be saved through the
proclamation of right theology. Luther aptly paraphrases
the words of Psalm 51:13 ["Then I will teach transgressors
22LW 27, p. 225; WA 2, 493, 8-14.
23LW 27, p. 240; WA 2, 503, 23-28.
24Cf. Gerrish, Grace and Reason, pp. 55-56; this reference also cited on page 69 above.
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Thy ways, And sinners will be converted to Thee"--NASB]:
[That passage] is as if [the psalmist] were saying: "Let
me not, I pray, teach the ways of men and the doctrines
of our own righteousness, since thereby they will not be
converted to Thee but will be turned farther away from
Thee. . . ." 25
Those words truly sound forth Luther's focus of the entire
realm of the theological pursuit of truth.
The Employment of "Ratio" in
Theological Discussion
Defense by Reason
If the statement is true, that Luther would contend
that true theology is under obligation to dispute against any
point which is in conflict with the word of God (that might
imperil the Gospel) [see page 147 above], then the question
arises as to what extent ratio is to be employed in such
defense of doctrine (polemics and apologetics).26 On this
subject, two passages from The Bondage of the Will (which is
perhaps Luther's most significant "apologetic" work) are
especially noteworthy. On the one hand, Luther says:
So one of the main reasons why the words of Moses and
Paul are not taken in their plain sense [by the Diatribe]
is their 'absurdity'. But against what article of faith
does that 'absurdity' transgress? And who is offended
25LW 27, p. 185; WA 2, 466, 34-37.
26This writer defines 'polemics' as that aspect of
applied theology which is concerned with the defense of right
doctrine within the realm of the Christian church, and 'apologetics' in the narrow sense of the term--that of making a
so-called "scientific" defense of the basic tenets of the
Christian faith to those who stand outside of the Christian
faith.
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It is human reason that is offended; which,
by it?
though it is blind, deaf, senseless, godless, and sacrilegious, in its dealing with all God's words and works,
is at this point brought in as judge of God's words and
works! On these same grounds you will deny all the articles of faith, for it is the highest absurdity by far-foolishness to the Gentiles and a stumbling-block to the
Jews, as Paul says [compare 1 Corinthians 1:23]--that
God should be man, a virgin's son, crucified, sitting at
the Father's right hand. It is, I repeat, absurd [emphasis theirs] to believe such things! So let us invent
some figures with the Manichaeans, and say that he is
not truly man, but a phantom who passed through the virgin like a ray of light through glass, and then fell, and
so was crucified! This would be a fine way for us to
handle the Scriptures!27
In this quotation, Luther contends against the use
of reason in theological debate, since that human faculty is
unable to comprehend articles of faith which are based upon
Scripture as the supreme authority for determining truth. As
the Reformer notes, human reason finds such articles absurd,
and is wont to rewrite them according to its own standpoint.
To engage in such practice is, for Luther, an abominable way
to "do" theology. Faith must always take precedence over
reason in theological endeavors.
In light of the excerpt given above, justification
can be found for conclusions which find Luther critical of
the validity of 'Christian apologetics.'28 Faith cannot be
proved, in the same sense that philosophical methodology
seeks to "prove" its arguments on the basis of experience
27BOW, p. 201 [WA 18, 707, 19]; cf. pp. 69 and 76 of
the present work.
28See Siegbert W. Becker, "Luther's Apologetics,"
Concordia Theological Monthly 29 (October 1958):742-759.
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and observable evidence. But to push such a condemnation of
apologetics to the extreme, suggesting that Luther had absolutely no place in his theology for making defense of the
truth claims of Christianity, is without warrant. Indeed,
the entire writing on The Bondage of the Will shows demonstrably that Luther had precious much to say in defense of
the doctrine of Scripture. Specifically, Luther writes:
To take no pleasure in assertions is not the mark of a
Christian heart; indeed, one must delight in assertions
to be a Christian at all. (Now, lest we be misled by
words, let me say here that by 'assertion' I mean
staunchly holding your ground, stating your position,
confessing it, defending it and preserving it unvanquished. . . .)29
In this second passage, Luther makes a strong a case for the
validity of a Christian apologetic, even within his own view
against the improper joining of philosophy with theology.
In the final analysis, then, is Luther for, or
against, a reasonable defense of the Christian faith? This
writer finds the proper answer in the synthesis of Luther's
ideas, as rendered by Paul Althaus. As that writer surveys
Luther's arguments against Erasmus in The Bondage of the Will
he notes that Luther uses philosophy and natural reason to
provide secondary proof for theological theses. However,
that remains a secondary and peripheral addition to his method.30 Therein lies the key to Luther's view of the proper
29BOW, p. 66; WA 18, 603, 10.
30Cf. Theology of Luther, p. 4.
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employment of reason in applied theology: as long as reason
remains subordinate to Scripture in all aspects of theological practice, it may be used to its fullest extent as a
gift of God.
Speculation
Within the presentation of Chapter Three of the current work [pages 68-69], mention was made of Luther's aversion to speculation, when approaching matters of theology.
There the apt quotation "What is above us does not concern
us" was shown to be a basic rule for the Reformer's procedure
of relating truths concerning God.31 Speculation about
things which God has not revealed to man (beyond the empirical) does not yield any certain truths.
Yet, Jaroslav Pelikan comments: "In general [Luther]
regarded philosophy as dangerous; and yet, when the occasion
seemed to demand it, he was not at all averse to philosophical speculation."32 What situations might occasion Luther
to employ philosophical speculation within the framework of
his applied theology? The Reformer's writings give indication that, when involved in controversy, Luther's general
way was to meet his opponents on their own ground; if they
were to attack with the weapon of philosophical argument, he
would parry by showing--via logic and philosophical specula31See above, page 68; cf. BOW, p. 170; WA 18, 685, 7.
32Luther to Kierkegaard, p. 10.
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tion--the weaknesses in the statements of his adversaries.33
A clear example of this method is found in Luther's debate
with Erasmus concerning the problem of evil.
Against Erasmus's Diatribe Luther takes up the query
as regards by what means God is said to work evil in man. A
word of introduction concerning such speculative inquiry
seems appropriate to the Reformer:
We should in any case be content with the words of God,
and simply believe what they say; for the works of God
are wholly indescribable. However, to humour reason
(that is, human folly), I do not mind aping its stupidity and foolishness and seeing if I can make any impression on it by my own broken words on this subject.34
Luther then proceeds to his argumentation, by establishing
basic premises which even reason and the Diatribe had to
accept: namely, that God works all in all, and that without
Him nothing is effected nor effective--by definition of His
omnipotence. Once these foundations are in place, the Reformer's argumentation follows a brilliant line of thought:
(1) Satan and man, being fallen and abandoned by God, cannot
will good; (2) but their will's turning away from God cannot
have turned itself into nothing, since they ever remain part
of God's creation; (3) as part of God's creation, man's will
remains subject to God's omnipotence and action [by virtue of
the agreed definition of God's actions, at the outset of the
33Cf. James I. Packer, "Luther Against Erasmus,"
Concordia Theological Monthly 37 (April 1966):207-221.
34BOW, p. 203; WA 18, 709, 6.
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argument]; (4) therefore, God must move and work of necessity
even in Satan and the ungodly; but since they are evil and
corrupt, God must work through them such as they are;
(5) ergo, although God is not the cause of evil (since it is
against His nature to act evilly Himself), he can be said to
35
work evil insofar as He works through evil instruments!
Devices of Logic
That Luther was no mere novice in his use of logic
within his theological method has been shown [Chapter Four,
pages 127-132 above]. In fact, in those writings with which
the present work is concerned, the Reformer demonstrates
adeptness in formulating highly persuasive argument. Listing
instances of Luther's usage of logical devices is a task that
would be tedious for both reader and writer alike. But in
the interest of demonstrably proving the assertion that the
Reformer makes use of such argument, a few examples shall be
given [the following examples are excerpted from The Bondage
of the Will]: (1) Luther finds a most essential fault in
Erasmus's argument for 'free-will,' in that the latter has
failed to adequately define the term--the definition fails
to cover the thing defined;36 (2) Luther places Erasmus on
35BOW, pp. 203-204 [WA 18, 709-710]; it is in this
reference that Luther makes a well-known analogy concerning
a man who rides a horse with only three, or two, good feet-his riding corresponds with what the horse is, which means
that the horse goes badly, but this is not the rider's fault.
36BOW, p. 137; WA 18, 662, 12.
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the horns of a dilemma, forcing a decision between the assertion that the great scholars and martyrs of the church (who
held that the Scriptures were clear) were to be admired for
their skill in the sacred writings, or the statement that the
Scriptures are not clear;37 (3)Luther reduces Erasmus's
argument--that because God promises a reward to those who
keep His commandments, therefore man must have the 'freewill' to accomplish them--to the absurd statement "The prize
is set before all in the race; therefore, all can run and
obtain it," and so forth;38 (4)Luther associates Erasmus's
position with that of the Pelagians, who were noted for the
heresy that man's will was not at all corrupted by the Fall
of man;39 (5)Luther employs a rule of logic that a conditional statement asserts nothing indicatively, as "if the
devil be God, he is deservedly worshipped"; or, "if an ass
flies, an ass has wings"; or, "if there be 'free-will', [sic]
grace is nothing".40
In each of these examples, Luther employs various
devices of logic and rhetoric, in order to gain advantage
over his opponent in the debate at hand. The devices appear
not to be meant to prove the meaning of the texts of Scrip37BOW, pp. 134-135; WA
18, 661.
38BOW, p. 181; WA 18, 693, 19.
39BOW, pp. 140-141; WA 18,
664, 14.
40BOW, p. 151; WA 18, 672, 33.
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ture, which are his most important line of defense; but in
their usage, Luther seeks to weaken the argumentation of his
adversary, to make way for the acceptance of his exposition
of the meaning of those Biblical passages that support his
theological standpoint.
Philosophical Language
The writings of Luther that are under survey in the
present work, indicate his frequent usage of terminology and
categories from the realm of philosophy. However, in recognition of his adamant position of defending the purity of the
Gospel against the perversion of philosophical method, it
hardly seems likely that the Reformer was intent on employing
the distinctions of philosophy as proof for theological
assertions. If the present writer might be allowed to speculate on this matter, it would appear that evaluating Luther's
applied theology in light of his historical context is of
importance; for one must remember that the predominant way of
theological method in the fifteenth and sixteenth century,
was one which had not divorced theology from philosophy. In
order for Luther to make the most of his argumentation within
that setting, therefore, it seems likely that by the use of
such terminology he was again meeting the opposition on its
own ground, clearing the way for his exposition of Scripture.
Such seems the case in the instance of Luther's mention of the philosophical controversy over the validity of
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"universals" within the Galatians Commentary (1519).41
In that reference, he shows his familiarity with the ongoing
debates of his time, while at the same time demonstrating
that all the uproar concerning the validity of "universals"
was not of significance for the proper understanding of the
text of Scripture. In so doing, Luther seems also to employ
another device of logic, in undermining any argument against
his exposition of the text through anticipating objections
that his opponents might raise, thus stealing away the force
of their assertions to the contrary.
Therefore, Luther's employment of philosophical language in applied theology appears to have a twofold purpose:
first, that he might demonstrate his cognizance of the position of other theologians and philosophers on the matters
being discussed, and secondly, that by mentioning such ideas,
he might show their irrelevancy toward trying to disprove the
clear import of Scripture toward the development of true doctrine. To this twofold purpose, Pelikan might also add a
third, stating, ". . . it is significant that when the opinions of ancient philosophers, dramists, or poets seemed to
coincide with his own, Luther was perfectly willing to cite
41LW 27, p. 390 [WA 2, 604, 9-11]: ". . . And would
that the Thomists, the Scotists, and the moderns would thus
settle their question whether universals are real things or
are terms predicated indifferently of real things! Man is
man. Flesh is flesh. Flesh has never done anything that
similar flesh would not do wherever God did not make a distinction."
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such opinions as evidence."
Limitations
This chapter of the present work has established that
Luther was not altogether intolerant in the use of ratio in
applied theology, even as ratio might be used in a manner in
some ways consistent with philosophy. Human reason was seen
to remain a gift from God, which enables man to infer truths
based upon what can be observed and experienced. It has also
been shown in the preceding pages, that reason was held to be
incompetent in matters of faith: that such truths as lay
outside the realm of the empirical were dependent upon the
revelation from God, if man was to know articles of faith
with any certitude.
As Luther considers the propriety of coupling philosophical method with theological defense and investigation,
he establishes clear limitations as being essential before
any such co-operative endeavor can take place. Above all do
the mottos "Let God be God" [pages 67-70 above] and "Sola
Scriptura" [pages 104-106 above] hold places of prominence
in Luther-an theology. A shining example of these guidelines
in action is found in the Galatians Commentary (1519), where
the Reformer expostulates the meaning of Paul's words of
Galatians 3:5-7.43 In that place, Luther asserts that Paul
42Luther to Kierkegaard, p. 13.
43LW 27, pp. 251-253; WA 2, 510-511; the Biblical
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does not follow the rules of logical argumentation in making
the point, that the righteous are made such apart from any
similarity of action (or ancestry) with Abraham--that only
the Spirit's action brings the grace of God to men. The
Reformer surmises that the formulation "Abraham believed;
therefore those who are of faith are the children of Abraham"
simply does not stand up to logical analysis.
Luther's point appears to be this: that truths given
to man via God's revelation must not be expected to square
with human reason or logic. Some things exceed man's grasp,
and are better left for faith to take hold, rather than for
ratio to gain the upper hand. Above all, reason must yield
to the incomprehensible nature of the Gospel. Especially at
this point, Luther is apt to quote Colossians 2:8: "See to
it that no one makes a prey of you by philosophy and empty
deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elements of the world, and not according to Christ."44 Here
again we see that Luther's primary concern is, above all
else, of a soteriological nature. That concern is reflected
in his stern words against Erasmus:
passage is rendered in that location: "[5] Does He who supplies the Spirit to you and works miracles among you do so
by works of the Law or by hearing with faith? [6] Just as
Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned to him as righteousness. [7] So you see that it is men of faith who are the
sons of Abraham."
44LW 27, p. 285; WA 2, 533. 12-13.
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Your craft and cunning may gain forbearance in secular
matters, but in a theological discussion, where plain
straightforward truth is required, for the salvation of
souls, it is supremely objectionable and intolerable.45
Here, this writer allows Luther to have that last word on
the matter of his own theological guidelines for the use of
reason and philosophy in matters that concern man's relationship with God.
45BOW, p. 221; WA 18, 721, 31.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Martin Luther lived in a time when the Copernican
revolution in the field of astronomy still lay in the future;
and yet, as Brian Gerrish suggests, Luther gave rise to a
'Copernican Revolution' of his own--in the field of theology.
According to Gerrish, Luther's great achievement was, above
all else, his substitution of a God-centered Christianity for
the man-centered religion of the Schoolmen of the Middle
Ages.1

That summation of Luther's approach to Biblical

theology is apt, especially when considering the topic of the
present work. The preceding pages have offered a survey of
the Reformer's understanding of the proper use of ratio within the realm of theological method and discourse; and what
has been shown as the focal point throughout that discussion
was Luther's keen awareness of man's relationship to God
since the Fall. Those who had seen no apparent contradiction
between the truth claims of philosophy and theology had not
(in Luther's view) taken seriously enough the magnitude of
sin's effect upon mankind; and because of that major error
1Brian Albert Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in
the Theology of Luther (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 2.
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in judgment, the theologians of the Middle Ages had developed
a system of thought which had placed reasonable speculation
on the same plain of authority with God's revelation.
Luther's primary concern over the marriage of philosophy with theology was of a soteriological nature. The
theologians of his era had brought the man-centered presuppositions of philosophical speculation to bear upon the very
word of God: and all to the detriment of the saving proclamation of the Gospel. Allowing fallen ratio the privilege of
guiding man's thoughts about God, was bound to bring about
the total removal of the Gospel [salvation by grace, for
Christ's sake, through faith alone] from its pivotal position
as the very heart of the Christian proclamation. Although
human reason remains, even since the Fall in Eden, as a gift
from God--and man's highest attribute, distinguishing him
from the animal kingdom of the creation--it, too, has suffered the dire consequences of man's sin. Corrupted by the
self-centered essence of sin, reason distorts the image it
has of God, and of man's relationship to Him. Thinking his
situation before God not to be as serious as the Scriptures
proclaim, unregenerate man stands as an enemy of the Gospel,
desiring to rely upon works of the Law to make his relationship with God right again. That God should have to take up
the task of reconciling man to Himself solely by His efforts
(especially by way of a cross) is the ultimate absurdity to
fallen reason. This Luther seemed to know more than anyone
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else at his time.
Of course, even in Luther-an theology, reason has its
place. Those who would accuse Luther of irrationalism do not
take into consideration the profound use of reason that is
prevalent throughout the works under consideration in the
current thesis. In Chapter Five, Luther's widespread use of
reasonable argumentation as a secondary proof for the doctrine of Scripture was outlined. However, in that section
careful distinctions were drawn between the "epistemology"
of philosophy and theology. It appears that Luther held a
"nominalistic" evaluation of that which can be known through
philosophy: that man is able to know with certitude only that
which is empirical, that is, gathered through observation and
experience. For theology, God's revelation of Himself to man
must remain the ultimate standard of truth; for God is able
to reveal more to man than the latter is capable of determining through introspection and observation.
In the same vein, Chapter Four surveyed Luther's
critique of reason's competence in the realm of Biblical
interpretation. Even in this sphere of theological inquiry,
ratio serves a useful purpose; for God has made revelation
of Himself in such a way as intelligible to human reason,
through the use of human language that in its basic proclamation is clearly understood by the human mind. Yet, there are
certain articles of faith that remain incomprehensible to
ratio, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, the Real Presence
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in the Lord's Supper, and (especially) the Gospel itself.
Luther did not attempt to explain such articles of faith; nor
did he find much use for speculation about things which God
has not directly revealed to man through His word. "What is
above us does not concern us" [see page 68]. The Divine
exceeds man's grasp. God has chosen to remain hidden in some
ways from man.
The later Lutheran systematicians condensed quite
well the Reformer's view of the use of reason in theology in
their formulations which distinguish the so-called 'usus rationis ministerialis' from the 'usus rationis magisterialis'
[pages 81-82]. The former term refers to reason's proper
sphere of competency in theological questions, as it acts as
a servant to God's revelation, and does not attempt to usurp
authority to itself in determining what is true about God
and His relationship to man. In this realm, man not only is
able to interpret the language of Scripture, but even
unregenerate man is able to judge over civil affairs, and to
otherwise exercise his God-given dominion over the creation
in which he lives.
The 'magisterial' use of reason is the converse position of the 'ministerial': that is, when ratio oversteps its
bounds of competency and becomes supreme judge over what is
'true,' even at the expense of Scriptural statements to the
contrary. It is reason acting in this capacity that draws
Luther's adamant attacks, and upon which the Reformer bestows
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the names "White Devil," "the Devil's whore," "Frau Hulda,"
"Madam Reason," and so forth [pages 87-89]. When ratio is
given license to determine 'right' doctrine on a plain equal
to the revelation of God, the Gospel itself is at stake.
Being no friend of the Gospel (it is utter foolishness to
unenlightened reason), fallen reason--in its magisterial use
--is no friend to Luther.
One scholar points to what he calls the "two-fold
advice" that Luther has for all who come to search for truth
in theology: (1) leave alone all speculation and inquiry into
God's hidden purposes, and confine all attention to what He
has revealed and affirmed in His word; and (2) remember that
2 The central
theology is ultimately a matter of eschatology.
concern of theology is man's relationship with God, that will
climax in the believer's being received into heaven by Christ
at the last. And whatever is unknown to man in this present
world, will be at last revealed to him in glory! This writer
feels certain that Martin Luther understands this all the
more . . . now.
Some Remaining Questions
The focus of this thesis was to give a presentation
of Luther's view as to the proper place of the use of ratio
in theology, as can be determined by the Galatians Commentary
(1519), On the Bondage of the Will, and the Disputation Con2James I. Packer, "Luther Against Erasmus," Concordia
Theological Monthly 37 (April 1966):207-221.
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cerning Man. Thus, the subject of the current project was
necessarily narrowed for the sake of manageability. But any
such limiting of the topic and source material comes at a
price. In the case of the present survey of Luther's understanding of the use of reason in theology, that cost is reflected in several significant questions which will have to
remain unanswered until a future endeavor is able to treat
them adequately.
One of the most intriguing of these questions, for
this writer, has to do with the development of Lutheran
theology after the Reformer's death: recognizing that Philip
Melanchthon was an integral part of the systematizing of
Lutheran theology, it would be important to discover the
parallels and dissimilarities of Melanchthon's views concerning the place of reason in theology, as contrasted with
Luther's. The present thesis has shown, to no small extent,
that Luther's view of reason is not a dogmatic statement in
isolation from other questions, but is instead integral to
his entire theological structure and method. If the same is
true for Melanchthon, then perhaps this is an important factor for his taking mediating positions with theologians at
variance with Luther's theology after the latter's death.
Other questions are perhaps of more pertinence to
our present day, such as What relationship does Luther's
view of ratio have to current "Lutheran" theological method
and doctrine? Are there any true "Luther-ans" in present-day
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theology? To what extent has Luther's view of reason helped
to give shape to theological practice in the various circles
of Lutheranism today? What changes, if any, would need to
be effected in current Lutheran theology, if that system
were to be brought back into line with Luther's concept of
reason?
Another class of questions has to do with Luther
himself: specifically, Since no perceivable difference in
understanding of the use of ratio in theology is present in
the writings surveyed in the current thesis, is it true that
during Luther's entire career after the posting of the
Ninety-five Theses he maintained a uniform view of human reason? Would a comparison of the present work with Luther's
earlier lectures--those before the year 1517--yield any differences in insight?
And, finally, there are the queries of speculation,
which though they can never be answered with certitude, are
interesting, nonetheless. To what extent was Luther influenced by his predecessors in giving shape to his theological
method and insight? Where would Luther have stood in the
later controversies within the Lutheran church? Would Luther
have joined in the later questioning of the inspiration and
inerrency of Scriptures, or would he have continued to equate
them with the word of God? Interesting questions, all.
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